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Abstract 
This thesis examines the adherence of credit unions to their co-operative 
principles.  Noting the financial crisis of 2008 and the calls for change to a more 
ethical, transparent and fairer financial industry co-operatives appear to be a 
plausible way forward.  The analysis of the corporate governance of co-operatives 
indicates that they are founded on co-operative principles, the cornerstone being 
the active participation by its members.  The study of the previous literature 
demonstrates instances where co-operatives did not adhere to their principles as 
well as instances where members were not very active.  Credit unions in Cyprus 
were selected as the specific co-operative industry and geographic location for the 
collection of data; one of the reasons being that in March 2013, six months prior to 
the first collection of data, Cyprus suffered a second financial crisis, giving the 
opportunity to investigate these two issues in a time of scrutiny and pressure.  
Structured interviews with thirty credit union employees, documents (statistics) 
from the ex-supervisory body and three focus groups with thirty members (in total) 
were carried out. The findings show that credit unions do not seem to adhere to 
their principles and members do not seem to be actively involved with their credit 
unions.  As the warning bells for their long-term survival may have already 
sounded, credit unions must encourage their members to get involved, rebuild 
their trust amongst them, among membership and the society in general, provide 
co-operative-related training and restrict the involvement of the political parties.  
Finally, ways must be found so that credit unions remain closely involved with the 
societies they serve.  To this extent, Service-Dominant Logic is proposed as a 
possible way in assisting credit unions to re-focus on their membership. 
 
Keywords: 
Co-operatives, credit unions, co-operative principles, member 
involvement/participation, corporate governance, Service-Dominant Logic. 
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Chapter 1: Setting the scene 
1.1 Co-operatives 
“A co-operative is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet 
their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations through a 
jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise”. 
(International Co-operative Alliance (ICA, 2011) 
Co-operatives are perceived as unique in creating and fostering long-term 
relationships of trust with their members (Hansmann, 1988; Spear, 2000; Jones, 
2001; Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; EACB, 2010; Xiang 
and Sumelius, 2010; Sacchetti and Tortia; 2012; Achleitner et al., 2012; Bijman et 
al., 2012a; 2012b; Borzaga and Galera, 2012; Ferri, 2012; Sabatini, Modena and 
Tortia, 2014; Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014).  Moreover, co-operatives aim to 
improve their members’ financial position and to raise their social status (Taylor, 
1971; Papageorgiou, 2004; Harvey and Sykuta, 2005; Fonteyne, 2007; Alexopoulos 
and Goglio, 2011), e.g., by allocating capital to their members for productive uses 
(Cabo and Rebelo, 2015).  Co-operatives seem to be capable of representing 
multiple and even conflicting economic or social objectives (Hogeland, 2006), but 
they are particularly good in instances where members’ interests are homogeneous 
(Holmstrom, 1999).  Additionally, co-operatives are good in areas that are 
geographically and socially segmented (Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011) or in areas 
that are sporadically populated (Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014), such as the remote 
rural areas of India (Talwar, 2011).  Overall, it can be argued that co-operatives 
assist in the alleviation of problems associated with poor market structure (Harte, 
1997) and they allow their members negotiating power (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  
Historically, co-operatives have been created by members coming together, e.g., 
farmers and artisans (Fonteyne and Hardy, 2011), sometimes as was the case in 
Greece, supported by the small local industry and local chambers of commerce 
(Karafolas, 2005), to either counteract the excess bargaining power of trading 
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partners or to combat opportunism (Cook, 1995).  Through the years, co-operatives 
have grown around the world based on their shared principles rather than on a 
common legal basis and this has contributed to their variety of purpose (Shaw, 
2007).   
Co-operatives are distinctive organisations as they are member-controlled and 
owned (Harvey and Sykuta, 2005; Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014) and their members 
enjoy a double identity: that of owners and users (Holmstrom, 1999).  Co-
operatives sometimes are even identified as dual associative and entrepreneurial in 
nature (Shaw, 2007) and three features distinguish them from other types of 
organizations.  Firstly, co-operatives are characterised by three principles: the 
user-owner principle according to which those providing finance to a co-operative 
are also the users of its services; secondly, the user-control principle in which case 
those using the services of the co-operative are also the ones controlling it; and 
thirdly, the user-benefits principle, where the benefits arising from the co-
operative are returned to the users of the services based on their usage (Nilsson, 
1996).  It could be the case that the biggest advantage of co-operatives is that 
their value in usage is much bigger than their value in exchange, i.e. members 
benefit from the co-operative by using its services rather than through the 
appreciation of its value (Pellervo, 2000; Harvey and Sykuta, 2005; Yair and Davis, 
2008).  This is because, co-operatives serve their clients/owners based on personal 
relationships thus, minimizing the effects of information asymmetry and the agency 
problem (EACB, 2010; Ferri, 2012).   
A second differentiating factor is that co-operatives are perceived as having two 
natures: economic and social (Taylor, 1971).  The social element allows members 
to get together to achieve specific common goals and the economic element 
ensures that this new entity is able to accomplish their common goals, i.e. its 
raison d-être (Yair and Davis, 2008).  In other words, the not-for-profit nature of 
the co-operatives stems from the subordination of the economic element to the 
social element and the oxymoron is that co-operatives are too social to be included 
in the for-profit organisations and too economic to be considered as not-for-profit 
organisations (Yair and Davis, 2008).   
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The third differentiating factor of co-operatives is their subsidiary nature. That is, 
co-operatives argue that they make economic decisions on the basis of what is best 
for their members (Taylor, 1971, Nilsson, 1996), providing personal service to them 
(Hogeland, 2006).  Subsidiary nature may also mean that co-operatives can be seen 
as an extension of their members’ economic activities, as co-operatives do not 
have a profit motive of their own and they exist for the economic and social 
benefit of their members (Taylor, 1971; Papageorgiou, 2004).  For example, co-
operatives are able to reduce the transaction costs for their members and to build 
up enough critical mass for more effective bargaining (Valentinov, 2007), i.e. the 
economic strength of a co-operative is larger than the sum of its members’ 
economic abilities (Papageorgiou, 2004).  Based on the above analysis, it can be 
seen that co-operatives are very important for the well-being of their members, 
something however, that puts additional pressure for their effective functioning 
and co-operative governance.   
 
1.2 Co-operative governance 
The governance of co-operatives is so important that, Co-operatives UK issued the 
“Corporate Governance Handbook” (Co-operatives UK, 2010) and it is, at least, as 
important in co-operatives as in investor-owned-organisations (Mswaka and Aluko, 
2015).  Governance has been widely discussed and defined (Roe, 2004; FSA, 2007; 
Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; Shaw, 2007; Leviten-Reid and Fairbairn, 2011; 
Hanisch and Muller, 2012; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014; Mswaka and Aluko, 
2015).  For example, Spear, Cornforth and Aiken (2007, p.6) define governance as 
“the systems and processes concerned with ensuring the overall direction, 
supervision and accountability of an organisation”.  Typically, co-operative 
governance consists of a Members’ Annual General Meeting during which the Board 
of Directors is elected from amongst members (Shaw, 2007).   
Despite that the principles state what should be done, in practice members of a co-
operative have little influence, if any, over the Board of Directors and hence 
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cannot control the management of their co-operative (Spear, 2004b; JeanNoel and 
Lemzeri, 2012), or its capital (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Fonteyne, 2007).  This 
lack of control can lead to managers investing large amounts of idle cash in 
unprofitable ventures (“free cash flow hypothesis”) (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  
So, too, it can result in “empire building”, i.e. creating and accumulating profits 
for no other reason than their managers’ aggressiveness and power seeking.  Even 
worse, the lack of members’ participation leaves the door open for the 
misappropriation of assets by managers (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Fonteyne, 2007; 
Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009; Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011; Ferri, 2012).  The 
situation may become even worse in cases where, e.g., due to lack of competence, 
instead of controlling management, the Board of Directors is effectively controlled 
by it (Gutiérrez, 2008).  Another factor that contributes to the ineffectiveness of 
co-operative governance is the lack of external pressure on management, e.g., by 
an influential stakeholder (Bijman et al., 2012a) or by a takeover, as the restriction 
on voting and ownership rights eliminates this possibility (Spear, 2004b; Gutiérrez, 
2008) (see also Section 2.2.1).  The effectiveness of co-operative governance can 
be further reduced by the political aspirations, collusion, and personal agendas of 
the Board of Directors (Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009; 2011) as well as their 
preferential treatment of stakeholders (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009).  Finally, 
co-operative governance may be further weakened due to the involvement of 
political parties, e.g., in the direction and management of co-operatives (Korres, 
1999; Stefancic, 2011) or even in the choice of Board of Directors (Pellervo, 2000), 
rendering their governance much more complex and questionable (Shaw, 2007) and 
the co-operatives ineffective (Kamenidis, 1991 as cited in Karafolas, 2005; Klimis, 
1991 as cited in Karafolas, 2005).   
In addition to the effects of lack of member control, co-operative governance also 
suffers from lack of research.  Existing literature has been criticized for 
underestimating the different member pressures and demands, for oversimplifying 
problems and for offering solutions that are difficult to implement (Cornforth, 
2002).  Furthermore, much of the available literature on governance is prescriptive 
(Cornforth, 2002; 2004; Spear et al., 2004) and it aims, merely, to address the 
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perceived drawbacks of governing bodies (Cornforth, 2002).  More recently, it has 
been argued that research on the corporate governance of not-for-profit 
organisations (including co-operatives) is limited both with respect to the way the 
research has been carried out and to the way co-operative governance has been 
conceptualized, placing too much emphasis on the Board of Directors and ignoring 
the wider governance environment (Cornforth, 2012).  Moreover, various studies 
question whether the democratic governance model (as it is adopted by co-
operatives) is anyhow consistent with the open market and contemporary practices 
(Mswaka and Aluko, 2015).  For these reasons, a number of researchers (Cornforth, 
2002; 2003; 2004; 2012; Spear et al., 2004; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; 
2009; Malo and Vezina, 2004; Bataille-Chedotel and Huntzinger, 2004; Leviten-Reid 
and Fairbairn, 2011; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Mswaka and Aluko, 2015; 
Aldashev, Marini and Verdier, 2015) claim that, even today, co-operative 
governance is under-researched.  Specifically, Spear et al. (2004, p.5-6) argue that 
the empirical perspectives “relating to governance… have only been explored to a 
relatively small extent in the social economy”, while Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2013) 
agree that there is lack of literature on the corporate governance of co-operatives.  
Along the same lines, Aldashev, Marini and Verdier (2015, p.3) claim that despite 
the significance of not-for-profit organisations “our knowledge of their governance, 
and of its’ implications for their behaviour is still quite limited”.  So, too, Mswaka 
and Aluko (2015, p.57-58) maintain that there is lack of academic knowledge on 
the co-operative governance model: “to date, there is paucity of empirical 
research scrutinising how nature of social enterprise governance affects its 
operations”.  Having set out the importance of co-operative governance structure, 
the next section will focus on the level of co-operatives’ adherence to their 
founding principles, which in turn will lead to the research intent. 
 
1.3 Co-operative principles and research intent 
As discussed above, the quality and the effectiveness of the co-operative 
governance structure depends on the active participation of members.  This is due 
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to the fact that management, as a result of members’ participation, remains under 
control and aligned to latters’ wishes.  Simultaneously, active member 
participation acts as a pressure mechanism ensuring that co-operatives follow their 
founding principles.  The adherence to co-operative principles leads management 
to focus on members’ needs, reinforcing active member participation, which in 
turn leads to an even closer adherence of co-operatives to their founding 
principles.  Hence, the present study examines two related areas: adherence to co-
operative principles and members’ participation.   
1.3.1 Adherence to co-operative principles 
Co-operative principles can be considered as guidelines for all types of co-
operatives as, in effect, they represent the compacted wisdom of international 
experience (Korres, 1999).  Moreover, co-operative principles represent the 
common characteristic of co-operatives around the world (Parnell, 1995; Korres, 
1999; Co-operative Commission, 2001; Fajardo Garcia, 2012) and form the basis of 
the co-operatives’ differentiation in relation to investor-owned organizations 
(Nilsson, 1996; Korres, 1999; Fajardo Garcia, 2012), rendering their 
implementation of paramount importance.  Moreover, co-operative principles 
empower members to exert greater influence over decision-making (Spear, 2000), 
enhancing members’ feeling of ownership and identification with the organization 
(Gray, 1998; Spear, 2000).  This means that by adhering to the co-operative 
principles the co-operative movement can accomplish its objectives (CSSDA, 2005), 
it can facilitate its operations and its growth (Drossopoulou, 1989) and overcome 
difficult situations it is faced with (CSSDA, 2005).  By embedding these principles in 
their operations, (Co-operative Commission, 2001) co-operatives could contribute 
to their members’ better understanding of the co-operative culture and hence 
increase their willingness to remain as members (Cicognani et al., 2012).  Finally, 
for a co-operative to succeed (Moroney et al., 2009), the co-operative principles 
must be communicated in a clear and simple way (Parnell, 1995) and, membership 
must support them (Co-operative Commission, 2001).   
Page 15 of 297 
 
The present study acknowledges the importance of the practical adherence of co-
operative principles, thus proposing to research this issue in greater depth 
especially as there are indications of the opposite, i.e. that co-operatives do not 
adhere to their principles.  These indications may explain the lack of member 
engagement, e.g., Hogeland (2006) and Wilson and MacLean (2012) conclude that 
members use co-operatives for more self-motivated reasons than the literature 
proclaims, i.e. members use co-operatives as a defence mechanism in order to 
remain independent.  More specifically, Wilson and MacLean (2012), researching 
mainly producer co-operatives established in rural and island areas of Scotland, 
found that members were not concerned about co-operative principles.  According 
to Wilson and MacLean (2012, p.539), “the principles of co-operatives are 
fundamental to the founders of the co-operative but as time passes these become 
less visible and important”.  Similarly, Cabo and Rebelo (2015) found evidence 
that, in Portugal, the fundamental differences of co-operatives in relation to 
investor-owned bank are diluted over time, with level of profits becoming the most 
important success indicator.  Additionally, Gray (1998) having researched 1,156 
farmers that were members in co-operatives, found that almost half (49%) of the 
co-operative members did not consider that their co-operative was different from 
any other organisational structure.  Furthermore, only 60% of the co-operative 
members preferred a co-operative approach rather than an individualistic approach 
(Gray, 1998).   
Hence, it can be said that without proper adherence to co-operative principles, the 
distinctive nature of co-operatives is lost, members refrain from engaging in their 
co-operative and thus, co-operative governance becomes less effective, leading to 
even more member alienation.  Thus, this raises questions about the adherence of 
“credit co-operatives to their democratic principles that characterize them” 
(Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 2008, p.31).  Considering the importance of co-
operative principles for the long-term survival of co-operatives, the intention of 
the present study is to understand the perceptions with regards to the adherence 
of co-operatives to their founding principles.   
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1.3.2 Members’ participation 
The 2nd principle, “Democratic members’ control”, is the key to effective 
governance structure and the proper functioning of co-operatives because 
members’ loyalty and active participation are vital for the success of co-operatives 
(Hakelius, 1996 cited in Bhuyan, 2007).  Therefore, there is a need for a number of 
active stakeholders with vision and the necessary skills to effectively provide 
direction and lead the organisation to its growth (Jones, 1999; Alexopoulos and 
Goglio, 2011).   
Co-operatives must find ways to keep their members involved, e.g., through 
encouraging members to participate and through introduction of qualified 
independent members on the Board of Directors (Fonteyne, 2007; Shaw, 2007; 
Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011), otherwise there will be problems with their 
governance (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009).  In general, there are many reasons 
behind members’ lack of participation including mismanagement, fraud and 
opportunism (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012) as well as the pursuit of management 
goals, while setting aside members’ satisfaction, needs and opinions (Bhuyan, 
2007).  Other reasons for the disconnection of members from their co-operative 
include lack of alignment between management values and those of its members as 
well as high agency costs, i.e. the costs of monitoring and ensuring management, 
acts as it should (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012).  Additionally, the size of a co-
operative could cause members feeling powerless to influence its decisions 
(Borgen, 2011; Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011).  Moreover, there are indications that 
as size and geographical dispersion of members increases, the common 
bond/linkage is lost.  Thus, members start to distance themselves from the 
management of their co-operative, handing more power to professional 
management (Spear, 2004b; Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 2008).  The resulting lack 
of contact between members and management prevents members from properly 
understanding the reasoning behind the decisions of the co-operative, thus creating 
even more member alienation (Hakelius, 1996, cited in Bhuyan, 2007; Alexopoulos, 
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2004; Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012).  What is more, the loss of the local character of 
co-operatives, due to the expansion into new areas, may also be another possible 
reason for members not willing to participate (Fonteyne and Hardy, 2011).   
Additionally, members’ lack of participation could be caused by the shorter 
investment horizon (horizon problem) faced by older members (Osterberg and 
Nilsson, 2009).  The horizon problem is created where a member’s benefits from an 
asset (future cash inflows and/or disposal value) are less than the required 
investment in the specific asset.  Hence, members have a disincentive to invest in 
the co-operative or they may prefer to invest for short-term rather than long-term 
periods (Cook, 1995; Harte, 1997; Borgen, 2011).  In such a case, members free 
ride, as they feel that, even though they have contributed to the increase in the 
net worth of their co-operative, they are not entitled to their share of this increase 
in value (Cook, 1995; Harte, 1997; Borgen, 2004; 2011).  Osterberg and Nilsson 
(2009) agree with the above, as findings showed that the more satisfied members 
are with their transactions with the co-operative, the higher their commitment 
towards it.   
One last reason for members’ lack of participation could be that co-operatives do 
not provide the service that members require.  This means that it is up to credit 
unions to find ways to attract and maintain their members by offering services and 
products that are of value to these members.  Hence, co-operatives should offer 
their members new ways to co-create value and give them as many opportunities 
as possible to create meaningful/memorable experiences with their credit unions 
(Payne et al., 2009).  Based on the above, Osterberg and Nilsson (2009, p.195) 
conclude that there is need for further research on member involvement as “such 
studies concern the very survival of the co-operative business model”.   
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1.4 Structure of present thesis 
Having briefly analysed the research intent in Chapter 1, the structure of the rest 
of the present study is as follows.  In Chapter 2, the co-operatives governance 
system is further analysed, highlighting the challenges it faces and the factors that 
influence its choice (the stage in an organisation’s life cycle, ways available to 
control management, the high number of stakeholders and the lack of market 
pressure).  Additionally, the role and challenges faced by the Board of Directors are 
examined along with the various co-operative governance models that exist today, 
followed by an explanation of the seven co-operative principles.  Finally, the 
commonalities among co-operatives and Service-Dominant Logic (S-D Logic) are 
explored, indicating the explicit link between participation of members as owner-
customers and service provision within the co-operative. 
In Chapter 3, the importance of the practical implementation of co-operative 
principles is explained, highlighting the need for more academic research.  
Furthermore, the research intent of the present study as well as the two research 
questions are explained; followed by a discussion on the contribution of the 
present study to the existing academic knowledge and practice. 
In Chapter 4, the geographical area and the type of co-operatives to be used in the 
collection of data for the present study are discussed.  The reasons for choosing 
Cyprus as the geographical location for data collection are explained, including an 
examination of the economy of Cyprus in relation to the financial breakdown of 
March 2013, as well as the importance of the co-operative sector to the local 
economy.  Following, the calls for change in the financial industry are highlighted 
looking into the need for a more transparent, ethical and fairer banking sector.  As 
financial co-operatives could represent a plausible solution to these calls, they are 
evaluated against investor-owned banks, their special features, their importance, 
their presence in the UK and their use in the collection of data for the present 
study.   
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In Chapter 5, the research approach is discussed, highlighting issues such as 
research paradigms, epistemology, ontology and research design.  Additionally, the 
present study analyses the characteristics of quality of research, the process of 
data analysis as well as issues relating to reliability, replication and validity, 
including triangulation, trustworthiness, informed consent and confidentiality.  
Finally, the research methods used in collecting the data for the present study are 
discussed.  
In Chapter 6, the results of each of the three research methods (structured 
individual interviews, documents and focus groups) are analysed in relation to the 
two research questions.  This is done ensuring that the results of each of the three 
methods are kept separately from each other and from the discussion. 
In Chapter 7, the results of the present research are discussed and compared to the 
existing literature, indicating similarities and differences in findings.  Additionally, 
the contributions to practice as well as the possibilities for further research and 
the limitations of the present study are set out and explained.  
 
1.5 Summary 
In this Chapter, co-operatives were presented as distinctive organisations that are 
member-controlled and member-owned.  Co-operatives aim at improving their 
members’ financial position and at raising their social status, whilst contributing to 
the social and economic development of the surrounding community.  Additionally, 
co-operatives are perceived as unique in creating and fostering long-term 
relationships of trust with their members and are created by members coming 
together to counteract the excess bargaining power of trading partners and to 
combat opportunism.  It appears that the biggest advantage of co-operatives is that 
their members benefit by using its services; that co-operatives are perceived as 
having two natures: economic and social and lastly, co-operatives argue that they 
make economic decisions on the basis of what is best for their members.   
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What is more, there was an analysis of co-operative governance, which typically 
consists of the Annual General Meeting of members.  Governance-related problems 
could include the fact that, in practice, members of a co-operative have little 
influence, if any, over the Board of Directors and hence cannot control 
management.  Another problem identified is that the governance of co-operatives 
is an under-researched academic area.  
In order to overcome the aforementioned problems, the present study aims to 
search two related areas: adherence to co-operative principles and members’ 
participation.  Possible reasons for this lack of participation include 
mismanagement, fraud and opportunism, pursuit of management goals, lack of 
alignment between management values and those of its members and the shorter 
investment horizon faced by older members.  Additionally, the large size of a co-
operative, the loss of the local character of co-operatives and of members’ 
cohesion could have a negative impact on their willingness to participate. 
Hence, in the following Chapter, the governance structure of co-operatives 
including the factors influencing its choice, the various governance models and the 
issues related to the Board of Directors are discussed in more depth.  Moreover, the 
co-operative principles will be analysed and explained, in order to indicate how the 
research questions have been formed. 
Page 21 of 297 
 
Chapter 2: Co-operative governance and principles 
2.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1, co-operatives, their governance structure, their non-adherence to 
their founding co-operative principles as well as members’ lack of participation 
were discussed.  In this Chapter, the co-operative governance system is further 
analysed, highlighting the challenges the co-operative governance system faces.  
Furthermore, the seven co-operative principles are analysed and explained, as well 
as the commonalities of co-operatives and Service-Dominant Logic, leading to the 
formation of the two research questions. 
 
2.2 Co-operative governance revisited 
The issue of governance is as old as the separation of management from ownership 
(Pellervo, 2000).  The most important aspect of governance in co-operatives is the 
active involvement of members.  Bijman et al. (2014) specifically argue that the 
internal governance’s function is to exert effective control by members-patrons 
over the important co-operative decisions, providing enough discretion to 
management to run the operations of the co-operative.  Similarly, Itkonen (1996) 
states that governance ensures co-operative performance and relevance by 
connecting members, employees, management and representatives to the decision-
making, strategy and policy processes.  Chaves, Soler and Sajardo (2008, p.31), add 
that good governance is “governance that achieves the maximum level of economic 
performance compatible with the preservation or development of the co-operative 
identity, particularly maintaining democratic decision-making principles”.  Despite 
its importance, choosing and implementing the most appropriate governance 
structure/model is a very difficult and complex task (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 
2007; 2009; Bijman et al., 2012b), as there are many factors that influence its 
choice.   
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2.2.1 Factors influencing the choice of governance model 
The boundaries of the co-operative corporate governance are set out by the co-
operative principle of democratic member control and participation (Sacchetti and 
Tortia, 2015), as well as by the objectives and purpose of co-operatives (Itkonen, 
1996).  However, a co-operative governance system cannot be implemented “as 
is”, i.e. one size does not fit all, or even the same organisation over time, but 
rather they must be adjusted to reflect the organisation’s origins, its history, the 
cultural, social, economic contexts, applicable regulation and legislation as well as 
the level of member homogeneity (Spear, 2004b; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; 
Leviten-Reid and Fairbairn, 2011; Achleitner et al., 2012; Bijman et al., 2012a; 
2012b).  Moreover, the choice of the governance model to be adopted, depends on 
the (number of) goals of the co-operative, as numerous goals may result in a 
complex incentive system for management, in the loss of members’ strategic focus, 
in members’ apathy (free riding) and in cosy relationships between the Board of 
Directors and management (Spear, 2004b).   
The governance model is influenced by the stage of the co-operative’s life cycle, 
reflecting the level of members’ active participation.  That is, soon after the 
formation of a new co-operative, the founder members have full control and 
authority, as they are directly involved in all aspects, fuelled by their activism and 
commitment (Malo and Vezina, 2004; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007).  This 
direct involvement of members, in small and traditional co-operatives, reduces the 
managerial opportunism and the costs of monitoring and collective decision-
making, in contrast to that of larger and more complex co-operatives (Nilsson and 
Svendsen, 2011; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  However, small co-operatives are 
not free of governance problems, as the role of the Board of Directors is not always 
well defined, resulting in less strategic thinking and in its involvement in 
operational issues (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007) that have a negative impact 
on the effectiveness of the governance structure.  Later on and once a co-
operative is established, management and employees become salaried, the Board 
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of Directors becomes less involved in the day-to-day operations, thus strengthening 
the position of management (Malo and Vezina, 2004; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 
2007).  However, the management’s strengthening may confine the authority of the 
Board of Directors to that of rubber-stamping management decisions, instead of 
challenging management’s strategies and policies (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, Cornforth 
and Aiken, 2007).  Additionally, when a co-operative becomes large, membership 
engagement becomes difficult as the larger the membership, its heterogeneity and 
its geographical disparity, the less active members become (Bataille-Chedotel and 
Huntzinger, 2004; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; Nilsson and Svendsen, 2011) 
creating the need for a more robust governance structure.  Birchall and Simmons 
(2004) do not agree indicating that co-operatives seem to continue to be truly 
member-controlled and owned no matter how large they become. 
Another important parameter to be taken into account when deciding on the 
governance structure of a co-operative is the fact that the not-for-profit nature of 
co-operatives forces them to design and implement more complex mechanisms 
than the equivalent investor-owned enterprises (Hanisch and Muller, 2012; Bijman 
et al., 2012a; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).  Further to Section 1.2, this is 
firstly due to the fact that there are almost no external mechanisms, e.g., 
acquisitions and mergers that could control management (Cook, 1995; Harte, 1997; 
Spear, 2004b; Hanisch and Muller, 2012; Bijman et al., 2012a; Bijman, Hanisch and 
Sangen, 2014, Cabo and Rebelo, 2014).  That is, there is no “market for corporate 
control” (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007, p.57).  Secondly, there is no pressure 
on management from a dominant external stakeholder, as Boards of Directors 
represent numerous stakeholders, with different aims (Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 
2008; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009).  The most important reason for this 
inability stems from the co-operatives’ non-for-profit nature, firstly because it 
renders the market price of shares as a not valid measure of performance and 
secondly, the one-member, one-vote principle prevents hostile takeovers (Cabo 
and Rebelo, 2014). 
Other factors that affect co-operative governance include the number of 
stakeholders in a co-operative and the presence of non-member investors.  
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Traditionally, co-operatives had only one stakeholder but, recently, the creation of 
community and social co-operatives have created multi-stakeholder co-operatives 
(Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007), increasing the heterogeneity of members’ 
demands (Leviten-Reid and Fairbairn, 2011).  This heterogeneity has also increased 
the influence on the Board of Directors, by members, in pursuit of their own self-
interests (Cook, 1995; Borgen, 2011).  Additionally, as a result of recent changes, 
the existence of outside investors influence the choice of governance structure, as 
sometimes they are allowed to participate in the share capital of the co-
operatives, in the form of preferred shares, voting or income rights (Bijman et al., 
2012a).  Moreover, the choice of governance structure is influenced by the profile 
of the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, that is, whether it promotes 
collective decision-making and entrepreneurship or it follows a command and 
control style (Bataille-Chedotel and Huntzinger, 2004).  In general, the choice of 
governance structure should reflect the level of management opportunism costs, 
the effectiveness and the composition of the Board of Directors, the accessible 
main resources and the types of markets served (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 
2007).  Having analysed the factors influencing the choice of governance structure, 
the focus of the next section will be on the various co-operative governance models 
that exist. 
2.2.2 Co-operative governance models 
Co-operatives are characterized by their horizontal and inclusive governance 
(Sabatini, Modena and Tortia, 2014).  Four different co-operative governance 
models exist: the traditional, the extended traditional, the managerial and the 
corporate model.   
A key characteristic of the traditional model is the significant power that is 
concentrated in the hands of the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, acting as 
CEO, with no maximum term of office (Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).  In this 
model, only members are allowed to take any decisions and hence, no non-member 
executive or professional director can be employed (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  
In particular, the traditional model provides for three governing bodies, that is, the 
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members’ General Meeting, the Board of Directors and the Supervisory Body 
(Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).   
Based on the traditional model, the most important governing body is members’ 
General Meeting.  This is because it exercises the ultimate control over the co-
operative, at least once a year and through which the members exert control over 
management’s decisions and decide on policy and other important issues 
(Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005).  Decisions are taken either on a proportional 
(e.g., based on each members’ volume of trading) or equal allocation of residual 
control rights (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014), 
i.e. based on the one-person, one-vote principle (CSSDA, 2005).  Decisions are 
taken on simple majority basis, except for those issues for which special majority is 
required, e.g., the amendment of the statute of the co-operative (Erakleous, 
2007), dissolution, acquisitions and mergers (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  The 
most important aspect of the Annual General Meeting is not the ability for 
unanimous decision-taking, but rather the actual participation of most members in 
the democratic procedures, taking decisions and implementing them 
(Papageorgiou, 2004).  Finally, the General Meeting elects the Board of Directors 
and the Supervisory Committee (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013) and it approves the 
annual financial statements and it drafts the by-laws (institutions) (Chaddad and 
Iliopoulos, 2013).  
The second most important governing body of the traditional model is the Board of 
Directors.  It is charged with most of the decision-making as it has both real and 
formal authority and it exercises decision management and control on an ex ante 
basis (apart from the decisions that require approval by the members in the 
General Meeting) (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 
2014).  Each member of the Board has equal rights in decision control overall 
though the chairman may have a winning vote in the cases of split votes (Chaddad 
and Iliopoulos, 2013; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).   
Finally, according to the traditional model, the Supervisory Committee is chosen 
and elected by members’ General Meeting and it exists only when it is stipulated 
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by the law or the institutions (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  The main function of 
this Committee is to monitor the Board of Directors on an ex post basis (after 
decision-making) and it usually consists only of members (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 
2013).  Some countries have also enabled the participation of experts that are non-
members (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013). 
Because of practical problems in the traditional model faced in some countries in 
Europe, a number of innovations have been implemented to it.  One of these 
innovations include the appointment, in growing co-operatives, of professional 
management charged with all decision-making, with the majority of decision 
control transferred from the General Meeting to the Board of Directors (Bijman, 
Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).  Another innovation is the introduction of proportional 
voting in order to attract additional capital, as well as the introduction of non-
members to the Board of Directors in order to complement their expertise (usually 
in finance, legal or marketing issues) (Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).  
Furthermore, a Member Council representing the interests of various member 
groups was introduced, replacing the powers of members’ General Meeting and also 
hybrid ownership structure(s) were introduced (Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).  
Finally, in some countries, e.g., Germany and The Netherlands, members were 
separated from the legal entity that carries out the operations of the co-operative 
and they became shareholders in a holding company that owns 100% of the shares 
in the co-operative.  The reasoning behind this innovation was to reduce members’ 
liability and to give more space to management to take entrepreneurial decisions 
(Bijman et al., 2012a; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).  These changes were 
considered as necessary in order to introduce appropriate mechanisms and tools for 
co-operatives to raise additional capital, e.g., by issuing non-voting shares to 
members at competitive interest rates (Korres, 1999), to borrow from financial 
markets (Fonteyne, 2007), or even to boost the market confidence in the banking 
system (Gutiérrez, 2008).  However, these recent attempts to adopt the co-
operative financial model to the changing banking industry, may take co-operatives 
away from their principles and values (Spear, 2004a).   
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In addition to the innovations of the traditional model, three further models were 
developed.  The first one is an extension of the traditional model according to 
which all decisions regarding operations are taken by professional management 
which is recruited by the Board of Directors (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  In this 
case, the Board of Directors does not carry a decision-making role (Chaddad and 
Iliopoulos, 2013).  The second model is the managerial model, in which the Board 
of Directors is consolidated with professional non-member management and is 
involved in all operational and strategic decision-making (Hanisch and Muller, 2012; 
Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  That is, the Supervisory Committee supervises and 
controls management on an ex post basis (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  Finally, 
according to the third model, the corporate model, the Supervisory Committee is 
integrated into the Board of Directors overseeing management (Hanisch and Muller, 
2012; Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  This enlarged Board of Directors consists of 
both members (two thirds) and experts non-members (one third) while professional 
management exercises real and formal authority (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  
With regards to the use of these four models (the traditional plus the three new 
ones), the extended traditional and the traditional models are the most commonly 
applied governance models for larger and smaller co-operatives respectively, in 
Southern Europe (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  In continental European 
countries, it is more common to find a two-tier governance system where the 
supervisory body, e.g., the Board of Directors and management, operate 
simultaneously (Achleitner et al., 2012).  However, in the UK and the USA there is a 
one-tier system in operation with a single Board of Directors comprising of both 
members, acting as non-executive external Board members and management 
(Achleitner et al., 2012). 
A special case of co-operative governance is that of Mondragon Corporación 
Cooperativa (MCC).  It comprises of the (Plenary) Congress, the most important and 
representative body laying the general criteria and guidelines for MCC, the 
Standing Committee, which implements the decisions/policies of the Plenary 
Congress and has a wide range of authorities (Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 
2004).  Finally, MCC has the General Council which provides co-ordination and 
Page 28 of 297 
 
direction for regulations and policy, i.e. the executive body of MCC has the highest 
level of power (Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004).  Even though the current 
governance structure of MCC facilitates good co-operation among the involved co-
operatives, it could find ways to increase the adherence to the co-operative 
principles of participation and democracy, in order to avoid possible future 
problems (Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004).  However, it is not the specific 
governance model of MCC that has problems, but rather the essence of governance 
as “governance is a complex, inherently difficult and problematic activity” 
(Cornforth, 2004, p.26).  Having discussed the four co-operative governance 
models, governance related-issues will be discussed in the next section, starting 
from the ones relating to the Board of Directors.  
2.2.3 Governance issues relating to the Board of Directors 
The Board of Directors must be separate from management so that any 
interdependencies are prevented/minimized.  For example, in the case of Cyprus, 
the private interests of the Board of Directors and management were “intertwined 
with those of their customers” (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2013, p.61).  This is 
because in smaller co-operatives the difference between the two is blurred and in 
larger co-operatives the Board of Directors depends on management for 
information and proposals (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009).  Furthermore, the 
Board of Directors can assist the organisation to achieve its mission and goals by 
providing strategic expertise and support, by signaling credibility to external 
stakeholders (Achleitner et al., 2012), and by having written policies and strategies 
that reflect its perspectives and values, the regulations and laws (FSA, 2007).  
What is more, it can help by providing access to various networks, by ensuring 
legacy and vision and by empowering specific individuals to lead the organisation 
(Achleitner et al., 2012).  As the responsibility for good governance lies in its hands 
(FSA, 2007), the Board of Directors is ultimately responsible for ensuring that the 
organisation remains financially viable, in the long-term, and that it achieves its 
objectives (Cornforth, 2014).  This can be ensured by the Board of Directors 
ratifying decisions and setting the strategic direction (FSA, 2007; Bijman et al., 
2012a; Mswaka and Aluko, 2015) at a higher level than management.  Additionally, 
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the role of the Board of Directors is that of fiduciaries, that is, to hold the assets 
and the organisation, as a whole, in trust (Mswaka and Aluko, 2015).  However, as 
the number of stakeholders in the co-operative increases, the Board members find 
it difficult to balance the short-term demands of members for financial returns, on 
one side, with the long-term survival of the co-operative on the other side 
(Pellervo, 2000).   
A key characteristic of co-operatives, which has a fundamental consequence on the 
effectiveness of their governance structure, is that co-operatives employ salaried 
personnel, whilst depending on volunteers for their Board of Directors (Mswaka and 
Aluko, 2015).  Based on co-operative law, the Board of Directors must be members 
of the co-operative (Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014) and they must be elected 
by members (Bijman et al., 2012a).  The paradox is that the volunteers that are 
elected on the Board of Directors to supervise professional management are driven 
by their passion for the well-being of their community and are not selected on the 
basis of their expertise or knowledge (Mswaka and Aluko, 2015).  Ideally, and in 
order to be effective, the Board of Directors must consist of members that among 
them, achieve a balance of experiences and skills (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, Cornforth 
and Aiken, 2007; 2009; FSA, 2007), something that in reality is difficult as they may 
lack the right knowledge set and skills (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; 2009; 
Cabo and Rebelo, 2014) or they may only work on a part-time basis, in contrast to 
the full time jobs of management (Cabo and Rebelo, 2014).  This lack of skills and 
knowledge however, is not aligned to the role of the Board of Directors and 
especially that of ensuring that the co-operative provides the value added 
expected by its membership without taking (great) risks (Pellervo, 2000).  
Additionally, the part-time status of the Board of Directors opposes its task of 
ensuring that management remuneration, management control and members’ 
governance systems are closely aligned to the interests of members (Pellervo, 
2000).  The best strategy to control management effectively could be to train the 
Board of Directors enriching their related knowledge and skills, easing their 
conflicts with members and reducing corruption (Shaw, 2007).  Moreover, in order 
to enhance the skills and expertise of Board members, non-members could be 
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allowed on the Board (Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).  It is noted that despite 
the general lack of skilful and capable volunteers, most people would accept the 
position on the Board of Directors if it is offered to them (Ward and McKillop, 
2010).  
To succeed, the Board of Directors must be distinct from the management of the 
day-to-day operations of a credit union (Jones, 1999) and their accountability and 
performance must be improved (Shaw, 2007).  More specifically, the roles of the 
Board of Directors and management should be set so that management has full 
responsibility and authority over the day-to-day operations of a co-operative, while 
the Board of Directors or other governing bodies, should bring aboard different 
expertise and perspectives (Itkonen, 1996).  Additional recommendations towards 
an enhanced co-operative governance structure include a more active Supervisory 
Committee and/or Internal Audit Committee that challenges the decisions of the 
Board of Directors, as well as a clear description of the roles of Board members and 
management (Itkonen, 1996; FSA, 2007).   
A second problem related to the Board of Directors is that it may not represent the 
majority of members.  As only a minority of members attend and vote at the Board 
of Directors elections (e.g., 1%- 5% in consumer Co-operatives), the elected Board 
of Directors is effectively unrepresentative of membership (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, 
2004b).  To enhance member representation, the Board of Directors could ensure 
contested elections, allowing real choice to members (Spear, 2004b) and 
safeguarding that appropriate controls and systems of internal controls are in place 
(FSA, 2007).  Moreover, to deal with the professionalization of co-operatives, the 
Board of Directors should be restructured and the capabilities of its members 
should be enhanced (Hanisch and Muller, 2012).  In order to downplay the role of 
any dominant individuals on the Board of Directors, i.e. the “member- Board 
conflict” (Cabo and Rebelo, 2014, p.5; Shaw, 2007), new members should be 
elected, while the roles of the existing should be frequently rotated (FSA, 2007).  
This is because the low rotation of Board of Directors’ members may indicate that 
the long lasting members remain in their roles through personal choice, either 
because there are not many good candidates for these roles or because the 
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members vote again the individuals who already have a post (FSA, 2007).  
Furthermore, co-operative members could form coalitions to better control the 
Board of Directors and/or management (Spear, 2004b).   
To better understand the role of the Board of Directors, researchers have 
attempted to explain it in the light of various theories such as, managerial 
hegemony theory (Cornforth, 2002; 2003; 2004), stakeholder theory (Itkonen, 1996; 
Cornforth, 2002; 2003; 2004), democratic perspective (Cornforth, 2002; 2003; 
2004), resource dependency theory (Cornforth, 2002; 2003; 2004; Mswaka and 
Aluko, 2015), stewardship theory (Cornforth, 2002; 2003; 2004; Mswaka and Aluko, 
2015) and principal agency theory (Cornforth, 2002; 2003; 2004; Spear, 2004b; Roe, 
2004; Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014; Mswaka and Aluko, 2015).  However, it 
must be noted that each of these theories sheds light only on a specific aspect of 
not-for-profit Board of Directors hence, a multi paradigm that concentrates on the 
governance paradoxes may be more appropriate (Cornforth, 2002; 2003).  Proper 
governance should not be a matter of choosing between any of the above theories, 
but rather the combination of these theories, in such a way so, as to reflect upon 
the specific circumstances of each co-operative (Spear, 2004b). 
Apart from the challenges mentioned above, a Board of Directors also faces a 
number of tensions.  The first tension faced is among a professional and a 
representative Board of Directors, that is, who should serve on the Board of 
Directors.  Based on the stewardship theory and the partnership model members of 
the Board of Directors should be experienced and skilled in order to add value to 
the organization (professionals), whereas according to the democratic perspective 
they should be lay members who represent their fellows (representatives) 
(Cornforth, 2002; 2003; 2004).  These different approaches give rise to a certain 
dilemma, whether Board members should be elected or selected based on their 
expertise or whether they should represent certain group of stakeholders 
(Cornforth, 2003; 2004). 
Another tension faced concerns the performance and conformance roles of the 
Board of Directors.  According to the principal-agency theory, the Board of 
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Directors should ensure that agents (management) operate in the interests of their 
members, thus taking up a conformance role which requires risk aversion, scrutiny 
and monitoring of past performance (Cornforth, 2002).  On the other hand, the 
stewardship theory supports that they should act in partnership with management 
and thus assist in enhancing the performance of the organisation (performance role 
requiring vision and risk-taking) by adding value to strategic decisions (Cornforth, 
2002; 2003; 2004).  Ways to deal with this tension include appropriate chairing of 
meetings and meeting agendas, use of an annual round of meetings, separation of 
the various Board of Directors’ roles over time, and the setting of specific meetings 
for strategic decisions (Cornforth, 2002; 2004). 
A third tension occurs between the partnering and controlling roles of 
management.  According to the principal-agency, democratic perspective and 
stakeholder theories, members of the Board of Directors must monitor and control 
management whereas the stewardship theory requires the Board members to be 
partners with management, enhancing the quality of decision-making (Cornforth, 
2002; 2003; 2004) and acting as a “critical friend” (Cornforth, 2002, p.56).  It is 
important for the Board of Directors to differentiate its role from that of 
management as sometimes the Board is deeply involved in the day-to-day 
operations while in other times it is very distant in relation to these (Cornforth, 
2002).  One way to overcome this is by regular negotiation and discussion about 
various responsibilities and roles among the Board of Directors and management 
and by easing the resulting tensions (Cornforth, 2002; 2004). 
Finally, tension may exist due to multiple or ambiguous accountability of the 
Board.  The Board of Directors may not be clear to whom it is accountable, i.e. to 
members or/and to other stakeholders (Cornforth, 2002).  To deal with this, 
management and the Board of Directors should regularly review to whom they are 
accountable and in doing so, to ensure that the members/stakeholders’ views are 
taken into consideration (Cornforth, 2002).   
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2.2.4 Other governance-related issues 
The most important challenge is that co-operatives must balance their social with 
their financial aims (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; 2009), avoiding “mission 
drift” (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007).  Ways to overcome these challenges 
could include compulsory reporting of the Board of Directors, at the members’ 
Annual General Meeting, on various compliance requirements, setting out any 
activities that the credit union has carried out and the establishment of written 
and approved policies that management must follow (FCA, 2015).  Other ways to 
remedy these challenges include co-opting non-members experts on the Board of 
Directors or as advisors (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009), recruiting good 
management (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009), or even including a 
variable part in the remuneration of management, in order to ensure the alignment 
of the management’s interests to those of members (Cabo and Rebelo, 2014).  For 
example the internal governance measures of Portuguese Credit co-operatives were 
not as effective as assumed (Cabo and Rebelo, 2014) and thus the possibility of a 
friendly merger with a stronger and more efficient co-operative was introduced, a 
move that assists in keeping management aligned and focused (Crespi, Garcia-
Cestona and Salas, 2004; Cabo and Rebelo, 2014).  Apart from the fear of a merger, 
it was found that the most significant governance mechanism, for Savings Banks in 
Portugal, was the removal of the chairman from the Board (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona 
and Salas, 2004).   
In addition to the issue above, governance issues could be caused by incentive 
problems.  The appearance of these incentive problems and their extent depend on 
a number of factors such as the level of members’ contribution and involvement, 
the alignment of co-operative and members’ goals and the extent of members’ 
heterogeneity (Borgen, 2011).  One such incentive problem is caused by the 
“vaguely defined property rights”, i.e. co-operatives do not adequately define 
property rights and especially the residual property rights (Cook, 1995, p.1156).  
The conflicts that arise because of the lack of clearly defined property rights give 
rise to two additional problems: the portfolio problem and the decision problem.  
The portfolio problem is created by the absence of transferability of residual 
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claimant rights and of a market for the co-operative’s shares.  Hence, members put 
pressure on the co-operative to change its investment decisions in line with their 
personal preferences, usually resulting in sub-optimal decisions (Cook, 1995; Harte, 
1997; Borgen, 2011).  The decision problem, arises because management finds it 
difficult to align the heterogeneous member interests (Borgen, 2011) and thus, the 
decisions it takes may not be the most optimum ones.  As seen above, the portfolio 
and horizon problems “force” members to behave according to their own best 
interests and not for the common good of all membership (Harte, 1997).   
Credit unions must introduce additional mechanisms for controlling management 
and for directing the latter’s effort in serving their current and future stakeholders 
(Fonteyne, 2007).  These could include increased transparency, e.g., through 
additional disclosures in reporting (Pellervo, 2000; Fonteyne, 2007), increased 
minimum members’ investment and mechanisms to expose co-operatives to market 
mechanisms (e.g., by allowing borrowing from financial markets) (Fonteyne, 2007).  
Moreover, co-operative governance could be strengthened by the introduction of 
co-operative objectives that are in line with members’ objectives (Itkonen, 1996).  
The above measures will enhance the status and the credibility of the credit union 
enabling it to attract more members (Jones, 1999; Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011).   
Finally, the most important challenge, in relation to governance, seems to be 
initiating and sustaining the active involvement of members, especially in larger 
memberships, not permitting the fall of the co-operative in the hands of a few 
members (an “elite” group) or in the hands of management (Itkonen, 1996; 
Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, 2004a; 2004b; FSA, 2007).  This would indicate that 
there is a tendency, the “quality of democracy …[to decline] over time” (Birchall, 
1997, p.54).  In Portugal, Saving Banks select their depositors’ representatives 
randomly, effectively giving management more power over the other stakeholders 
(Crespi, Garcia-Cestona and Salas, 2004).  This means that whatever the co-
operative governance structure chosen, it can be strengthened by the active 
member involvement in the control and direction (participating democracy) of the 
co-operative (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007).  Member 
participation could range between 100% member control and loss of member 
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control (demutualisation) (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  These findings are in 
line with the findings in Sections 1.3.1 and 1.3.2.  That is, the lack of members’ 
participation reduces the effectiveness of co-operative governance.  Therefore, the 
intention of the present study is to understand the perceptions regarding the 
adherence of co-operatives to their founding principles with special attention to 
the 2nd co-operative principle of “Democratic member control”.  To this effect, the 
co-operative principles will be analysed in the following section.   
 
2.3 Co-operative principles revisited 
Overall, the co-operative values are the foundation for co-operative principles and 
the latter are detailed applications of the corresponding values (Nilsson, 1996).  
Therefore, before proceeding to the analysis of the co-operative principles, values 
will be set out and briefly analysed.   
The co-operative values guide the development of the appropriate rules, norms and 
expected controls of members’ behaviours (Cicognani et al., 2012).  These can act 
as important incentives in strengthening members’ sense of community (Nilsson, 
1996; Cicognani et al., 2012).  According to the International Co-operative Alliance 
(ICA 2012a), the co-operative values are:  
(1) Self-help: members must undertake initiatives to improve their financial 
position and not wait for someone else to do it for them. 
(2) Self-responsibility: members take decisions and they accept responsibility of 
their actions whether positive or negative and this is because co-operatives are 
autonomous and do not depend financially on others. 
(3) Democracy: co-operatives are anthropocentric organizations using economic 
resources for the improvement of their members’ wealth. 
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(4) Equality: practised when all members are treated in the same way by a co-
operative no matter their socio-economic background in decision-making and in 
using its services. 
(5) Equity: proved by the distribution of wealth to all members based on the 
amount of transactions each one undertakes with the co-operative. 
(6) Solidarity: the most important value as through it societies are progressing, the 
common needs of people are being met and all of this without expecting anything 
in return.  
(Papageorgiou, 2004, pp.30-31) 
Moving on to the co-operative principles, the first four co-operative principles are 
very important for the existence of co-operatives as without them co-operatives 
would have lost their identity (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  From these, the first 
three principles are the fundamental ones as they have remained unchanged 
through the years (Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013).  The co-
operative principles, which co-operatives use in order to put their values into 
practice, are provided by ICA (2012a): 
(a) Voluntary and Open Membership.  “Co-operatives are voluntary organisations, 
open to all persons able to use their services and willing to accept the 
responsibilities of membership, without gender, social, racial, political or religious 
discrimination” (ICA, 2012a).  “Voluntary” refers to potential members deciding 
whether and when to become members while “Open” refers to a co-operative 
being able to accommodate new members that are willing to undertake the 
responsibilities that membership entails (Papageorgiou, 2004).  The issue of when 
someone can become a member and when to leave a co-operative is something 
that only an individual can decide (CSSDA, 2005).  There are no obligations as to 
when to do so and nobody (including the government) can force a person to act in 
either way (CSSDA, 2005).  The open membership policy has economic value to 
future members and this value can only be realized as long as this policy is 
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maintained (Fulton and Giannakas, 2012).  Hence, as co-operatives serve the 
interests of a group of people with common characteristics (religion, ethnic origin 
etc.), the true test is not whether membership is restricted but whether 
membership is refused unfairly and those not qualifying have the opportunity to 
become members in other co-operatives (Birchall, 1997).  Having stated this, under 
certain conditions, membership to new members may be denied, e.g., in farming 
where the introduction of new members will require additional machinery or 
premises on part of a co-operative, creating excess capacity and thus endangering 
the whole co-operative (Papageorgiou, 2004).  With regards to members exiting a 
co-operative, this may be up to the member but only once certain obligations have 
been met (Papageorgiou, 2004).  This is done in order to prevent the collapse of a 
co-operative, for example, in the case that members leave without meeting their 
loan obligations (Papageorgiou, 2004).  Additionally, the members in a General 
Meeting can decide to expel a member that has ceased to satisfy the conditions of 
membership, has intentionally harmed the interests of the credit union or, without 
reason, has refused to perform his obligations towards the credit union (CSSDA, 
2014a).  Finally, the Co-operative Companies’ Institutions 1987- 2012 enable the 
re-registration of a member that has been struck off who satisfies the membership 
conditions (CSSDA, 2014a).   
(b) Democratic Member Control.  This means that “Co-operatives are democratic 
organisations controlled by their members, who actively participate in setting their 
policies and making decisions” (ICA, 2012a).  “Men and women serving as elected 
representatives are accountable to the membership” (ICA, 2012a).  Members in 
primary co-operatives are democratically organised, having equal voting rights 
based on one-member, one-vote, whilst the democratic structure applies also to 
co-operatives at other levels (ICA, 2012a).  Moreover, “practicing democracy is not 
an ability, rather, it is a virtue manifested in practical ways” (Papageorgiou, 2004, 
p.50).  This principle shows the anthropocentric nature of co-operatives and proves 
their socioeconomic nature (Papageorgiou, 2004), allowing for different qualities of 
democracy in different co-operatives and in the same co-operative at different 
times (Birchall, 1997).  Basically, co-operatives depend on their members and thus 
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members must have the power to take decisions as a single and unified entity 
(Reynolds, Gray and Kraenzle, 1997).  Active participation can be measured on two 
axes: the percentage of members that are involved with their co-operative (spread) 
and their level of involvement (depth) (Birchall, 1997).  Similarly, accountability 
can be measured by the extent to which the Board of Directors consults members 
and whether the Board members are typical representatives of the majority 
(Birchall, 1997).  Despite what is claimed above, member control could be 
threatened by the growth of co-operatives and their “professionalization” 
(Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009).   
(c) Member Economic Participation. “Members contribute equitably to, and 
democratically control, the capital of their Co-operative” and usually, at least part 
of the capital of the co-operative, is its “common property”, whereas, membership 
receives limited compensation (if any) on their subscribed capital (ICA, 2012a).  
“Members allocate surpluses for any or all of the following purposes: developing 
their co-operative…; benefiting members in proportion to their transactions with 
the co-operative; and supporting other activities approved by the membership” 
(ICA, 2012a).  Limited compensation means that a co-operative will pay only as 
much as it has to in order to attract enough capital to finance its operations 
(Birchall, 1997).  Co-operatives aim to increase the well-being of their members by 
compensating them, based on the contribution of each member towards the 
success of the co-operative, i.e. the value of members’ transactions (Hansmann, 
1988; Papageorgiou, 2004; Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  By distributing surpluses 
according to the value of each member’s transactions with co-operatives, the 
latter have managed to build a sense of belonging and, at the same time, rapidly 
grow their operations (Birchall, 1997).  Finally, the undistributed reserves (or 
intergenerational endowment) could be perceived as the social capital that existing 
members leave for future members and generations (Papageorgiou, 2004; McKillop 
and Wilson, 2011).   
(d) Autonomy and Independence.  This means that “Co-operatives are autonomous, 
self-help organisations controlled by their members” (ICA, 2012a).  “If they enter 
to agreements with other organisations, including governments, or raise capital 
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from external sources, they do so on terms that ensure democratic control by their 
members and maintain their co-operative autonomy” (ICA, 2012a).  The first co-
operatives described themselves as societies in order to stress the importance of 
their self-governance (Atherton et al., 2011).  This has been the case in Cyprus 
even until recently, when the ex-supervisory body was called Co-operative 
Societies Supervision and Development Authority.  Co-operatives ensure their 
autonomy and independence by relying on the financial contribution of their 
members for their initial share capital and thereon, on the surpluses that are 
allocated to indivisible reserves (CSSDA, 2005).  Therefore, the members of a co-
operative should submit their short-term personal interest to the long-term mutual 
benefit of all members (Nilsson, 1996; CSSDA, 2005).  Co-operatives are and should 
remain independent, even in relation to governments (Papageorgiou, 2004).  Co-
operatives do not depend on non-members or any other organisation for their 
financing needs (CSSDA, 2005) but, if for any reason, a co-operative must borrow 
money from non-members (including the government), then it does so ensuring 
that its independence and autonomy is not jeopardized (CSSDA, 2005).  Finally, co-
operatives should remain independent of any political parties as this could break up 
any co-operative to many smaller groups of political supporters thus, weakening it 
(Papageorgiou, 2004).  Despite all the above, in reality, there were instances in the 
history of co-operatives when they had to decide whether their autonomy was 
restrained, e.g., when the German state provided aid to agricultural co-operatives 
(Simmons, Birchall and Prout, 2007).   
(e) Education, Training and Information: “Co-operatives provide education and 
training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so 
they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives” (ICA, 
2012a).  “They [co-operatives] inform the general public - particularly young 
people and opinion leaders - about the nature and benefits of co-operation” (ICA, 
2012a).  The pioneers understood the need for education and training of 
employees, management, members and potential members as well as government 
officers (as regulators and advisors) so well that, in the 1850s, they allocated 2,5% 
of their surpluses for this purpose (Birchall, 1997).  In Mondragon Corporación 
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Cooperativa 2% of the gross profit is used in providing research and development as 
well as co-operative education (Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004).  Moreover, 
in credit co-operatives in Portugal, 100.000 hours of internal teaching and 5.000 
hours of external teaching are provided to 8.000 trainees per year, and 
qualifications are considered as a major part of the employee promotion system 
(Cabo and Rebelo, 2014).  Also, training (education) was identified by ICA’s 
congress in 1937, in Paris, as an important Rochdale principle (Davidovic, 1967).  
Without the training of members, personnel, management and the Board of 
Directors, co-operatives can be mistaken as normal economic organizations, 
forgetting their important ideological differences (Papageorgiou, 2004).  
Additionally, training enhances the co-operation spirit among members and 
encourages membership and hence, enables them to take advantage of what co-
operatives offer (Papageorgiou, 2004).  Thus, training has potentially large 
economic benefits something that investor-owned businesses are aware of 
(Birchall, 1997).  The education of all involved is also a commitment of a co-
operative to its members to render them more effective and to facilitate 
democratic control (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  Co-operatives in Cyprus recognise 
the importance of this principle and hence they provide professional training to co-
operative officers, in order to meet the rapid changes of the market conditions 
(CSSDA, 2004), by financing co-operative studies, organising seminars, issuing books 
and magazines and by using the mass media for promoting co-operatives (CSSDA, 
2005).  Finally, the training of members to take on a role on the Board of Directors 
should be seriously considered as it enhances the strength of the co-operative 
governance system (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009).   
(f) Co-operation among Co-operatives means that “Co-operatives serve their 
members most effectively and strengthen the Co-operative movement by working 
together through local, national, regional and international structures” (ICA, 
2012a).  This principle can be seen as a strategy that ensures the economic success 
of co-operatives (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  This can represent a substitute to 
the growth of any individual co-operative (Papageorgiou, 2004) and could represent 
a sound business practice, e.g., creation of a centralised organisation to meet the 
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needs of co-operatives engaged in consumer goods in Europe (Davies, 1995).  Co-
operation can occur on a local, national and international level, as well as on the 
promotion of joint interests, to better serve members and to promote the co-
operative movement (CSSDA, 2005).  Such co-operation is advantageous as long as 
economies of scale can be achieved and/or knowledge and knowhow are 
transferred from advanced co-operatives to less advanced ones (Papageorgiou, 
2004).  Similarly, co-operation among co-operatives also leads to the co-operation 
between members of any co-operative (Papageorgiou, 2004).  In theory, co-
operation is beneficial but the extent to which this principle is applied in practice 
has to do with whether the co-operators consider themselves as part of the larger 
co-operative movement (Birchall, 1997).  Possible ways of actual co-operation 
among co-operatives include the development of a range of similar products and 
services (ABCUL, 2013) -such as The Credit Union Current Account and pre-paid 
debit cards in the UK (Jones and Ellison, 2011)-, the use of the same software for 
carrying out their day-to-day operations and the launch of a common marketing 
campaign (ABCUL, 2013).  Finally, a way to foster co-operation amongst co-
operatives could be the creation of partnerships and mergers (Jones and Ellison, 
2011; Jones, 2012; ABCUL, 2013).  This is because through mergers, credit unions 
would become more financially stable; they would attract external finance (Jones 
and Ellison, 2011), strengthen existing operations, enable the entry in new markets 
and create economies of scale (Jones, 2012; Jones, 2016).  On the other hand, 
partnerships would assist in achieving consistency among credit unions with regards 
to the delivery of service and in the quality of their products (Jones, 2012).  A key 
ingredient for a successful merger is the existence or creation of goodwill and trust 
amongst the merging credit unions (Jones, 2012) something that is necessary due to 
the different business approaches and affiliations of each credit union that have 
accumulated over its many years of operation (Jones and Ellison, 2011; Jones, 
2012).  A first step towards a successful merger could be the collaboration among 
two or more credit unions (Jones, 2016).  In such a case the control would remain 
in the hands of the management of each credit union (Jones, 2016).  Once the 
needed trust is built then, more control can be channelled to the central 
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management which, in the mean-time, will have built the new management and 
governance structures (Jones, 2016). 
(g) Concern for Community “Co-operatives work for the sustainable development of 
their communities through policies approved by their members” (ICA, 2012a).  This 
principle shows the inter-connection of the success of a co-operative with that of 
the community, in which it operates (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  Credit unions 
focus on local communities, through engagement in schools and by building 
networks and partnerships with the local authorities (Jones, 2012).  This means 
that apart from their primary purpose, which is to best serve the interests of their 
members, co-operatives also aim at the development of the societies in which they 
operate (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005), providing benefits (Jones, 1999; Valor 
et al., 2007) such as, in the form of donations (Valor et al., 2007; Brannen and 
Ibrahim, 2010).  For example, in Portugal, the Savings Banks invest about 25% of 
their profits into cultural and social programmes (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona and Salas, 
2004).  Co-operative members must identify and identify with the wider community 
as the latter is an important stakeholder able to influence the success of their co-
operative (Birchall, 1997).  However, that may be more difficult in urban societies 
as the sense of community may be partial and weak (Birchall, 1997).  Having 
analysed the co-operative principles, the following section will set out and discuss 
the similarities between co-operatives and Service-Dominant Logic (S-D Logic).  
 
2.4 Co-operatives and S-D Logic 
The world view of services has its roots in the Goods-Dominant Logic (G-D Logic), 
which was founded on economic theory based on Adam Smith’s theory about the 
“Wealth of Nations”.  This theory was relevant to the 18th century as it was 
established because of the industrial revolution (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; Vargo and 
Lusch, 2008b; Vargo and Lusch, 2008a; Vargo, 2007; Lusch, Vargo and Wessels, 
2008).  At that time, the most important aspect was the efficiency of 
(manufacturing) production measured in units of output, standardization of 
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production, maximization of profits and equilibrium of supply and demand (Lusch, 
Vargo and Wessels, 2008; Vargo and Lusch, 2008b). 
Since the industrial revolution and the creation of marketing, a number of various 
sub-disciplines emerged in an attempt to explain phenomena (Vargo, 2007; Vargo 
and Lusch, 2011), as well as relationships and structures in practice, that could not 
be explained by the mainstream G-D Logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2008b).  For example, 
all people serve one another, through exchange, aiming at increasing the well-
being of everybody involved, i.e. value creation is of systemic and collaborative 
nature (Vargo and Lusch, 2011).  Additionally, nowadays, the emphasis is on 
creating long lasting relationships between co-operating customers, suppliers and 
competitors, but unfortunately the G-D Logic cannot assist in understanding these 
relationships (Vargo and Morgan, 2005).  S-D Logic of exchange is more inclusive 
than the G-D Logic as it can explain goods and not vice versa (Vargo and Morgan, 
2005).  It seems that S-D Logic tries to create a unifying umbrella under which all 
these sub-disciplines can be explained (Vargo, 2007) and extended (Vargo and 
Lusch, 2008b; Vargo and Lusch, 2011).   
The conceptualization of service is the most important distinction between the S-D 
Logic and the G-D Logic (Vargo and Lusch, 2008b; Vargo and Lusch, 2008a).  Based 
on G-D Logic, the organisation creates value which is then delivered to its 
customers, whereas the S-D Logic argues that the organisation puts together offer 
propositions which the customer may choose or not, and the value is created as the 
customer uses the solution (Lusch, Vargo and Wessels, 2008).  In G-D Logic, 
customers are passive exogenous players that the provider can influence using the 
4Ps (product, place, price, promotion) in order to buy more of what the provider 
produces (Lusch, Vargo, and O’Brien, 2007; Lusch, Vargo and Wessels, 2008; Vargo 
and Lusch, 2008a), hence the focus of G-D Logic is on efficiency of production and 
not effectiveness in the market place (Lusch, Vargo, and O’Brien, 2007; Lusch, 
Vargo and Wessels, 2008).  Moreover, service in G-D Logic is merely a by-product of 
a tangible product or something that is added to a tangible product (Lusch, Vargo 
and Wessels, 2008).  However, according to S-D Logic, the customer integrates the 
value proposition/inputs from the specific organisation and any other organisation 
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using his own skills and experience in order to create value, i.e. customers co-
create value with the organisations (Lusch, Vargo and Wessels, 2008).  Additionally, 
S-D Logic concentrates on the interaction of the organisation with its customers in 
meeting their demands, in providing solutions to their unique issues and not in 
transferring the product ownership (Lusch, Vargo and Wessels, 2008).   
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Having described the main differences of S-D Logic from G-D Logic, the analysis will 
now move to the similarities that co-operatives share with S-D Logic, and most 
importantly the need for organisations to (re)focus on their customers/members 
Table 2.1: Fundamental Premises of S-D Logic and their explanation (taken from 
Vargo, 2009).   
 Premise Explanation/justification 
FP1 Service is the fundamental 
basis of exchange 
The application of operant resources 
(knowledge and skills), "service," is the basis for 
all exchange. Service is exchanged for service 
FP2 Indirect exchange masks the 
fundamental basis of exchange 
Goods, money, and institutions mask the 
service-for-service nature of exchange 
FP3 Goods are distribution 
mechanisms for service 
provision 
Goods (both durable and non-durable) derive 
their value through use - the service they 
provide 
FP4 Operant resources are the 
fundamental source of 
competitive advantage 
The comparative ability to cause desired 
change drives competition 
FP5 All economies are service 
economies 
Service (singular) is only now becoming more 
apparent with increased specialization and 
outsourcing 
FP6 The customer is always a co-
creator of value 
Implies that value creation is interactional 
FP7 The enterprise cannot deliver 
value, but only offer value 
propositions 
The firm can offer its applied resources and 
collaboratively (interactively) creates value 
following acceptance, but cannot 
create/deliver value alone 
FP8 A service-centered view is 
inherently customer- oriented 
and relational 
Service is customer-determined and co-created; 
thus, it is inherently customer-oriented and 
relational 
FP9 All economic and social actors 
are resource integrators 
Implies that the context of value creation is 
networks of networks (resource-integrators) 
FP10 Value is always unique and 
phenomenological 
Value is idiosyncratic, experiential, contextual, 
and meaning-laden determined by the 
beneficiary 
Page 46 of 297 
 
and the active engagement of the latter with these organisations.  These include 
the fact that co-operatives are not-for-profit organisations that strive to increase 
the well-being of their customer/members.  Similarly, S-D Logic argues that profit 
should not be the objective of organisations, but rather an indication/feedback of 
how well the organisation meets the needs of its customers/members (Lusch et al., 
2008; 2010).  What is more, co-operatives are created by their customers in their 
attempt to increase their well-being (Hansmann, 1988; Papageorgiou, 2004; Cuevas 
and Fischer, 2006).  This however, is exactly how S-D Logic perceives customers: 
active actors in pursuing activities that will improve their own well-being (Vargo et 
al., 2008, Vargo and Lusch, 2011).   
Another common point can be found in the 5th co-operative principle of 
“Education, training and information”, according to which co-operatives strive for 
the education of their members, enabling them to enhance their abilities and their 
value creation capabilities, e.g. by “… adding together small pieces of knowledge, 
competence and bargaining power” (Norman, 2001, pp.105-106).  In a similar way, 
S-D Logic refers to knowledge as one of the core competences (together with skills) 
that are necessary for the provision of service (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; 2008a; 2010; 
Lusch et al., 2008,).  S-D Logic specifically focuses on the transference of 
knowledge as something much more important than the mere exchange of service 
for money (Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Normann, 2001).   
Moreover, it can be said that the 6th co-operative principle, “Co-operation among 
co-operatives”, which concentrates on the exchange of experiences and knowhow 
as a way to better face competition and better serve their customers/members, 
coincides with S-D Logic, which states that in order to survive, organisations must 
form networks/alliances (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000).  This means that 
companies must collaborate amongst them as interdependent networks (Vargo, 
2009), as a “constellation” of suppliers or an “extended” organization (Prahalad 
and Ramaswamy, 2000, p.2).   
Furthermore, concerning the relationship that the organisation should have with its 
surrounding community, this is expressed both in the 7th co-operative principle, 
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“Concern for community” and in Lusch et al. (2007).  That is, to succeed, an 
organisation should perceive the local community as a warehouse full of resources 
that the organisation could co-operate with to obtain competitive advantages and 
to assist the community (Lusch et al., 2007).   
Finally, the most important similarity between co-operatives and S-D Logic is the 
fact that they both aim at encouraging the participation of members in the co-
operative (the organisation), something that can be best achieved through the 
active engagement of members as owner/customers in the co-operative’s service 
provision.  This is because co-operatives are service-oriented (Smith, 1984) and S-D 
Logic is all about service.  Additionally, the value of co-operatives is in usage 
rather than in exchange.  That is, members benefit from a co-operative by using its 
service (Harvey and Sykuta, 2005; Yair and Davis, 2008), which is the foundation 
stone of S-D Logic (Vargo, 2007).  Co-operatives provide personal service to their 
members (Hogeland, 2006), which is also one of the main components of S-D Logic.  
In other words, S-D Logic provides that co-operatives should concentrate on 
meeting their customers’ demands and on providing solutions to their unique cases 
(Lusch et al., 2008).  Having discussed the similarities between co-operatives and 
S-D Logic, the following section will set out the research questions of the present 
study. 
2.5 Research questions 
Considering the significance of the adherence to the co-operative principles for the 
proper functioning of the co-operative governance system, and further to the 
discussion in Section 1.3.1, e.g., that the co-operative principles empower 
members to be more active in the decision making (Spear, 2000) the first research 
question is formed as follows:  
“How are co-operative principles perceived?” 
Moreover, in Sections 1.3.2 and 2.2.4, it has been discussed that co-operatives 
must find ways to keep their members involved (Fonteyne, 2007; Shaw, 2007; 
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Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011), because otherwise there will be problems with their 
governance (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009).  This could happen, for example, 
as the size and geographical dispersion of members increases, gradually leading to 
the distance of members from their co-operative (Spear, 2004b; Chaves, Soler and 
Sajardo, 2008).  Based on this discussion and due to the importance of the second 
co-operative principle, the second research question is: 
“How is the democratic participation of members perceived?” 
It is noted that the two research questions will be set out anew in Chapters 3 and 5 
as they develop. 
 
2.6 Summary 
In this Chapter, the co-operative governance system has been discussed, 
highlighting the factors that influence its choice.  For the traditional governance 
model, the most important governing body is members’ General Meeting, followed 
by the Board of Directors.  Apart from the traditional model, three other models 
(extended traditional, managerial and corporate model) were created in response 
to practical problems faced in some countries in Europe.  Additionally, the role of 
the Board of Directors was perceived as very important and the challenges faced by 
it were analysed.  Furthermore, the seven co-operative principles were discussed in 
detail, the similarities of co-operatives with S-D Logic were set out and explained 
as well as the relationship between service and member engagement.  Finally, the 
two research questions of the present study were set out.  In the following 
Chapter, the research aim is set and the research questions are further discussed.   
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Chapter 3: Research intent and research questions 
3.1 Introduction 
Having considered the co-operative governance and the co-operative principles in 
Chapter 2, this Chapter highlights the need for academic research on the practical 
adherence of co-operatives to their founding principles.  Additionally the research 
intent and research questions will be discussed in more detail.  Finally, the 
intended contribution to literature and to practice will be discussed. 
 
3.2 Qualitative research on the adherence to co-operative principles 
The need for qualitative research on the practical adherence of co-operatives to 
their founding principles was emphasised by a number of researchers (Spear, 2000; 
Novkovic, 2006; Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009; Wilson and MacLean, 2012; 
Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013).  In particular, Wilson and 
MacLean (2012) state that there is scope for research on assessing what co-
operative principles mean to co-operative members.  Moreover, Spear (2000) 
argues that the theoretical advantages of co-operatives over other forms of 
organization may not be reflected in their day to day reality.  Also, Novkovic (2006) 
claims that there is room for improvement in the application of co-operative 
principles in practice.  In general, the adherence of co-operative principles is so 
important that, in April 2015, the International Co-operative Alliance’s Principles 
Committee set out a draft of Guidance Notes on co-operative principles (ICA, 
2015a). 
Given that co-operative principles, and especially that of democratic member 
control, are the foundations for co-operative governance (Sacchetti and Tortia, 
2015) and as these represent a set of guidelines on how a co-operative and its 
members can interact with each other (Nilsson, 1996), the present study aims at 
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researching the adherence of co-operatives to their principles, paying special 
attention to the second principle, i.e. “Democratic member control”.   
As co-operatives engaged in the financial industry are currently under pressure and 
scrutiny, they arguably represent the ideal industry to be used for the collection of 
data for the present research.  This is because the 2008 crisis may have had a 
positive or a negative effect on the level of co-operatives’ adherence to co-
operative principles.  That is, the crisis and the resulting pressure and scrutiny may 
have reinforced the importance of principles, forcing co-operatives to adhere even 
more to them.  On the other hand, co-operatives may have suppressed their 
principles for more urgent issues, such as the reduction of non-performing loans, 
the reduction of expenses and the increase in deposits and surpluses.   
As seen above (Section 1.3.1), based on the literature, in theory co-operative 
principles are followed by all co-operatives at all times but, in practice, this may 
not be 100% true.  The present study thus, aims to understand the level of co-
operatives’ adherence to their founding principles in the post 2008 era.  This is 
done using structured interviews and focus groups in order to understand the 
perceptions of those employed and the members of co-operatives.  To the view of 
the present study’s author, this is the first time that co-operative principles are 
studied in a time of crisis and this is its biggest contribution.   
Additionally, this research intends to contribute to practice by informing 
practitioners and supervisory bodies regarding the perceived adherence of co-
operatives to their principles as well as any related issues, e.g. the importance of 
co-operative-related training, the need for capitalization, need for enhanced 
professionalism and organisational structure as well as the level of involvement of 
political parties in running of credit unions and ways to assist surrounding 
communities without cost to the co-operative.  Having set out the calls for more 
qualitative research on the practical adherence of co-operatives to their principles, 
the personal interest of the author of the present study on the same area will be 
explained below. 
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3.3 Researcher’s personal interest 
The author of the present study has personal interest in learning more about co-
operatives.  This is because, having worked for fifteen years in for-profit 
companies, when he came in contact with co-operatives, through his employment 
at the senior position of a large credit union, he felt that there was something 
different, something distinctive about them.  This distinctive feature seemed to 
stem from their not-for-profit nature as their objective was the enhancement of 
the well-being of their members (and not profit maximization).  Moreover, the 
issues pertinent to co-operative governance, the lack of members’ participation 
and co-operative principles, as discussed in Chapter 2, as well as co-operatives are 
of great interest to the author of the present study.   
The present study aims to research co-operatives, as the author believes that these 
organisations can benefit/assist their members, especially during the times of high 
unemployment, low salaries and high pressure from banks.  Simultaneously, the 
interest lies in the adherence of co-operatives to their founding principles.  
Although co-operatives claim that they follow these principles, the author believes 
that reality may be somehow different.  Finally, the successful history of co-
operatives indicates the need to return to their founding principles and build on 
their differentiating factors, restating the enhancement of their members’ wealth 
as their first and foremost important objective.  Having discussed the co-operative 
governance as well as the calls for academic research on the practical application 
of the co-operative principles, and the alignment of these calls to the personal 
interest of the author of the present study, the following section provides an 
overview of the existing literature leading to the two research questions. 
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3.4 Research intent and research questions 
Considering the discussion, in Sections 1.3.1 and 2.2.4, on the importance of co-
operative principles to the governance and the long-term survival of co-operatives, 
the intention of the present study is to understand the perceptions regarding the 
adherence to co-operative principles.  This may be achieved by examining and 
understanding the perceptions of those employed and the members of co-
operatives. 
With regards to the first research question, as set in Section 2.4, academics such 
as, Nilsson (1996), Korres (1999), Fajardo Garcia (2012) argue that the co-operative 
principles and values form the basis of the differentiation of co-operatives from 
investor-owned organizations.  More specifically, Korres, (1999) and Fajardo Garcia 
(2012) support that the distinction between true co-operatives from non-co-
operatives lies within the implementation of co-operative principles.  The co-
operative principles reduce the transaction costs both in the interaction of 
members amongst them, but also in the interaction of members with external (to 
the co-operative) parties simply by increasing the social cohesion of members as a 
group, and their sense of confidence, fellowship and solidarity (Nilsson, 1996).  
Moreover, these principles and values act as catalysts aligning the interests of 
members, allowing them to function together towards the fulfilment of their 
common goals (Nilsson, 1996).  In particular, Parnell (1995) supports that co-
operative principles should be consistently and continuously applied in the day-to-
day operations of the co-operatives and, at the same time, they should be kept up 
to date, adjusting them to the world developments and changes.   
However, despite what the literature above supports, there are indications that, in 
reality, the co-operative principles are not put in practice as proclaimed.  For 
example, further to the work of Wilson and MacLean (2012), Oczkowski, Krivokapic-
Skoko and Plummer, (2013) argue that co-operatives engaged in financial services 
seem to follow none of the seven co-operative principles.  Additionally, based on 
Sir Christopher Kelly’s report one can argue that co-operatives may not adhere to 
their principles because if they did so, the actions of the Co-operative Bank UK, 
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would not have “badly let down the Group's members” (Kelly, 2014, p.10).  In 
particular, according to Novkovic (2006, p.19) there may be a “separating line 
between the “co-op values” and “co-op business” as there is evidence that the 
practical application of the co-operative principles can be improved.  In a later 
article, Novkovic (2008) adds that even though the co-operative principles are well 
accepted, nevertheless, their implementation in their daily operations is entirely 
optional, and hence it may not happen in reality.  Thus, Oczkowski, Krivokapic-
Skoko and Plummer (2013) suggest that there is need for qualitative research 
aiming at the identification of the practical adherence of the co-operative 
principles by co-operatives.  Furthermore, Cabo and Rebelo, (2015) reinforce this 
claim by saying that there is a gap between how co-operatives behave in reality 
and what they proclaim.  For example, the co-operative principle of “autonomy 
and independence” is not a reality yet and the principle of “member democratic 
participation” is not often rewarded (Shaw, 2007).  Overall, Davis and Worthington 
(1993) support that it is not enough for a co-operative to declare that it follows co-
operative principles and values.  It must apply these values in its day-to-day 
operations so that its members can recognize and benefit from them, focusing on 
and delivering services that satisfy the needs of members (Davis and Worthington, 
1993).   
Going a step further, a number of researchers (Spear, 2000; Novkovic, 2006; 
Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009; Wilson and MacLean, 2012; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-
Skoko and Plummer, 2013) argue that there is room for qualitative research on the 
practical application of co-operative principles, for example, “the relationship 
between different organisational members' passion for the co-operative form and 
the application of the principles…, is worthy of further exploration” (Oczkowski, 
Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013, p.59).  Similarly, Wilson and MacLean (2012), 
state that there is scope for important research on the systematic assessment of 
what co-operative principles mean to the various stakeholders.  Moreover, 
Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013) argue that there is a need for 
qualitative research on the practical adherence of co-operative principles by co-
operatives.  What is important is the fact that the application of co-operative 
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principles in practice can be improved (Novkovic, (2006), while it is highlighted 
that there is not a lot of research on the ways co-operatives have integrated their 
values into their operations (Shaw, 2007).  Based on the above the first research 
question is:  
“How is the practical application of the co-operative principles perceived?” 
The second research question is mainly based on the discussion in Sections 1.3.2 
and 2.4.  In these sections, it has been identified that co-operatives must find ways 
to keep their members involved (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009), as their 
members play an important role in the success and long-term survival of their co-
operative (Hakelius, 1996, cited in Bhuyan, 2007).  In the case of member 
alienation, there could be a negative impact on the effectiveness of the co-
operative governance model (Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009; 2011) and could even 
cause the failure of a co-operative (Bhuyan, 2007).  Additionally, as discussed 
above (Section 2.2.4), the lack of members’ participation, could allow a small (an 
“elite”) group to control the co-operative (Itkonen, 1996; Birchall, 1997; 
Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, 2004a; Spear, 2004b; FSA, 2007), or even “permit” 
management to become the dominant figure (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007).  
This may restrict the authority of the Board of Directors to rubber-stamp 
management decisions and to review the past performance of co-operatives instead 
of challenging management (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007).  
Finally, the lack of members’ participation could cause problems in the 
identification of proper individuals to run for the Board of Directors’ elections 
(Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; 2009) effectively, leading to Boards of Directors 
that do not have the required skills for the job in hand (FSA, 2007).   
Despite the importance of members’ involvement in their co-operative and the 
negative consequences mentioned above, there is evidence that members are 
distant from their co-operatives.  It seems that when a co-operative is small and 
members are homogeneous, they are inclined to participate in their co-operative 
(Nilsson and Svendsen, 2011), but even in this case, members may become tired 
and hence distant themselves (Birchall, 1997).  On the other hand, as a co-
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operative becomes large and the geographical dispersal of members increases, 
membership engagement becomes more difficult (Bataille-Chedotel and 
Huntzinger, 2004; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; 2009).  Moreover, in large and 
heterogeneous co-operatives, members tend to free ride instead of controlling 
their co-operative because they believe that even if they participate they could 
achieve nothing or that others will control it (Nilsson and Svendsen, 2011; Edwards, 
2013).  Moreover, members in large co-operatives may distant themselves if they 
feel that they are ignored by management (Hakelius, 1996 cited in Bhuyan, 2007).  
Another reason for this abstention may be mismanagement, fraud and opportunism 
(Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012) as well as management pursue of its own goals, 
ignoring members’ needs (Bhuyan, 2007), that is, when there is a misalignment of 
management objectives from members’ objectives (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012).  
Finally, members may refrain from participating when they feel that the benefits 
and costs associated with membership are not balanced (Leviten-Reid and 
Fairbairn, 2011). 
Member alienation could be identified by the percentage of members attending the 
Annual General Meetings.  For example, there are findings that in democratic, 
member-based organisations (including co-operatives), members cannot control 
management effectively as, in 2001, only around 3% of members attended and 
voted at Annual General Meetings (Spear, 2004b).  Moreover, in 2007, only 3,6% of 
members (44,000 in total) attended the meetings of the Swedish Farmers' Supply 
and Crop Marketing Association (Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009).  Furthermore, 
the attendance of members at the General Meetings of Mondragon Corporación 
Cooperativa is lower than 30% reflecting the fact that citizens are not as active as 
anticipated (Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004).  Based on the above it seems 
that despite what is proclaimed, there is evidence that members may not be so 
actively involved with their co-operative and that they are distant in relation to it.  
This lack of participation could cause important problems to co-operatives as was 
the case with the Co-operative Bank UK, where the Group Board did not fulfil its 
duties to “provide effective stewardship” and thus “collectively…failed to ensure 
that the Co-operative Bank consistently lived up to its ethical principles” (Kelly, 
Page 56 of 297 
 
2014, p.4).  Hence, “these practical problems have to be understood and admitted 
if we are to apply the co-operative principle of democratic member control” 
(Birchall, 1997, p.54).  Finally, based on Wilson and McLean’s (2012, p.539) call for 
additional research “can active democratic participation by the majority of 
members be evidenced?” the second research question has been formed as follows:  
“How is the active democratic participation of members perceived?” 
3.5 Contribution to existing knowledge and practice 
One of the debates which started in 1980s and is still valid today relates to the 
governance system of co-operatives, with a number of researchers having 
highlighted, since 2002, the need for more research on co-operative governance.  
As co-operative principles, such as the principle of democratic member control and 
participation (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2015), represent the guidelines that describe 
the form and inter-relationships of members with their co-operatives.  This means 
that since the co-operative principles are considered to be the foundation for the 
governance structure and the indicator of the co-operative governance’s level of 
effectiveness, the aim of the present research is to study the adherence of co-
operatives to their founding principles.  By doing so, the present study will 
contribute to the general theory of co-operatives and more specifically to the 
effectiveness of the co-operative governance. 
The present study also aims to contribute to practice by informing the co-operative 
movement, the supervisory authority and the general co-operative movement 
regarding the members’ level of participation as well as possible reasons and 
solutions for this.  More specifically, the present study highlights the importance of 
co-operative-related training to all that are involved (Board of Directors, 
management, employees, existing and potential members, the general public, 
governmental officials); the low participation rates of members to the Annual 
General Meetings, to elections for the Board of Directors and standing as 
candidates for the Board elections and; the need for strengthening the 
capitalization of co-operatives in anticipation of downturns of economy.  Moreover, 
Page 57 of 297 
 
the present study aims to highlight to the supervisory authorities, the governmental 
officials and the regulators the need to enhance the professionalism and 
organisational structure of co-operatives and finally the extent of involvement of 
political parties in running of co-operatives.   
 
3.6 Summary 
In this Chapter, the need for qualitative research on the practical adherence of co-
operatives to their founding principles was analysed and the aim of the present 
study was set to investigate the adherence of co-operatives to their founding 
principles.  Additionally, as the co-operatives engaged in the financial industry are 
currently under pressure and scrutiny, they arguably represent the ideal industry to 
be used for the collection of data for the present research.   
The adherence to co-operative principles is studied because a number of academics 
argue that there is room for qualitative research on the practical application of co-
operative principles and because despite what the existing literature argues, there 
are indications that, in practice, not all co-operatives adhere to their founding 
principles.  Based on these, and in addition to Section 2.4, the 1st research question 
has evolved to: “How is the practical application of the co-operative principles 
perceived?” 
As co-operative members are an important part of their co-operative, and as co-
operatives are run by members for the benefits of members, to avoid potential 
problems and in order to succeed, co-operatives must find ways to keep their 
members involved.  Despite this, there is evidence that members are distant from 
their co-operatives.  Based on the above and Section 2.4 the 2nd research question 
has become: “How is the active democratic participation of members 
perceived?”.  The present study aims also at contributing to practice by 
highlighting the importance of co-operative-related training; the lack of member 
participation; the need to enhance the professionalism and organisational structure 
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of co-operatives and finally, the extend of involvement of political parties in 
running of co-operatives.  To the view of the present study’s author, this will be 
the first time that co-operative principles will be studied in a time of crisis and this 
could be its biggest contribution.  
As we have seen the intention of the present study is to understand the perceptions 
of employees and members of co-operatives in relation to the adherence of the 
latter to their founding principles.  As it will be shown in the next Chapter, in doing 
so, the present study considers collecting data in the context of Cyprus.  This 
geographic location is probably one of the most important as to the amount of 
pressure and scrutiny that has accumulated as a result of the financial crisis of 
2008 and the local financial breakdown of March 2013.  The changes that took 
place in credit unions in Cyprus include the passing of 99% of their ownership to the 
state, the very intense schedule for mergers reducing their number from more than 
100 to just 18 within a few months.  Additionally, there was a transfer of co-
operatives’ supervision to the Central Bank and mounting pressure to reduce the 
huge percentages of non-performing loans (caused by the change in the way they 
were calculated, by the unemployment and the salary reductions) in order to 
reduce the need for more external capital.  All these changes that took place could 
have pressured Cypriot credit unions to either adhere even more to their principles 
or; to abandon them.  Either way, Cypriot credit unions are a good co-operative 
sector in a good geographic location to collect data for the present study, a 
discussion that will follow in Chapter 4.   
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Chapter 4: Research context 
4.1 Introduction 
In this Chapter, the reasons for choosing Cyprus as the geographical area for this 
research are discussed, giving details of the Cypriot co-operative movement and 
analysing credit unions as the type of co-operative to be researched in the present 
study.  The choice of credit unions is also supported by the indications that they 
could represent a viable answer to the calls for change in the financial industry, 
following the financial crisis of 2008.  Moreover, credit unions are compared to 
investor-owned banks their special features and importance are discussed as well 
as their relevance to the data collection of the present research. 
 
4.2 The Cyprus context 
The co-operative movement in Cyprus already has 100 years of history and it 
focuses on meeting the needs of its members (CSSDA, 2004).  Cypriots trust co-
operatives as the latter are the main reason behind the uplift of peoples’ standard 
of living, enabling their members to avoid money-lenders and to be in a better 
negotiating position with regards to merchants (CSSDA, 2004).  For this and for 
another four reasons, Cyprus has been chosen as the focus for this research.  
As a starting point, co-operatives are very important for the Cypriot economy, as in 
the past there were 365 Savings and Credit co-operatives (Jones, 2001; CSSDA, 
2004) managing 32% of the domestic deposits of the island (Jones, 2001).  In 2002, 
the co-operative financial institutions employed 1,877 people, having deposits of 
Cy£3,513 million and loans of Cy£2,670 million (CSSDA, 2004).  By April 2007, there 
were 286 co-operative financial institutions, with deposits amounting to €5,544 
million and loans of €4,000 million (CSSDA, 2007).  However, as part of the 
continuous mergers between co-operative financial institutions their number has 
reduced from 286, in April 2007, to just 99 in 2012 (CSSDA, 2012).  In March 2013, 
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the Credit co-operative sector managed 18% of the total assets of the Cypriot 
banking sector (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2013), whereas, in 2014, it managed 
around 25% of deposits and around 20% of loans (Stockwatch, 2015).  In 2015 the 
number of credit unions fell to just 18 (Stockwatch, 2015), due to the mergers 
amongst them with no closures.  Due to the measures taken following the financial 
crisis of 2013, the number of co-operative branches has been reduced from 472, in 
2002, (CSSDA, 2004) to 417, in 2012, and to 296, in 2014 (Stockwatch, 2015).  Even 
after the reduction in the number of their branches, and with only 20%- 25% market 
share, co-operatives operate the same number of branches as all commercial banks 
combined (Stockwatch, 2015).  Also, co-operatives in Cyprus play a very important 
role in the reduction of unemployment as the co-operative sector in Cyprus is the 
largest employer after the public service (CSSDA, 2004).   
The second reason for focusing on Cypriot co-operatives is that they are facing the 
same issues as other co-operatives around the world.  For example, the perceived 
inability to attract external finance due to their small size and the inexperience of 
co-operatives in dealing with the financial markets and the restrictions of one 
person, one vote discourage members from increasing their shareholdings in co-
operatives (Co-operative Central Bank Ltd, 2011).  These highlight the fact that co-
operatives in Cyprus rely only on retained profits to increase their capitalization 
thus, lag behind the investor-owned banks which do not have such restrictions (Co-
operative Central Bank Ltd, 2011).  A second common problem among Cypriot and 
co-operatives around the world face is the double supervision scheme which in 
some cases does not facilitate enough enforcement of decisions by either of the 
two supervisory bodies.  However, as a result of the 2013 financial crisis in Cyprus, 
the supervision of credit unions was taken from the Commissioner for the Co-
operative Societies Supervision and Development Authority (CSSDA) and was 
granted to the Central Bank of Cyprus (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2013; 2015a; CSSDA, 
2014b).  By doing so, the double supervision was eliminated as co-operatives were 
appointed under the same supervisor as investor-owned banks.   
A third reason is that they face the same governance challenges as other co-
operatives around the world.  More specifically, co-operatives in Cyprus operate 
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under the traditional governance structure, i.e. they are governed by a Board of 
Directors that is elected by members, during an Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
(Bijman et al., 2012a).  The Board of Directors has no salary or other financial 
benefits and is elected for a renewable three-year term (Bijman et al., 2012a).  
The Board of Directors has no executive powers and hence it appoints a salaried 
General Manager (not necessarily a member of the specific co-operative), with no 
voting rights, to implement the decisions of the Board of Directors (Bijman et al., 
2012a).  In addition to the problems associated with traditional governance 
structure (Section 2.2.2), credit unions also face other problems as identified by 
the Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector.  These 
problems include the private interests of the members of the Board of Directors 
and that of management which are “intertwined with those of their customers, 
particularly their borrowers” (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2013, p.61).  What is more, 
it has been found that credit co-operatives were influenced by political 
figures/parties and that their supervision was ineffective (Central Bank of Cyprus, 
2013).  These problems have left Cypriot co-operatives with an ineffective 
governance system and huge losses, created by bad and non-performing loans 
(Central Bank of Cyprus, 2013).  To rectify these governance problems, the 
Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus Banking Sector, suggested the 
restructuring of Credit co-operatives to enable the introduction of “governance 
that is strong and, above all, independent" (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2013).   
The final reason for focusing on Cypriot co-operatives is the fact that the author of 
the present study has had experience in this environment.  To be able to collect 
data for his research, a researcher must understand the interviewees’ culture and 
language (Foddy, 1993).  He must be able to access sensitive information, establish 
strong rapport with the interviewees and gain their trust (Foddy, 1993).  With the 
researcher having been a General Manager of a large credit union in Cyprus his 
access to data in the specific context is facilitated, as he has already established 
strong rapport and understanding of the participants’ culture and language.  Having 
analysed the reasons for choosing Cypriot co-operatives, the following section will 
analyse the economy of Cyprus so as to set the scene for the present study. 
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4.2.1 The economy of Cyprus 
Cyprus joined the European Union on 1st May 2004, and on 1st January 2008 it 
adopted the Euro as its currency (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011).  Overall, Cyprus is 
a small open economy with a Gross Domestic Product –GDP at current prices- of 
€17,506,000, at the end of 2014, down from €19,063,000, at the end of 2010 
(Central Bank of Cyprus, 2015b).  During the decade 2000-2010, the Cypriot 
economy was strong with the fiscal deficit being at 2,7% of GDP and the Current 
Account deficit being at 6,9% of GDP (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011).  Financial 
services, tourism and real estate, in 2010, represented about 70% of GDP rendering 
services the largest sector of the Cypriot economy (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011).   
As a result of the financial crisis of 2008, Cyprus entered recession, in 2009, with 
its problems heightening in March 2013 due to the local financial crisis.  In 2009, 
the real growth shrunk by 1,7% with construction and other sectors of the economy 
facing serious problems (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011).  It is worth noting that 
construction, in 2013, had reached a record decrease of 32,6% (measured at the 
end of 2013) and a further decrease of 17,4% in September 2014 (Central Bank of 
Cyprus, 2015c).  Inflation averaged 2,7% for the first decade of 2000 (Central Bank 
of Cyprus, 2011), reaching -0,4%, in 2013, and -1,4%, in 2014 (Central Bank of 
Cyprus, 2015b).   
The Cypriot financial crisis of March 2013 had serious effects on the economy and 
on people.  From these, it is noted that the GDP Per Capita has decreased from 
€27,300, in 2008 (highest for the period 2004-2014), and €24,800, in 2012, to just 
€23,200, in 2014, signalling a fall of 15% (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2015e).  
Moreover, unemployment soared at historically high levels, from an average of 4,5% 
for the period 2000- 2010 (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011) to 11,3%, in 2014 (highest 
percentage since 2004) (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2015b, 2015e).  The reduction in 
the monthly earnings for the second quarter of 2003-2015 are seen in Figure 4.1 
below, showing the rollback of monthly earnings by at least four years, to the 
monthly earnings of 2011.  Moreover, the “Risk of poverty” increased, in 2014, to 
27,4% from 23.3%, in 2008.  This constitutes another indication of the worsening of 
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the income of households in Cyprus (Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus, 
2015d).  In a slightly better trend, the forecasts for real GDP growth for 2015 was 
0,2%, for 2016 it was estimated at 1,3% and for 2017 is estimated as 1,8% (Central 
Bank of Cyprus, 2015c), indicating an expected improvement of the financial 
situation.   
Figure 4.1: Average monthly earnings (seasonally adjusted data) for the period 
2003-2015 (Prepared by author using data from the Statistical Service of the 
Republic of Cyprus, 2015a). 
 
In addition to the reduction in the household income, the financial crisis of March 
2013 also caused a reduction in deposits.  This could be the result of the deposit 
haircut (or bail-in, i.e. the reduction of the amount of each client’s deposits over 
€100.000 in an attempt to cover the bank’s losses) and the flow of deposits out of 
the banks (and abroad) in an attempt to save them from a second haircut or to 
have them available in case of additional capital controls on the movement of 
cash.  The value of deposits (“Amounts owed to customers”) in the Cypriot system 
has decreased from €95,5billion, by the end of 2010, to just €47,4billion by end of 
March 2016 (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2016).  At the same time, the balance of loans 
(“Total loans and advances to customers (gross of allowances)”) from banks and co-
operatives to their customers has decreased from €93,6billion, by the end of 2010, 
to €55,1billion, by the end of March 2016 (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2016).  This 
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could indicate the pressure from banks on customers to repay their loans and the 
pause in granting new loans.  Based on the Financial Statements of Co-operative 
Central Bank Ltd for the year 2013 and the period from 1 January to 30 September 
2015, the balance of loans granted to customers (before provision for non-
performing loans) as at 31 December 2012 was €13,9billion (Co-operative Central 
Bank, 2015a, p.51) whereas, as at 30 September 2015 it was €12,9billion (Co-
operative Central Bank, 2015b, p.46,47), showing a 7,4% decrease most probably 
due to the non-granting of new loans to members.  
4.2.2 Banking sector in Cyprus 
The banking sector in Cyprus includes a large number of banks.  More specifically, 
there are seven local banks (three of which are listed on Cyprus Stock Exchange, 
with one of them being subject to resolution), the Co-operative Central Bank Ltd 
(acting as Central Body) and eighteen co-operative Credit Institutions affiliated to 
the Central Body (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2015d).  In addition to the local banks, 
there are currently six subsidiaries of foreign banks (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2015d) 
–in comparison with eight in 2011 (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011)-, there are nine 
branches of banks established in European Union countries, sixteen branches of 
banks from non-EU countries (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011; 2015d) and two 
representative offices (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2015d) -compared to just one in 
2011 (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011)-.  It is worth noting that, in 2013, as a result of 
the financial crisis in Cyprus, the second larger local investor-owned bank collapsed 
and its operations were merged with the biggest local one, creating a local bank 
with huge financial problems partly due to the size of the non-performing loans.   
The banking sector in Cyprus is supervised by the Central Bank of Cyprus, whose 
primary objectives include, ensuring a stable and safe financial system that fosters 
economic stability, economic growth and, at the same time, preserves public 
confidence (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011).  The role of the Central Bank of Cyprus 
is to grant the necessary licenses to all interested parties to carry banking business 
in Cyprus, to protect depositors and to minimize systemic risk through an effective 
supervision (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011).  Its supervisory role is exercised on a 
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consolidated basis and covers the banks and their subsidiary companies engaged in 
banking related activities (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2011).  Finally, the Central Bank 
of Cyprus follows the EU Directives on banking regulation and the banking 
supervision recommendations of the Basle Committee (Central Bank of Cyprus, 
2011).   
4.2.3 The co-operative movement in Cyprus 
Even though the co-operative practice, especially among farmers, has existed since 
the ancient times, the co-operative movement in Cyprus began, in 1909, about 60 
years after the European one because of the difficulty in building up enough initial 
capital and because of the apathy that was caused by peoples’ fear and 
disappointment from the money-lenders’ power and actions (CSSDA, 2004).  The 
co-operative movement in Cyprus was created in 1909, “placing man, his needs and 
his problems at the centre of its attention” (CSSDA, 2004, p.73).  The first official 
step in the creation of co-operatives, in Cyprus, was taken in 1914, when the "Law 
13 for Co-operative Credit Societies" was approved, enabling farmers to form co-
operatives (CSSDA, 2004) (in comparison, this step in Greece, took place in 1993 
(Karafolas, 2005)).  After this, the establishment of the Agricultural Bank, in 1925, 
led to the creation of an even larger number of co-operative societies as it lent 
money to local co-operative financial institutions which, in turn, granted loans to 
farmers (CSSDA, 2004).  After independence, in 1960, co-operatives in Cyprus grew 
stronger (Bijman et al., 2012a) as they were considered a necessity for the 
restriction/elimination of social problems, for the increase in the cohesion and 
unity of society and for fighting poverty and financial exclusion (CSSDA, 2004).  
Moreover, co-operatives were necessary because money-lenders and merchants, 
taking advantage of illiterate farmers, charged interest at rates as high as 600%, 
instead of the official interest rate of 12% (CSSDA, 2004).  Today, co-operatives in 
Cyprus offer a complete range of financial services and products including, loans 
for housing, education, health and business (CSSDA, 2004), deposits, current 
accounts with or without cheques, credit and debit cards, buying and selling of 
foreign currencies, insurance services, internet banking as well as ATMs (Co-
operative Central Bank Ltd, 2012). 
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With regards to the status of Cypriot co-operative financial institutions in relation 
to the European ones, in 1996, Cypriot co-operative credit institutions were 
harmonized with the European Directive on Money Laundering enacting the Law on 
the Prevention of Money Laundering (CSSDA, 2004).  Moreover, during the years 
between 2001 to 2007, the co-operative movement harmonised the Co-operative 
Societies’ Legislation with the European Directives on credit institutions (CSSDA, 
2004) and the European Directive putting in place their own Deposit Guarantee 
Scheme in 2000 (CSSDA, 2004).  In addition, since 2003, co-operative financial 
institutions have aligned with the provisions of the European Section on State Aid, 
when it was agreed to tax the portion of profits that result from transactions with 
non-members (CSSDA, 2004).   
Cyprus follows the traditional governance model (Section 2.2.2), thus, General 
Meetings (the supreme body in a co-operative) are where members’ control is 
expressed (Erakleous, 2007; CSSDA, 2014a).  Annual General Meetings can be 
summoned by the Board of Directors (Erakleous, 2007) within three months from 
the receipt of the audited financial statements (CSSDA, 2014a).  Additionally, an 
Extraordinary General Meeting can be summoned by the Board of Directors or the 
Commissioner of CSSDA (CSSDA, 2014a).  The members have the right to attend 
both regular Annual Meetings and the Extraordinary Meetings (Erakleous, 2007).  In 
the General Meeting, decisions on any subject that concerns a co-operative can be 
taken and are binding on all members (Erakleous, 2007).  During an Annual General 
Meeting, members have the power to assess the actions (or the lack of actions) of 
management in the period since the previous General Meeting (Erakleous, 2007).  
In practice, during an Annual General Meeting, the members present can approve 
the financial statements (CSSDA, 2005; 2014a; Erakleous, 2007), examine any 
member complaints, regarding the fairness of the Board of Directors’ decisions, 
(CSSDA, 2005; Erakleous, 2007) and decide how the profits of the previous year will 
be distributed (Erakleous, 2007; CSSDA, 2014a).  Moreover, at the General 
Meetings, the members ensure that their co-operative has followed the legal 
framework and the co-operative principles and that the decisions taken in previous 
General Meetings have been implemented (CSSDA, 2005).  Additionally, members 
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vote for the Board of Directors and they approve the appointment of the external 
auditors of the co-operative (Erakleous, 2007).  Overall, during a General Meeting, 
members decide about the dissolution of their co-operative and they have the legal 
right to deal with any issue which concerns their co-operative (Erakleous, 2007), 
including any governance-related problems.   
Concerning the Cyprus co-operative movement’s institutional bodies, these include 
the Committee and the Commissioner of Co-operative Societies’ Supervision and 
Development Authority (CSSDA), the Co-operative Central Bank Ltd, the Co-
operative Societies’ Audit Service and the Pancyprian Co-operative Federation Ltd 
(CSSDA, 2004).  The Co-operative Central Bank Ltd was created in 1937 and since 
then, it has acted as the central banker and the ‘lender of last resort’ for the co-
operatives (CSSDA, 2004).  Since 2003, the Co-operative Central Bank has also 
acted as the Central Body for all the co-operative financial institutions that either 
meet the minimum preconditions - but do not want to operate independently of 
the rest of the co-operative financial institutions- or do not meet them and hence 
affiliate with the Central Body in order to meet the threshold on a consolidation 
basis (CSSDA, 2004).   
Finally, co-operatives in Cyprus declare that they follow the co-operative principles 
and values.  This is evident by the central focus of co-operative principles and 
values in the publications of various member organizations of the co-operative 
movement in Cyprus.  For example, CSSDA has published a 23 page long booklet, 
which sets out the history of the co-operative movement in Cyprus, devoting three 
pages to explain the co-operative principles and values (CSSDA, 2004, 2005).  
Furthermore, the Co-operative Central Bank has devoted three pages in each of the 
two booklets prepared for the Education Fairs of 2008 and 2010, setting out and 
explaining the seven co-operative principles, (Co-operative Central Bank Ltd, 2008; 
2010).  Additionally, four pages of the booklet that was prepared by the Pancyprian 
Co-operative Confederation, as part of the celebrations for the 100 years of co-
operative presence in Cyprus, focused on the co-operative identity, principles and 
values (Pancyprian Co-operative Confederation, 2010).  Finally, the Co-operative 
Central Bank Ltd, the Cyprus Turkish Co-operative Central Bank Ltd and the 
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Pancyprian Co-operative Confederation are all members of the International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA), indicating that co-operatives in Cyprus adhere to the 
international co-operative principles and values (ICA, 2012b).   
Having explained the relevance of Cyprus as the geographical area for the proposed 
research and having set out information about co-operatives and the banking 
industry in Cyprus, it could be argued that the best context in which to test their 
adherence to the co-operative principles is the financial industry.  This is because 
the effects of the 2008 financial crisis are still being felt and academics and 
commentators are still voicing their requests for changes in this industry, inevitably 
putting pressure on all organisations that operate in it, including credit unions.  But 
before this, the present research will pause so that the issue of whether Cypriot 
financial co-operatives are credit unions will be examined. 
4.2.4 Are co-operative financial institutions in Cyprus credit unions? 
In Cyprus, there are two types of co-operative financial institutions: “Synergatiki 
Pystotiki Etairia” (or Co-operative Credit Company) and “Synergatiko Tamieftirio” 
(or Co-operative Saving).  The first type operates within a specified geographical 
area, whereas the second type operates within a specified profession, e.g. police 
officers, army officers, teachers, etc.  Both types of co-operative financial 
institutions register as members, people from their given area/profession only and 
they grant loans to their members only.  For both, only members can be elected on 
the Board of Directors and for both, the ultimate power rests with the members’ 
General Meeting where the one-person, one-vote principle is practised.  
Additionally, it is not necessary for employees and management to be members in 
either of the two financial institutions.  Both types of co-operatives are subject to 
the same law and institutions and have the same supervisory authority.  There are 
no restrictions on the amount of deposits, whereas the restrictions on the amount 
of shares to be held by any one member (physical person) are the same (less than 
20% of issued share capital of the organisation- paragraph 23) (CSSDA, 2014a, p.7).   
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During a search in various websites of credit institutions in Cyprus, on 30 
September 2013, in the Greek version of the websites almost all of them referred 
to themselves as co-operatives.  However one had a logo in Greek stating “Always 
remember this bank is yours” (http://www.stlmk.coop.com.cy/), another called 
itself as “Co-operative Bank” (http://www.estpafou.com/english/minima.shtml), a 
third one referred to itself as a “dynamic, effective and reliable banking 
institution” (http://www.lefkosia.coop/) and a fourth as a “modern banking 
institution” in Greek (http://www.coopparalimni.com/index.php/2013-06-04-17-
04-43/2013-06-04-17-09-19).  When the author of the present study also checked 
the English version of the same sites, one referred to itself as “Co-op” followed by 
its geographical area (http://www.coop-yeroskipou.com/en/coop/intro.html; 
http://www.coopparalimni.com/), two had at the end of their websites the 
following: “© 2011 Nicosia Coop Bank. All rights reserved” and “Copyright Coop 
Paralimni © 2013” respectively.  Finally, one of the credit institutions referred to 
itself as “Co-operative Savings Bank” (http://www.stl.com.cy/).  Based on the 
above search, it can be said that the Cypriot financial co-operatives are indeed co-
operatives, but the names used are not in agreement with this, especially in the 
English version of their names (e.g., with regards to the copyrights or the provision 
of banking services, etc.).   
Additionally, the author of the present study, having had the experience of dealing 
with both types and having studied their legislation and their institutions, 
personally considers that these two types of co-operative credit institutions may 
not be anything else but credit unions.  This is because, according to the World 
Council of Credit Unions (WCCU, 2012) the description/criteria of what can be 
called a credit union are all met by the credit institutions in Cyprus (Table 4.1 
below).   
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Table 4.1: Similarities of the Credit Co-operative Institutions in Cyprus with 
credit unions (based on WCCU, 2012) 
 “Criteria” set by WCCU Criteria met by Co-operative 
Credit Institutions in Cyprus? 
   
1a Credit unions, called by various names 
around the world,  
Co-operative 
Credit Company 
Co-operative 
Saving 
1b are member-owned,  True True 
1c not-for-profit  True True 
1d financial cooperatives that provide savings, 
credit and other financial services to their 
members. 
True True 
2 Credit union membership is based on a 
common bond, a linkage shared by savers 
and borrowers who belong to a specific 
community, organization, religion or place 
of employment. 
Geographical 
area of residence 
or employment 
Profession 
3 Credit unions pool their members' savings 
deposits and shares to finance their own 
loan portfolios rather than rely on outside 
capital. 
True True 
4 Members benefit from higher returns on 
savings, lower rates on loans and fewer 
fees on average. 
True True 
5 Credit unions worldwide offer members 
from all walks of life much more than 
financial services. They provide members 
the chance to own their own financial 
institution and help them create 
opportunities such as starting small 
businesses, growing farms, building family 
homes and educating their children.  
True True 
6a Regardless of account size in the credit 
union, each member may run for the 
volunteer board of directors 
True True 
6b and cast a vote in elections True True 
 
Based on the above similarities between Cypriot financial co-operatives and credit 
unions and as a matter of simplicity with regards to the names of the two types of 
the former, the present study will use the term “credit union” when referring to 
Cypriot financial co-operatives.  Moving on, as it might be the case that financial 
co-operatives could represent a viable answer to the calls of academics and 
professional media for changes in the financial industry, especially for a back to 
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basics, more transparent, fairer and more ethical services, the analysis moves to 
the financial crisis of 2008 and more specifically to the calls for change as a result 
of it.  
 
4.3 Calls for change in the financial industry 
The need for changes in organisations engaged in the finance industry was 
identified by the author of the present study through the review of academic and 
professional media in the periods after the financial crisis of 2008, and more 
specifically in 2010 and 2011.  The crisis and its significant and ongoing 
consequences have provoked academics, individuals, commentators, regulators and 
professional institutions to call for change.  Given that academic articles usually 
lag behind professional media, the decision was taken, by the researcher of the 
present study, to review the latter in order to identify the themes that are useful 
in establishing people’s reactions to the financial crisis and what needs to be done 
in order to improve the situation.   
For the purpose of the present study, international professional media was initially 
reviewed aiming at highlighting demands and expectations.  This review was 
carried out through the library of the University of Glasgow “Newsbank”, searching 
the headlines and using the key words ‘financial crisis’ for the years 2008 and 2009 
and then for 2010 and 2011.  In addition to professional media, academic journals 
were reviewed by searching using the key words ‘financial crisis 2008’, ‘small 
business’ and ‘personal banking’ for the years 2010 and 2011, in Business Source 
Premier, Econlit and Science Direct databases.  The academic articles found simply 
confirmed what was already discussed in professional media (Table 4.2).  That is, 
not much had been done yet and that there was a pressing need for ethical 
finance.   
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Table 4.2: Findings from both the academic journals and the professional 
media: 
 
 Need Calls for action: Professional 
media 
Calls for action: Academic & 
government 
1 New 
business 
models 
Carnall (2008); Boyle, (2008); 
Tett, (2008); Duncan and 
Kennedy, (2008); Atkins (2009); 
Nimmo, (2010); Mustafa, (2010); 
Anonymous (2010c); Anonymous 
(2011a); (Anonymous, 2011b); 
O’Brien (2011); Farrands (2011)  
Crotty (2008); Dudley (2009); 
Brunnermeier (2009); 
Colander et al. (2009); Dowd 
(2009);  
 
2 Change Chan (2010); Fitoussi (2010); 
Rowley (2010); Tan (2010); 
Anonymous, (2010b); Anonymous 
(2010e); Hadfield (2011); Wilson 
(2011); Cermak (2011b); O’Brien 
(2011); Raleigh (2011); 
Anonymous (2011d) 
 
Simmons, Birchall and Prout 
(2007); Borio (2008); 
Congleton, (2009); Richter 
(2009); Blundell-Wignall and 
Atkinson (2009); Massey 
(2010); Coperstake (2010); 
Peters, Pierre and Randma-
Liiv (2010); Transparency 
International (2010); Berg, 
(2011); Grint and Holt (2011); 
ECRC (2011); Mehran, Morrison 
and Shapiro (2011); Gibbons 
(2011);  
3 Legislation/
Regulation 
Benoit and Wilson (2008); 
Hosking (2009); Booth (2009); 
McCathie (2010); Felsenthal and 
Clarke, (2010); Anonymous 
(2011c); Johnston (2011a); Yee 
(2011); Chang (2011a); McArdle 
(2011); Lagarde (2011); Johnston 
(2011b); Cermak (2011a) 
Scott (2009); Kotz (2009); 
Ingves (2009a); Ingves 
(2009b); Brunnermeier et al. 
(2009); Gorton (2009); Dowd 
(2009); Gorton and Metrick 
(2010); Geanakoplos (2010); 
Anonymous (2010d); Campbell 
(2011); Munir (2011); Brown 
(2011); 
4 Alignment 
of 
executive 
with 
corporate 
targets 
Soros (2008); Booth (2009); 
Herman (2009); Coates, Nugent 
and Cohen (2009); Farrell (2011); 
Cua (2011); Quah (2011) 
Cornforth (2004); Kalmi, 
Pendleton and Poutsma 
(2004); Kaarsemaker and 
Poutsma, (2006); Cremer 
(2009); Kaarsemaker, 
Pendleton and Poutsma 
(2009); Sharfman (2009); 
Sharpe (2010); Igan, Mishra 
and Tressel (2011); Turnbull 
and Pirson (2011);  
5 Training Masters, (2008); Carnall, (2008)  
6 Prosecution Ferry (2010); Anonymous 
(2010a); Brummer (2011); Chang 
(2011b) 
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One of the important findings from the review of academic articles was that the 
financial crisis has been partly caused by the breakdown of the corporate 
governance system of financial institutions.  For example, academics demanded 
that the executive directors’ power should be put into check and stakeholders, 
including non-executive directors, should act as devil’s advocates or internal 
’regulators’, constructively criticizing executive directors’ decisions and plans 
(Sharfman, 2009; Sharpe, 2010; Turnbull and Pirson, 2011).  Additionally, a number 
of researchers (Kalmi, Pendleton and Poutsma, 2004; Kaarsemaker and Poutsma, 
2006; Kaarsemaker, Pendleton and Poutsma, 2009), suggested that the personal 
targets of executives could be aligned to that of corporations by introducing plans 
enabling employees to participate both in the decision making and the company’s 
management.  In order to regain confidence and to avoid a similar future crisis 
(Dudley, 2009), it was proposed to implement a return to basics (Crotty, 2008) and 
to the core principles of society (Massey, 2010).  Moreover, more transparency in 
and more responsibility by the banking sector and the resolution of the principal-
agent problems were also suggested (Borio, 2008; Congleton, 2009; Richter, 2009; 
Gibbons 2011; ECRC, 2011). 
The above findings corroborate with the results from the review of reputable media 
as commentators argued that management worked against the interests of their 
shareholders and that management should align its interests to those of the 
organisation that employed it (Farrell, 2011).  Moreover, the Boards of Directors 
should have increased the time spent on company strategy and in assessing the 
appropriateness and the soundness of management's proposed strategies (Quah, 
2011).  Finally, commentators suggested a back to basics, a fairer, a more 
humanistic and a more ethical financial services sector (Boyle, 2008; Rowley, 2010; 
Mustafa, 2010; O’Brien, 2011; Farrands, 2011).   
Based on the above, it may be argued that financial co-operatives could indeed 
provide an alternative that could offer what is requested by both academics and 
professional media.  This is because co-operatives are not-for-profit providers of 
basic financial services, which are transparent and tailor-made to the needs of 
their members.  Moreover, financial co-operatives are run by members (i.e. the 
Page 74 of 297 
 
Board of Directors consists only of members) for the benefit of members.  This 
double identity of members, their ability to get elected to the Board of Directors 
and their ability to vote at the members’ Annual General Meeting empower 
members to an unparalleled level of transparency.  Additionally, the not-for-profit 
nature of co-operatives ensures that there are no “small prints” and that the 
products are fairly priced, ensuring that the members obtain the best possible 
deal.  
 
4.4 Financial co-operatives as the industry to collect data 
Having explained the reasons for choosing Cyprus as the geographical area, in this 
section, the choice of credit unions is examined as the industry in which to collect 
the data for the present study.  From all co-operatives, credit unions are chosen 
for the present study because, as a result of the financial crisis, they are presently 
under pressure, rendering them the best sector in which to study the practical 
adherence to co-operative principles.  It is an environment where the pressure and 
the demands of members, the society and the supervisory body are maximized, 
creating many and antagonising objectives.  If indeed credit unions adhere to their 
founding principles then, this excess pressure will not greatly affect this 
adherence.  If however, credit unions do not adhere to their principles, to the level 
they proclaim, then the pressure on them will reveal the reality. 
4.4.1 Financial co-operatives 
It is argued that the financial co-operative model is a proven one as it manages to 
attract new clients, an area where investor-owned banks seem not to have 
achieved what was required of them (EACB, 2010; Borzaga and Galera, 2012).  
Additionally, the 2008 crisis has shown that those claiming that co-operatives were 
obsolete and that they would disappear in the near future were wrong as more 
than 100 years had already elapsed since they were founded (CSSDA, 2004; 
Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011; Whyman, 2012; Groeneveld, 2015).  Even though 
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prior to the financial crisis of 2008 co-operatives were perceived as not very 
innovative or efficient, they, nevertheless, managed to weather this crisis better 
than the investor-owned banks (Cabo and Rebelo, 2015).  This finding is evidenced 
by net surpluses for co-operatives when investor-owned banks reported heavy 
losses in 2011 (Cabo and Rebelo, 2015).  Additionally, this evidence shows that co-
operatives are a real business alternative to investor-owned banks even to this day 
(Cabo and Rebelo, 2015).  Thus, co-operative financial institutions are not only 
relevant in today’s economic conditions, but they are also important in the 
economies in which they operate both in Europe and around the world. 
4.4.2 Importance of financial co-operatives 
Co-operatives are important for the economies of European countries, both within 
and outside the European Union, the USA and worldwide.  Additionally, co-
operatives are very important in job creation and in strengthening the economic 
and social fabric (Jones, 2012).  With regards to Europe in particular, co-operative 
banks are distinctive in the sense that their stakeholder-oriented governance 
enables them to engage mainly in retail banking, something that results in 
moderate risks and tight links with the local communities and the real economy 
(Groeneveld, 2015).  Co-operative financial institutions have played an important 
role in Europe since the 19th century (Stolz and Wedow, 2005; Goddard and Wilson, 
2005; Fonteyne, 2007; Hesse and Čihák, 2007; Brannen and Ibrahim, 2010; Talwar, 
2011; Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014).  According to EACE (2015), in Europe, 
81million members own 4,200 local and regional co-operative banks which, through 
a network of 67.000 branches, serve 205million customers, and manage €7,5trillion 
assets, deposits of €3,7trillion and loans of €3,9trillion.  In the European Union 
alone, there are 4,000 regional and local co-operative financial institutions with 
around 49 million members and 62,000 branches (Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009).  It 
is worth noting also that the five biggest financial co-operatives in the European 
Union are within the top 25 financial institutions in respect to equity (Hesse and 
Čihák, 2007).  In five EU countries, co-operatives have more than 40% of the 
country’s number of branches and in some countries they have almost 30% of total 
assets (Hesse and Čihák, 2007).  In Germany, at the end of 2003, the co-operative 
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and savings banks were a very important component for the financing of Small and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs) as their combined market share was 52%, while that of 
the investor-owned banks was only 44% (Stolz and Wedow, 2005).  Moreover, in 
Portugal co-operative saving banks have approximately 50% of the retail banking 
sector (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona and Salas, 2004).  Since its adoption by the 
European Council in 2003, transnational (within the European Union) co-operatives 
(called “European Cooperative Societies” or “SCE”) can be set up under SCE 
regulation (Cyprus Government, 2006; Shaw, 2007; Fonteyne and Hardy, 2011; Fici, 
2012; Campos and Ávila, 2012).  With respect to employment, the International 
Labour Organization stated that co-operatives are very important in job creation 
(ILO, 2002).  In fact, co-operatives, and the rest of Social Enterprises, account for 
6,5% of the total employment in the European Union, totalling 14,5 million jobs 
(Chaves and Campos, 2012) and hence, contributing to the strengthening of the 
social fabric (Spear, 2000; Julia- Igual and Melia, 2006; Jones, 2012).   
Similarly to financial co-operatives, agricultural co-operatives have been very 
important, in the European Union, with an average market share of 40%, in 2010, 
whereas, in some countries (e.g., Finland) it reaches 70% (Bijman et al., 2012a).  
Additionally, it can be argued that part of the competitiveness, economic success 
and prosperity of Finland, Sweden and Switzerland is due to the co-operative 
businesses that are in operation in these countries (Birchall, 2009). 
Apart from their European presence, co-operative financial institutions also have a 
strong presence in the USA, where it can be said that they have existed since the 
formation of the country (Harter and Krone, 2001).  Worldwide, 589 credit unions, 
co-operative banks and other co-operatives that engaged in the financial sectors of 
39 countries had a combined banking income amounting to US$232 billion, in 2013 
(Euricse, 2015).  Based on the same survey, there are 2,829 co-operatives in 76 
countries, with a total turnover of $2,951 billion, in 2013 (Euricse, 2015).   
Despite their considerable involvement in the economies around the world, it is 
estimated that co-operative financial institutions accounted for less than 3% of the 
total losses associated with the 2008 crisis (Stefancic, 2011).  This lends strong 
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support for the claim that co-operatives are indeed both ethical and sustainable 
providers of financial services (Valor et al., 2007; Boyle, 2008; Simon and Mayo, 
2010; EACB, 2010; Ferri, 2012) and that they are capable of pursuing ethical 
objectives effectively (Simon and Mayo, 2010; Fonteyne and Hardy, 2011).   
Despite their importance in the economies around the world, financial co-
operatives have both strengths and weaknesses when compared to investor-owned 
banks.  As with all co-operatives, these differences stem principally from the not-
for-profit nature of financial co-operatives. 
4.4.3 Financial co-operatives Vs investor-owned banks 
When co-operatives are evaluated in relation to investor-owned banks, all of the 
noted differences stem from their different ownerships (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  
According to various researchers (Feinberg and Rahman, 2006; Hesse and Čihák, 
2007; Fonteyne, 2007; Valor et al., 2007; Gutiérrez, 2008; Brannen and Ibrahim, 
2010) the co-operative organizational model is different from that of investor-
owned banks but this does not mean that it is inferior.  For example, co-operatives 
are usually less diversified and place more reliance on a specific profession or on a 
specific geographical area possibly creating an over-reliance on these 
professions/areas (Korres, 1999; Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009, 2011; Stefancic, 
2011).  Additionally, co-operatives may be slower in taking decisions, potentially 
causing problems, especially, in cases where speed is of essence, something that 
could result from the democratic way co-operatives are run (Fonteyne, 2007).   
The greatest advantage of co-operatives is that the double identity of 
members/customers could enhance the control of members over management, 
restricting opportunistic behaviours from management and encouraging responsible 
behaviours (Ferri, 2012; Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014).  The double identity of 
members/customers can also lower the risk of opportunistic behaviour and 
information asymmetry by members/borrowers (Jones, 2001; Fonteyne, 2007), 
something that is strengthened even more by the proposition that co-operatives are 
democratically controlled, usually on the basis of one-person one-vote (Fonteyne, 
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2007; Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009; Brannen and Ibrahim, 2010).  Additionally, this 
dual relationship of members/customers and their ability to constantly interact 
with their co-operative, enables the co-operative to gain an in-depth knowledge of 
the financial position of each of its members (Jones, 2001; Fonteyne, 2007), 
enabling it to structure its contractual relationships with its members differently 
and probably more efficiently than investor-owned firms (Harvey and Sykuta, 
2005).   
A second advantage of financial co-operatives is the indication that the presence of 
co-operative banks in an economy renders it more stable even for the investor-
owned banks (despite the investor-owned banks’ arguments against) (Feinberg and 
Rahman, 2006; Hesse and Čihák, 2007).  Additionally, financial co-operatives 
contribute to the smoothing of the economies in which they operate in times of 
rapid increases or decreases in the provision of loans (Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 
2014).  Moreover, through the direct competition between financial co-operatives 
and investor-owned banks, the functioning of the financial markets normalizes, 
resulting in lower risk of antitrust behaviour on the part of investor-owned banks 
(Feinberg and Rahman, 2006; Hesse and Čihák, 2007), effectively creating a 
“competitive yardstick” forcing all organisations to be more honest (Hogeland, 
2006, p.69).  For example, the presence of co-operative banks in the Italian 
banking system assists in the rationalization of the interest rates and bank charges 
and in increasing the banking system’s solvency (Gutiérrez, 2008).  This argument 
is strengthened further by evidence that credit unions are slower in increasing their 
interest rates (Feinberg and Rahman, 2006) and by evidence that co-operatives 
continue to provide finance even in the time of crises (Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 
2014).  Based on annual figures, for the years 1999-2011, of a sample of 4,352 
financial institutions from 12 Euro area countries, statistical proof was found that 
co-operatives continue to provide finance even during the period of crisis (period 
2008-2011), in contrast to investor-owned banks (Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014).  
The reason for this is the not-for-profit nature of co-operatives and their focus on 
long-term lending relationships with their members, enabling them to smooth out 
the financial position of their members (Ferri, Kalmi and Kerola, 2014).  
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Additionally, financial co-operatives have built a strong financial position over the 
years (EACB, 2010).  On the other hand, investor-owned banks depend on financial 
co-operatives for their liquidity as, due to the high level of deposits from their 
members, financial co-operatives are usually net lenders to investor-owned banks 
in the interbank market (Karafolas, 2002; Fonteyne, 2007).  Finally, financial co-
operatives are more stable than investor-owned banks because of the mutual 
support arrangements among co-operatives (Hesse and Čihák, 2007; EACB, 2010; 
Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011; Stefancic, 2011; JeanNoel and Lemzeri, 2012), which 
reduce transaction costs and distribute associated risks (Stefancic, 2011).   
A third advantage of co-operatives is that they enjoy a higher customer loyalty 
than investor-owned banks.  This may be because co-operatives have a social 
purpose and not a profit maximizing objective (Reed and Reed, 2009).  
Additionally, co-operatives have an advantage where the buyer of a service is 
locked in for the longer term or has no access to alternative services (Holmstrom, 
1999; Spear, 2000).  However, co-operatives’ advantages in relation to other forms 
of organisations exist only, as long as, there is an element of trust involved and 
especially where there is a great asymmetry of information between the consumer 
and the organization (Spear, 2000).   
Despite their advantages, co-operatives have also disadvantages in relation to 
investor-owned banks.  One of the most important drawbacks is that co-operatives 
face difficulties when they try to raise additional capital.  There are three reasons 
for this.  Firstly, the amounts that members are willing to invest in the co-
operative are held back by restrictions on membership, on the 
transferability/tradability of shares and on their redeemable value (restricting it at 
par value) (Cook, 1995; Harte, 1997; Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Karafolas, 2005).  
This means that co-operative members are allowed to withdraw their investment in 
a co-operative only when they exit from it, and this creates a deterrent as to the 
maximum amount that each member is willing to invest in his co-operative (Julia- 
Igual and Melia, 2006).  Additionally, the not-for-profit nature of co-operatives 
limits the incentives of external financiers to invest in co-operatives (Sacchetti and 
Tortia, 2012) as was the case in 1990, in Sweden, when the co-operative banks 
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demutualized in an attempt to attract enough new capital to overcome the crisis 
caused by the huge increases in the cost of capital (Hesse and Čihák, 2007).  The 
second reason is that the current legislation restricts the amount co-operatives 
could raise in the form of capital (Karafolas, 2005; Reed and Reed, 2009) and 
thirdly, the inability of co-operatives to access external finance as traditionally, 
any capital (in addition to the initial capital) was financed through retained 
earnings (Korres, 1999; Chaddad and Cook, 2004; Karafolas, 2005; Birchall and 
Ketilson, 2009; Fajardo Garcia, 2012; Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012).  This tactic 
however, has prevented co-operatives from gaining expertise in dealing with the 
money markets (Fonteyne, 2007; Fajardo Garcia, 2012; Cabo and Rebelo, 2014), 
something that could prove useful in case of crisis.  A possible solution to the above 
problems could be the imposing of stricter regulations on co-operatives but at the 
same time enabling them to grant bigger and lengthier loans (Jones, 2006).  
Additionally, changes to the current system could be needed so as to introduce 
appropriate mechanisms and tools for co-operatives to raise additional capital, 
e.g., by issuing non-voting shares to co-operative members (Korres, 1999; 
Fonteyne, 2007), changes that will also boost the market confidence in the entire 
banking system (Fonteyne, 2007; Gutiérrez, 2008).   
The second weakness refers to claims that the organizational model of financial co-
operatives results in their “ineffective” running.  That is, financial co-operatives 
are less inclined to reduce their operating expenses.  For example, there is 
evidence that investor-owned banks in Germany, France, Spain and Italy are more 
effective in managing costs and revenues than co-operative financial institutions 
(Fonteyne, 2007).  On the other hand, empirical studies have found that even 
though financial co-operatives overall are less profitable than investor-owned 
banks, the former seem to be more cost effective than investor-owned banks 
(Gutiérrez, 2008).  For example, financial co-operatives maintain a lower average 
cost per employee (Fonteyne, 2007), possibly due to the volunteer work (Karafolas, 
2002; Feinberg and Rahman, 2006) and donations from employers or associations 
(Feinberg and Rahman, 2006).  Additionally, even though Spanish Savings Banks are 
much smaller than investor-owned banks, nevertheless they are more profitable in 
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respect to profits from banking operations (Crespi, Garcia-Cestona and Salas, 
2004).  This higher profitability of co-operatives in relation to commercial banks is 
also true for co-operative banks in Greece as over the period 1994- 1999, they had 
an average “net interest margin on assets” of 6,2 in relation to just 2,2 of all 
commercial banks as well as lower expenses as reported by the average “Non-
interest expenses on assets” of 1,9 in relation to 2,4 of all commercial banks 
(Karafolas, 2002).  Even more, co-operatives may take less risk than investor-
owned banks (Fonteyne, 2007; Stefancic, 2011), something that is in line with the 
financial co-operatives’ not-for-profit nature and their lower pressure to show 
profits (Hesse and Čihák, 2007).  Overall, it can be argued that financial co-
operatives must be profitable, but profit itself is not an end but rather the means 
through which the wealth of the members is enhanced (Stikkers, 2011).  Based on 
the above, the lower reported profits are not the result of bad management or less 
effective cost management by financial co-operatives, but rather the result of the 
implementation of the co-operative objectives (Hesse and Čihák, 2007; Alexopoulos 
and Goglio, 2011).  The “ineffectiveness” of the financial co-operative model can 
also be induced by the fact that financial co-operatives are more asset and human 
resource intensive than investor-owned banks (Fonteyne, 2007). This means that, 
as a result of their extended branch network financial co-operatives are more 
vulnerable in case of reductions in profitability but, at the same time more 
profitable during normal times (Fonteyne, 2007).  
Another drawback is that even though there are laws and established supervisory 
bodies in each country, currently, there are not enough regulations and supervision 
of the co-operative financial institutions.  That is, the large number of financial co-
operatives and especially the large number of small ones causes problems to the 
governmental agencies, forcing them to rely on apex organizations for the 
supervision of small financial co-operatives (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Fonteyne, 
2007).  This practice however may cause conflicting roles and it may lower the 
expected supervision of smaller and more vulnerable (usually rural) financial co-
operatives (Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Fonteyne, 2007).  The idea of subjecting the 
co-operative financial institutions to the same laws and supervision as investor-
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owned banks is a tested, quick and low cost answer to the current problems 
(Cuevas and Fischer, 2006).  However, it may not be the best solution because of 
the not-for-profit nature of the co-operative financial institutions (Cuevas and 
Fischer, 2006).  In India, the ineffectiveness of the dual supervision was resolved in 
1966 when the supervision of the co-operatives was transferred from the 
governmental Registrar of Co-operative Societies to the supervision of India’s 
central bank (Talwar, 2011) which, in the case of Cyprus, took place in 2013, 
following the financial crisis of March 2013 (CSSDA, 2014b; Central Bank of Cyprus, 
2015a).   
Other limitations of the co-operative financial model include a report prepared, in 
2007, by the European Commission, which highlights the risk of co-operatives in 
Europe gaining more monopoly power than investor-owned banks as a result of 
barriers of entry (with non-members lacking voting power) and restrictions to 
compete, such as price-fixing and market-sharing (as a result of co-operatives 
collaborating amongst them) (Gutiérrez, 2008).  However, despite this, there are 
indications that the growth of their financial co-operatives is prevented by certain 
laws, such as the capital levels that they must maintain as minimum which are 
much higher than the equivalent for banks (Goddard and Wilson, 2005).   
Having analysed financial co-operatives and compared them to investor-owned 
banks the analysis will now move to a specific type of financial co-operatives, that 
of credit unions.  This is because as a result of the pressure they face, especially in 
Cyprus, and their importance in the local economies, credit unions could be a very 
good co-operative industry in which to collect data for the present study. 
4.4.4 Credit unions as the sector to collect data 
Having explained the reasons for choosing Cyprus, as the geographical area in 
which to collect data for the present study (Section 4.2), the choice of financial co-
operatives and the reasoning for choosing credit unions will be analysed below.  
Following the financial crisis of March 2013, in Cyprus, and the resulting deposit 
haircut, the loss of jobs, the reduction in salaries, but most importantly the fear 
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and the uncertainty that people felt has inevitably put co-operative principles 
under scrutiny and pressure.  At the same time, credit unions suddenly were faced 
with borrowers who either lost their jobs or were left with less income, causing a 
tsunami of non-performing loans, which in turn raised the need for additional 
capital.  Consequently, credit unions were thrown in deep and troubled waters, 
possibly causing them to move their focus on their own survival rather than on the 
adherence to their founding principles.  Additionally, the granting of 99% of shares 
in credit unions to the state in exchange for €1,5billion, which Troika considered as 
necessary for their proper recapitalization, has caused even more member and 
management/employee concerns about the future of credit unions.  Thus, as credit 
unions and their principles are under pressure and scrutiny, they could be the most 
appropriate co-operative sector in which to study the adherence to co-operative 
principles.  It could be the case that during times when their survival is 
endangered, credit unions and members consider co-operative principles more of a 
burden than an asset, turning their attention to more important aspects of their 
survival.  Having explained the reason for choosing credit unions, their importance 
and their differences from investor-owned banks will be discussed in the sections 
that follow. 
4.4.5 Importance of credit unions 
The importance of credit unions in today’s world, especially after the financial 
crisis of 2008, represents a vibrant and dynamic topic for contemporary inquiry by 
academics (McKillop and Wilson, 2011). Credit unions are a form of co-operative 
financial institutions (Davis, 2001; McKillop and Wilson, 2011; World Council of 
Credit Unions, 2012) and are self-help organisations which aim at attaining the 
financial and social objectives of their members and those of the wider 
communities they operate in (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  Furthermore, credit 
unions are service-oriented co-operatives (Smith, 1984) and they have been 
characterized as “the purest form of all cooperatives” as they deal exclusively 
with their members (Taylor, 1971, p.213).  Credit unions represent a combination 
of purchasing with marketing co-operatives as they deal with both lenders and 
borrowers of funds (Taylor, 1971).  In general, the objectives of credit unions 
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include promotion of prudence (encouraging both savings and loans), training of 
members in managing their financials and member control of credit unions 
(ABCUL, 2015).  Additionally, credit unions are quite unique social institutions 
(Taylor, 1971), are not-for-profit, member-owned organisations (Smith, 1984; 
Fonteyne, 2007; McKillop and Wilson, 2011; World Council of Credit Unions, 2012) 
and are governed on the basis of one-member, one-vote rule (Davis, 2001).  As 
credit unions are co-operatives, their members are able to take part in the 
running of their credit union and the members of the Board of Directors are 
elected from within the members in order to represent their common interests 
(ABCUL, 2015).  Credit unions serve their members which must have a common 
bond, i.e. a social link that pre-existed such as belonging to a specific 
geographic, industrial or community group (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  What is 
more, credit unions offer low risk (EACB, 2010), responsible (Valor et al., 2007), 
simple, transparent products which are adjusted to the local needs (Alexopoulos 
and Goglio, 2011) and priced in a reasonable and fair way (Jones, 1999; 
Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011; ABCUL, 2015).  Apart from the benefits they 
provide to their members (Valor et al., 2007; Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012), their 
not-for-profit nature enables credit unions to attract and serve people that would 
not otherwise have access to financial products (Jones, 1999; 2001; ILO, 2002; 
Ward and McKillop, 2005; Cuevas and Fischer, 2006; Valor et al., 2007; Fonteyne, 
2007; Gutiérrez, 2008).  There is evidence that credit unions charge around 2% 
lower interest rates on their loans in comparison to the equivalent of investor-
owned banks (Feinberg and Rahman, 2006) and that they offer their services, in 
rural areas (Jones, 1999; Valor et al., 2007) as well as in urban areas.  
Furthermore, credit unions grant affordable loans to their members, without 
loans or capital from non-members, simply by pooling the savings of their 
members (Taylor, 1971; WCCU, 2012; ABCUL, 2015).  These loans, range from 
education, to building family houses, to growing farms or even starting small 
businesses (WCCU, 2012). The distribution of the surpluses is done by returning 
money to members, in proportion of their business with the credit union, by 
growing the credit union’s operations and by introducing/enhancing the services 
for all members (McKillop and Wilson, 2011), meaning that these amounts remain 
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in local communities and are not sent to unknown shareholders (ABCUL, 2015).  In 
the USA, credit unions almost exclusively serve the household sector (Emmons 
and Schmid, 2000) whereas in Ireland, credit unions were set up in order to 
provide employment and to limit the power of money-lenders (Jones, 2001; 
McCarthy, Farrell and Hewson, 2016).   
Worldwide, credit unions have grown from 1,700 in 1932, to 53,685 by 2008, with 
presence in 97 countries and with almost 186 million members, owning assets of 
about US$1,2 trillion and loans of about US$847 billion (Brannen and Ibrahim, 
2010).  In 2009, there were 49,330 credit unions, serving 184 million members in 98 
countries managing assets worth of US$1,354 billion (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  
By the end of 2013, there were 57,000 credit unions in 103 countries, in 6 
continents, serving 208 million members (or 8% of the population) having 
US$1.4trillion in deposits and shares, US$1.1trillion in loans, US$1.7trillion of assets 
and US$171billion in reserves (WCCU, 2015).  In the USA alone, credit unions have 
78 million members (i.e. 28% of the population), managing $440 billion worth of 
total assets (Goddard and Wilson, 2005).  In Ireland, there are 520 credit unions 
serving 3.6 million members and managing assets of €16billion, savings of €13billion 
and loans of €4.5billion (McCarthy, Farrell and Hewson, 2016).  Having set out the 
importance of credit unions, their differences in relation to investor-owned banks 
will follow in the next section. 
4.4.6 Credit unions Vs investor-owned banks 
The fact that credit unions are owned by and serve their members creates an 
advantage over investor-owned banks, as the latter must balance the interests of 
their owners (asking for profit maximizing) with that of their clients (requesting 
lower loan interest rates and higher deposit rates) (McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  
Moreover, as credit unions serve a membership base which is uniform due to its 
common bond, they face fewer problems relating to asymmetry of information than 
investor-owned banks, enabling the latter to offer better priced financial products 
(McKillop and Wilson, 2011).  Moreover, credit unions have a lower cost of capital 
than investor-owned banks (Fonteyne, 2007; Brannen and Ibrahim, 2010) because 
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the dividend that is paid back to the members is limited by law and because the 
value of members’ investment in the organization does not increase but is limited 
to the amount of capital they had initially invested (Fonteyne, 2007).   
Additionally, credit unions stabilize the markets they operate in (Feinberg and 
Rahman, 2006; Hesse and Čihák, 2007) and they compete with investor-owned 
banks for both deposits and loans at the local level (Emmons and Schmid, 2000; 
Brannen and Ibrahim, 2010).  This could be evidenced by the increase or decrease 
of the number of members in credit unions following the growth or decrease in 
investor-owned banks’ market share (Emmons and Schmid, 2000).  Furthermore, 
despite the claims that credit unions cannot influence the deposit rate set by 
investor-owned banks (Amel and Hannan, 1999), there is indirect evidence of the 
opposite.  That is, investor-owned banks frequently complain about (unfair) 
competition from credit unions and have spent large amounts lobbying the US 
Congress to hinder the credit union growth (Emmons and Schmid, 2000).  Overall, it 
may be argued that although competition among investor-owned banks and credit 
unions could potentially drive either one out of business, this has not happen yet 
(Emmons and Schmid, 2000; Fonteyne and Hardy, 2011).  This could indicate that 
even though credit unions and investor-owned banks directly compete with each 
other, they are both necessary and important in the financial markets.   
The similarities and differences between credit unions and investor-owned banks 
are summarized in Table 4.3.  As observed in this table, even though credit unions 
offer the whole range of financial products and services that investor-owned banks 
provide, the two have differences, the most important of which are the higher 
interest rate on deposits and lower interest rates on loans and the common bond 
among members.  These differences stem from the not-for-profit nature of credit 
unions as opposed to the for-profit nature of investor-owned banks. 
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Table 4.3: Comparison of credit unions with investor-owned banks (adapted 
from WCCU, 2012): 
 Credit unions Investor-owned banks 
Structure Not-for-profit, member-owned 
financial cooperatives funded 
largely by voluntary member 
deposits  
For-profit institutions owned by 
stockholders  
Clientele Members share a common bond, 
such as where they live, work or 
worship.  
Typically serve middle-to-high 
income clients. No restrictions on 
clientele.  
Governance Credit union members elect a 
volunteer board of directors from 
their membership. Members each 
have one vote in board elections.  
Stockholders vote for a paid board 
of directors who may not be from 
the community or use the bank's 
services. Votes are weighted based 
on the amount of stock owned.  
Earnings Net income is applied to lower 
interest on loans, higher interest 
on savings or new product and 
service development.  
Stockholders receive a pro-rata 
share of profits.  
Products & 
Services 
Full range of financial services.  Full range of financial services, 
including investment 
opportunities.  
Service 
Delivery 
Main office, shared branching, 
ATMs, POS devices, PDAs, cell 
phones, Internet  
Main office, shared branching, 
ATMs, POS devices, PDAs, cell 
phones, Internet  
Following is a discussion of credit unions in the UK because even though they are 
positioned to meet the needs of financially excluded people, nevertheless, they 
have failed to do so, to a greater extent, because of the perception in peoples’ 
minds, i.e. that credit unions are for poor people only. 
4.4.7 Credit unions in the UK 
British credit unions are not-for-profit co-operatives that provide financial services 
whose ownership and control lies with their members (Jones, 2016).  Credit unions 
are homogenous in the range of products offered (simple loan and saving products), 
but are different in terms of the socio-economic environment in which they 
operate, their common bond type, their affiliated trade association, their age and 
their size (Ward and McKillop, 2005).  As opposed to investor-owned banks credit 
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unions can only serve their members (restricted to those having a common bond) 
(Jones, 2016).   
The first credit unions were created by (Irish and Caribbean) immigrants in London 
(Jones and Ellison, 2011; Jones, 2016), in the 1960s (Jones, 2016).  A traditional 
credit union was described as a community project depending on donations, 
managed by volunteers, considering any growth or commercial activity as being 
against its social goals, without any growth prospects, and aiming to support the 
financially excluded without any market or business orientation (Jones, 1999; 2001; 
2004; 2006; Jones and Ellison, 2011; Jones, 2012; 2016), usually with assistance 
from the local or central government (Jones, 2016).  The average British credit 
union is very small, having around 200 members with the legislation restricting its 
ability to attract savings and give loans, limiting also, its viability and the usage of 
common bonds (Jones, 1999; 2001; 2006).  These restrictions are created by the 
maximum amount of credit unions’ loans that can be insured by the federal 
government (Goddard and Wilson, 2005).  The work-related credit unions are by far 
the most advanced among all as they represent 50% of all members and 70% of all 
assets (Jones, 2001; 2005).  Additionally, credit unions are governed by specific 
legislation and with internal regulation which is provided by the affiliated trade 
associations, e.g., Association of British Credit Unions (Ward and McKillop, 2005).   
Some important legislation improvements took place in 1996, and then in 2002 
(Financial Services and Markets Act 2000), but, even in 2005, there was a need for 
further changes in the legislation so as to allow credit unions to strengthen their 
deposits and hence their capital (Jones, 2005).  Initially, credit unions were 
regulated by the Credit Union Act 1979 (Jones, 2001) which even though for the 
first time gave credit unions a legal identity and the means to become safe and 
secure financial institutions (Jones, 2016), nevertheless, was restrictive as to the 
ability of credit unions to grant loans and to attract deposits (Jones, 2001).  These 
restrictions aimed at reducing the financial risk and at protecting their liquidity by 
imposing limits on credit unions’ activities, e.g., a maximum limit on loan interest 
rate, on the dividend that can be paid, on the amount of loan that can be granted 
and on the amount of deposits that can be obtained from members.  Furthermore, 
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it imposed a minimum amount of capital that must be maintained (Ward and 
McKillop, 2005).  Further restrictions were applied on who can qualify as a 
member, since only people having a common background, such as profession, 
community or religion can become members (Taylor, 1971; World Council of Credit 
Unions, 2012; 2015; ABCUL, 2015).  The reason for this restriction is that a common 
background establishes a bond amongst the members of credit unions (Jones, 2001; 
Sabatini, Modena and Tortia, 2014) and hence, lowers the costs associated with the 
problems of agency and information asymmetry (Jones, 2001; Ward and McKillop, 
2005).  Nevertheless, the restrictions on common bond were uplifted in 1996 by the 
Deregulation (Credit Unions) Order which enabled a much broader geographical 
area to qualify as common bond and it introduced the work-or-live common bond 
(Jones and Ellison, 2011). 
In 2002, the supervision of credit unions was transferred from the Registry of 
Friendly Societies to Financial Services Authority (Spear, 2010; Jones and Ellison, 
2011).  This new law removed the maximum threshold of 5,000 members, allowing 
a more extended loan repayment period and borrowing from authorized banks and 
other credit unions (Ward and McKillop, 2005).  What is more, it enabled credit 
unions to charge fees for ancillary services and protected the term ‘credit union’ 
(Ward and McKillop, 2005).  Additionally, credit unions were enabled, under 
specific and strict conditions, to borrow money from additional sources (not just 
natural persons), to pay dividends at different rates, more than once a year and to 
grant loans to members of up to £500,000 as well as to non-members (FCA, 2015).   
This new law was the most important legislative breakthrough for the credit 
unions, e.g., enabling for the first time the protection of the savings of credit 
unions’ members (Jones and Ellison, 2011).  However, despite the changes in the 
legislation, the high financial exclusion rate that exists and the financial support 
from the UK government during the 1990s (as part of the fight against deprivation 
and social inequality) (Jones, 2001), and even though there is little evidence that 
investor-owned banks are interested in servicing the low income financial market 
(Jones, 2008), UK credit unions are not perceived as successful (Ward and McKillop, 
2005; Jones, 2016).  There are at least two indications of this.  Firstly, even though 
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credit unions seem to aim at the financially excluded, at the same time, this aim 
seems to deter additional people from joining credit unions (Fuller, 1998).  
Secondly, members join a credit union not because of the quality of its services 
and products but because of its ideology, directly affecting the long-term survival 
of credit unions (Jones, 2004).   
Even though credit unions experienced a growth during the years 1991 to 2014, 
nevertheless this is not representative of what credit unions can achieve and 
secondly the restriction in the number of members and assets has a direct effect on 
the long term survival of credit unions.  For example, in the UK credit unions grew 
from 232,000 members and assets worth £124million, in 1991, to 659,000 members 
and to £680million of assets by 2000 (Ward and McKillop, 2005).  Similarly, in 
England, Wales and Scotland, at the end of September 2006, there were only 
500,000 credit union members having an asset base of £500million and personal 
loans totalling £360million (Jones, 2008).  Additionally, at the end of 2014, in the 
UK, there were 362 credit unions, with 1,500 employees, serving almost 1.2million 
members, managing total assets of £1.26billion, loans of £718million and deposits 
of £1billion (ABCUL, 2015).  Moreover, membership of credit unions grows very 
slowly, e.g., in the West Midlands would grow by an average of only 14 members 
per annum (Jones, 2004).  That is, each credit union would serve on average of 381 
members with a penetration of 0.5% of population and with an average of total 
asset value in the range of £233,000 (Jones, 2004).  It is estimated that the 
penetration of credit unions in the UK is just 2%, rendering them as transitional in 
terms of their development (McKillop and Wilson, 2011; Jones, 2016).   
This low membership basis did not permit the accumulation of assets and savings 
therefore restricting these credit unions from building up organisational and 
financial strength (Jones, 2004).  Moreover, credit unions could only lend to 
members that saved for 8 weeks and the loan could only be twice the amount 
saved, thus restricting access to loans and to loans of higher value (Jones, 2008; 
2012), e.g., for the area of East England and Cumbria, the average loan size for 
2011 was just £700 (Jones, 2012).  What is more, the need for savings in order to 
obtain a loan not only deterred potential members from saving with the credit 
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unions (Jones, 2008), it also deterred existing members from saving more than the 
amount they needed to obtain a loan (Jones, 2008; 2012) and it even deterred 
Board members from keeping their deposits in their credit union (Jones, 2004).  
Even though credit unions considered that by offering lower loan interest rates, 
they maximised their impact on financial exclusion, however, the reality is that it 
is the creation of savings that opens more opportunities, for financially excluded 
people, to gain access to a cheaper and wider range of financial services (Jones, 
2008; Jones and Ellison, 2011), leaving the stigmatisation as poor peoples’ banks in 
the past (Jones and Ellison, 2011).  Under these circumstances it was difficult for 
credit unions to be effective in combating financial exclusion and building the 
wealth of communities (Jones, 2004).  This was further proven by research in which 
it concluded that only 15%- 20% could meet the management and governance 
standards to become quality (or new model) credit unions, while another 28% being 
possibly able to achieve these standards (Jones, 2008).   
Moreover, another study revealed that the “current credit union model is not 
financially sustainable… and that the gap between cost and income needs to be 
bridged” ABCUL (2013, p12).  This finding is very similar to that of Jones (2012), 
i.e. credit unions depend on money from donors, their expenses are high in relation 
to their income, their loan to asset ratio (loan book productivity) is low and their 
loan and deposit interest rates should increase to come closer to that of the 
market rates.  Additionally, to be able to combat financial exclusion, credit unions 
should be large and financially viable in the long-term (Jones, 1999), as there is 
evidence that the larger, the older and the more effective a credit union is, the 
more successful it is, especially in deprived areas (Ward and McKillop, 2005).  
Moreover, the current credit union model lacks technology, its systems and 
processes are outdated, its income is non-sufficient to cover the expenses, whilst 
some credit unions do not comprehend the interdependence of management and 
governance (Jones, 2004; Jones and Ellison, 2011; Jones, 2012).  Additionally, 
employees/volunteers are sometimes overworked; the Board members lack skills, 
expertise and knowledge, and they receive almost no mentoring or training (Jones, 
2012).   
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In order to become financially viable, credit unions could enlarge their product 
range offering higher interest rates (closer to the market rates) on both loans and 
deposits, something that has been labelled as a new model development (Jones, 
2004; 2008; Jones and Ellison, 2011; Jones, 2012; 2016; ABCUL, 2013).  
Furthermore, to be able to serve their existing and potential members, credit 
unions could attract skilful management (Jones and Ellison, 2011) and strong, 
charismatic leadership with the drive to change (Jones, 2004; Jones and Ellison, 
2011).  Additionally, research has shown that in order to attract more members and 
savings, credit unions should improve their information technology and procedures, 
changes that would enhance their perception as trusted financial providers (ABCUL, 
2013).  For the same reason, the linkage between savings and loans had to be 
broken (Jones, 2008; Jones and Ellison, 2011).  Furthermore, to attract middle 
income members, credit unions must be secure, ethical and professional 
organisations, something that is not compatible with the existing model of credit 
union development (Jones, 2008; Jones and Ellison, 2011).  However, this move 
would create the deposits and operational surpluses needed for credit unions to 
reach even more financially excluded people (Jones, 2004; 2008; Jones and Ellison, 
2011).   
Another way forward could be through mergers, as through them bigger and 
potentially more financially viable (Ward and McKillop, 2005), more professional 
(Ward and McKillop, 2005; Jones, 2016) and modern credit unions, could be 
created, enabling collaboration and sharing of back office systems (Jones, 2016).  
For example, it is noted that due to the mergers, in the 10 years from 2003 to 2013 
the number of credit unions had fallen by 42%, whilst membership increased by 
around 110% (Jones, 2016).  Merged credit unions could implement a more liberal 
traditional social model, incorporating business and commercial practices, for 
example, employing staff, hiring suitable premises and uplifting their image (Jones, 
2012).   
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4.5 Impact of research context on present research 
Based on the discussion on the research intent (Sections 1.3.1, 1.3.2 and 3.4) and 
the research questions (Section 2.4 and 3.4), the aim of the present study is to 
investigate the adherence of co-operatives to their founding principles.  More 
specifically, it sets out to examine: 
“How is the practical application of the co-operative principles perceived?” and 
“How is active democratic participation of members perceived?”. 
What has triggered this intent is the pressure and scrutiny credit unions are 
undergoing as a result of the 2008 financial crisis, the consequences of which are 
still affecting the economy as to this day.  Given this pressure, the present study 
has seized the opportunity to collect data in a period of crisis, with regards to 
credit unions’ adherence to the co-operative principles.  To the present study 
author’s knowledge, no other study to date has collected data concerning this 
issue, during a crisis and this is probably the biggest contribution, of the present 
study, to the existing literature.  In particular, considering the pressure on co-
operative principles, the data collected may give a better understanding of what is 
actually happening in credit unions in times of financial hardship.  Moreover, 
Cyprus, the context in which this research is carried out, may be considered as an 
ideal geographical location since, in addition to the crisis of 2008, it has also 
suffered the financial crisis of March 2013, which is even more recent and its 
effects were even more direct and harsh on local people.  Finally, the fact that the 
author used to be employed by a credit union in Cyprus facilitates the data 
collection due as he is already familiar with this sector and has the appropriate 
networks.  Hence, considering the above reasons, credit unions have been chosen 
as the co-operative sector to be researched by the present study.   
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4.6 Summary 
In this Chapter, the reasons behind the author’s choice for selecting Cyprus as the 
specific geographical area and credit unions as the specific type of financial co-
operatives were explained.  With regards to its geographic location, Cyprus was 
selected because of the century long presence of co-operatives on the island, their 
importance for the local economy, as well as the fact that local co-operatives face 
the same challenges as other co-operatives around the world.  A short description 
of the economy of Cyprus and the effects of the 2008 and March 2013 crises was 
given in order to better inform the reader about the context in which the data 
were collected.   
Moreover, because of the financial crisis of 2008 and the pressure on all financial 
providers, credit unions were analysed as the possible industry to be used when 
collecting data.  This is where, most probably, co-operative principles will be 
under stress and scrutiny.  To this effect, the calls for change in the financial 
industry have been analysed, indicating that co-operative financial organisations 
and especially, credit unions could be a possible answer to these calls.  This is 
because, both academics and professional media agree that there must be a move 
back to the basics, to a more transparent and fair financial industry. 
The importance of financial co-operatives was assessed, indicating their 
importance since the 19th century, as ethical and sustainable providers of finance.  
When compared to investor-owned banks, financial co-operatives seem different, 
but this is mainly due to their not-for-profit nature.  As far as the reasons for 
choosing credit unions as the specific type of financial co-operatives to collect data 
for the present study, these include the importance of credit unions as financial co-
operatives, the effects of the 2008 and March 2013 crises and the resulting pressure 
on credit unions and the prior working experience of the author.  In the following 
Chapter, the research approach is discussed in order to provide a research 
framework for the present study. 
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Chapter 5: Research methodology 
5.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 has focused on the reasons for choosing to carry out the present research 
in the Cypriot credit union context.  In this Chapter, the aim is to identify the 
research approach and methods which best inform the investigation of the research 
questions as set in Section 4.5.  As the research questions include perceptions, then 
a qualitative approach is undertaken.  Initially, the four paradigms, epistemology, 
ontology, research design, strategy and the methods are discussed indicating the 
research framework of the present study and giving details of the methods used.  
Finally, issues relating to the quality of the research and ethics are addressed. 
 
5.2 Research Strategy 
Research Strategy is defined as “the general orientation to the conduct of social 
research” (Bryman, 2001, p.20).  In this case, the qualitative paradigm constitutes 
the framework for the present research since the aim is to understand the 
perceptions of those working at and the members of credit unions, seeking to 
collect valid, real, deep and rich data (Shih, 1998).  Within the qualitative 
paradigm, an interpretivist stance has been taken, following a constructivist 
ontological position.  This is because the researcher aims at interpreting the 
perceptions of the employees and members regarding the application of the co-
operative principles in practice.  Within this qualitative paradigm, the present 
study has used individual interviews with employees of various credit unions, used 
documents (statistics) as well as focus groups with the members of a specific credit 
union to collect its data. 
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5.3 Paradigms 
A number of paradigms have been developed and set to define the framework of 
different kinds of research.  This section sets out to examine the characteristics of 
each of the main paradigms, in order to identify the most appropriate for the 
present research.  
The first paradigm, Positivism, to be examined has been formed by the positivist 
school of thought.  Positivists argue that knowledge is objective and tangible and 
thus, the researcher must take the role of an observer employing the methods of 
natural sciences (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  Positivists rely on 
experiments and closely controlled conditions to collect data (Lincoln and Denzin, 
1998).  However, Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000) argue that Positivism is not 
helpful in the study of human behaviour because of the high complexity of humans 
as opposed to the order and regularity that is found in the natural world.   
Rejecting the positivist paradigm, critical theorists argue that each researcher 
influences the outcome of his research and that the outcome is the result of the 
interaction of the researcher with the particular object of enquiry (Lincoln and 
Denzin, 1998).  Critical theory relies on the use of dialectical methods to collect 
data (Lincoln and Denzin, 1998).  Constructivism concurs with critical theorists to 
an extent, however this school of thought moves to a different level, arguing that 
there is more than one reality and that these realities are constantly evolving 
together with their holder (Lincoln and Denzin, 1998).  As in the case of critical 
theorists, constructivists believe that knowledge is created through the interaction 
of each participant with the researcher and that data is collected mainly through 
dialectical/hermeneutical methods (Lincoln and Denzin, 1998).  Moreover, 
constructivists, consider that knowledge does not consist of a number of facts 
reported, but rather it is, at least, reconstructed during an interview (Mason, 
2002).  Therefore, understanding and meanings are created or co-produced during 
the interaction between the researcher and his participants.   
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Considering the above, it can be said that this research is placed under the 
constructivist paradigm since it aims at understanding the perceptions of those 
employed by and the members of credit unions and secondly, the researcher does 
not believe that he can remain independent of the participants during the 
interviews and during the analysis of the results.  On the contrary, the researcher 
believes that his background and character act as a filter with respect to how he 
perceives what the participants have said.  Thus, the results are constructed by the 
interaction of the participants with him.  Having identified the paradigm the 
proposed research may fall under, the following step is to examine its 
epistemological stance.   
 
5.4 Epistemology 
Epistemology deals with the issue of what is or what should be regarded as 
“acceptable knowledge in a discipline” (Bryman, 2001, p.11).  Epistemology is 
concerned with the bases of knowledge, its forms and nature.  That is, how 
knowledge can be acquired and how it can be communicated among people 
(Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  In contrast to positivists, anti-positivists (or 
interpretivists) argue that knowledge is subjective, personal and unique for each 
person and thus the researcher must become involved with the subjects he is 
studying in order to learn about them (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  This 
means that interpretivism requires social scientists to take hold of the subjective 
meaning of social action emphasizing the understanding of human behaviour 
(Bryman, 2001). 
With regards to epistemology, this research is considered to adopt an interpretivist 
stance as it has striven to take hold of the subjective meaning of social action and 
more specifically to understand people’s perceptions.  This is because the 
researcher believes that knowledge is gained through the interaction of people and 
the way to achieve this is by discussing with them or by interviewing them.   
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5.5 Ontology 
Moving to the issue of ontology, this is concerned with the essence of the social 
phenomena researched, that is, whether reality is on the objective side of the 
spectrum and hence is independent and not influenced by the researcher or 
whether it is on the subjective side of the spectrum and hence is created through 
the interaction of the subjects with the researcher (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 
2000).  The ontological position of constructionism or constructivism supports that 
“social phenomena and their meanings are continually being accomplished by social 
actors” (Bryman, 2001, p.18).  In other words, social phenomena are created 
through social interactions and are constantly changing (Bryman, 2001).  
Constructivism has also come to mean that researchers are merely stating their 
version/understanding of the truth rather than the “real” truth (Bryman, 2001).  
Hence, constructivism aims at examining thoughts, beliefs, meanings and values of 
the research interest (Shih, 1998).   
Based on the above, it can be said that the proposed research takes a constructivist 
ontological position since it focuses on the version of “reality” that is constructed 
by the participants and the researcher during the interviews.  Thus, this research 
does not treat “reality” as different and distant from the social actors and the 
researcher.  The researcher is aware that interviewees and interviewers are 
treated as subjects that mutually construct meaning to the reality around them 
with the focus being on what that constructed reality is (Silverman, 2001).  Having 
set the epistemological and ontological position of the present research, the 
analysis moves to identifying the research design that best suits the two research 
questions that have been formed in Section 4.5. 
 
5.6 Research design 
The research design of a study “provides a framework for the collection and 
analysis of data” (Bryman, 2001, p.29).  One of the five research designs used in 
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some of the best known sociology researches (Bryman, 2001) and that has also been 
adopted in the present study is a case study design, which involves the intensive 
and detailed study of one sole case, i.e. that of Cypriot credit unions.  Case study 
is defined as an in-depth exploration, a particularization from multiple 
perspectives, of the complexity and uniqueness of a particular event in a “real 
life” context (Simons, 2009).  Moreover, a case study is an in-depth investigation of 
an organization, a group, a family or an individual and it represents a general 
strategy for undertaking research (Woods and Catanzaro, 1988).  Finally, a case 
study design is typical for both qualitative and quantitative analysis and is a 
broadly accepted research approach (Bryman, 2001; Simons, 2009).   
The strength of a case study is its ability to focus intensively on a single situation of 
interest within its actual context, allowing flexibility, since both the context and 
the case change over time (Yin, 1999; Simons, 2009).  Case studies have been 
criticized for the subjectivity of the results due to the researcher’s involvement 
(Simons, 2009), as well as for their inappropriateness in generalizing their results. 
This is due to the fact that they are valid only in the boundaries of the context in 
which the case takes place (Woods and Catanzaro, 1988; Patton, 1999; Yin, 1999).  
However, by studying a particular case in depth and comparing it with other cases, 
one can obtain a more general idea about the issue in hand (Simons, 2009).   
To overcome the problems related to the usefulness and validity of the results, it is 
suggested that the researcher should be transparent regarding the timing of the 
data collection and the influence on the interpretations of the results which are 
due to his personality and experiences (Simons, 2009, p.24).  Additionally, the 
researcher should identify and thoroughly test alternative explanations of the 
results in order to convince that the chosen explanation is the most feasible (Yin, 
1999).   
For the specific research, a case study design was adopted to collect data from 
employees, members and documents (statistics), allowing the intensive and 
detailed study of credit unions in Cyprus.  Having identified the research design of 
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the present study adopts, the next Section discusses various aspects of the quality 
of the research.  
 
5.7 Quality of Research 
There are three criteria for good qualitative research: (a) interpretation of 
subjective meaning that is, the researcher must ensure that his results are 
grounded on the participants’ responses (e.g., through participant validation); (b) 
description of social context and design and (c) lay knowledge, i.e. the views of all 
participants should receive equal importance in the results (Popay, Rogers and 
Williams, 1998). 
During interviewee validation the results of the research are checked with the 
participants in order to ensure that the researcher’s understanding was correct 
(Bryman, 2008).  The disadvantages of interviewee validation include possible 
defensive reactions on the part of the interviewees, possible reluctance of 
interviewees to express freely their opinion to avoid causing discomfort to the 
researcher and the potential inability of interviewees to validate the researcher’s 
results due to lack of academic background and/or specialized knowledge (Bryman, 
2008).   
5.7.1 Reliability 
Reliability refers to the extent that the results of the research are consistent with 
the findings/data (Miles and Huberman, 1994; Bryman, 2001).  Moreover “reliability 
is essentially a synonym for consistency and replicability over time, over 
instruments and over groups of interviewees” and it deals with accuracy and 
precision (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000, p.117).  As far as qualitative research 
is concerned, reliability may not be fully achieved because it is carried out in 
natural settings which constantly change (LeCompte, Preissle and Tesch, 1993).  
Moreover, the very essence of naturalistic studies lies in the idiosyncrasy and 
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uniqueness of situations, thus a study by definition cannot be replicated “like 
Heraclitus, who could not step into the same river twice” (LeCompte, Preissle and 
Tesch, p.332).   
Reliability has been achieved in the present research in two ways:  
(a) by providing a detailed description of the research methods used and the 
analysis of the results; and  
(b) by triangulating the results using different methods for collecting the data 
(individual interviews, focus groups and documents (statistics) from the previous 
supervisory authority – Co-operative Societies Supervision and Development 
Agency-) (Woods and Catanzaro, 1988). 
5.7.2 Replication 
Replication refers to the extent to which the measures of the results of the present 
research could be produced again by some other researcher (Bryman, 2001).  As 
seen above, under the qualitative paradigm, the results are constructed among the 
participants and the researcher, while in the case of the focus group, by the focus 
group specifics (i.e. flow of discussion among participants, involvement of 
moderator, room settings), thus rendering replication very difficult, if not 
impossible.  Hence, rather than looking for replication or generalizability, 
qualitative data looks for the transferability of results in other, similar cases 
(LeCompte, Preissle and Tesch, 1993; Kruenger and Casey, 2000; Barbour, 2005; 
2007; Doody, Slevin and Taggart, 2013c).   
5.7.3 Validity 
Validity is the most important measure as it refers to the honesty of the 
conclusions arrived at whilst carrying out a specific research (Bryman, 2001).  
Validity refers to whether the researcher observes, identifies and measures what 
he was supposed to (Woods and Catanzaro, 1988; LeCompte, Preissle and Tesch, 
Page 102 of 297 
 
1993).  Additionally, internal validity is concerned with whether the conclusions 
arrived at are 100% based on the research findings (Bryman, 2001).   
The quality of the research results can be improved by looking for outliers and for 
“rival explanations” as if trying to falsify the findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994, 
pp.271-274).  This “forces” the researcher to view data from a different 
prospective and to test any alternative explanations for the data collected (Miles 
and Huberman, 1994).  Apart from the issue of validity discussed above, it is very 
important for researchers to validate their data through either triangulation or 
interviewee validation (Bryman, 2001; Silverman, 2001).   
5.7.4 Triangulation and interviewees’ validation 
Triangulation is used to enhance the quality of the case study in the sense that the 
broader the variety of techniques used, the stronger the results of the case study 
are (Yin, 1999).  Triangulation is the employment of more than one source of data 
or research methods in the study of social phenomena, in order to enhance the 
confidence in the findings, i.e. to ensure that the findings from the various sources 
or methods confirm each other (Denzin, 1978; Kimchi, Polivka and Stevenson, 1991; 
Miles and Huberman; 1994; Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000; Bryman, 2001; 
Silverman, 2001; Bloor et al., 2001; Barbour 2007) or, at least, that they do not 
contradict each other (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  According to Patton (1999), 
triangulation is founded on the principle that none of the methods can, on their 
own, produce adequate data to support the findings of the research and that each 
method can only reveal some of the aspects of the solutions to the problem in 
question. 
Moreover, it is important to use the appropriate methods for triangulation 
purposes, as the methods should be in the position to complement each other, i.e. 
cover each other’s drawbacks with the various methods and are not in conflict with 
each other or are inconsistent (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  A combination of 
interviews and documentation is very common as different kinds of data provide 
cross-data validity checking (Patton, 1999). 
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The use of focus groups should be combined with other methods (such as personal 
interviews in the present study) so that different groups of participants are used 
with each method (focus groups with members as opposed to individual interviews 
with credit union employees in the present study), ensuring that the results of one 
method are confirmed by those of the other method (Lambert and Loiselle, 2008).  
In such a case, two data sets are coded and analysed separately and are then 
compared in order to validate the findings (Kimchi, Polivka and Stevenson, 1991).  
This procedure was also followed in the present study.  The combination of 
methods could be used for data complementary reasons that is, each method 
provides only partial view of the researched phenomenon and for making up for 
each method’s drawbacks (Kimchi, Polivka and Stevenson, 1991; Barbour, 1998).  
Shih (1998) agrees with different methods being combined in order to address the 
research question from different angles, however, he disagrees with these being 
used to counterbalance the weaknesses of the others.  The researcher of the 
present study believes that the combination of these two methods, using two 
different groups of participants as well as statistics assists in obtaining data from 
different angles, i.e. results in a better informed data set. 
The problem with combining methods for confirmatory purposes is that the 
researcher may attach higher importance to the results of one method over the 
other (Barbour, 1998).  Moreover, the major problem with triangulation, as a 
validity test, is the fact that social interaction is context-bound and thus, it is very 
difficult to validate it or invalidate it (Silverman, 2001).   
As far as organizational documents such as company newsletters, reports, charts, 
minutes, memos and correspondence are concerned, they could provide useful 
insight about the organization of interest, however they do not provide the 
“reality” but instead they should be treated for what they are: “texts written with 
distinctive purposes in mind, and not as simply reflecting reality” (Bryman and 
Bell, 2011, p.550).  Thus, researchers should compare documents with other 
sources of data.   
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In the present study, the researcher has used both structured individual interviews 
(with employees of various credit unions) and focus groups (with the members of a 
single credit union), in a case study design aiming to achieve data completion and 
to triangulate the results of the two methods.  Additionally, statistics were 
obtained from the office of the Commissioner of the Co-operative Societies 
Supervision and Development Authority (CSSDA), on a sample of twenty credit 
unions and were used in verifying specific data obtained from both the interviews 
and the focus groups. 
5.7.5 Trustworthiness 
Qualitative research is judged based on its trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba, 
1985).  Trustworthiness is explained by confirmability, which ensures that the 
researcher has acted in good faith and his results/conclusions have not been 
tempered/influenced by him.  However, it is very difficult for two scientists to 
arrive to the same results for four reasons: (a) the results depend on how the 
method is approached and used in practice –a type of “kaleidoscope”-; (b) each 
researcher is influenced by his prior experiences and actions thus, his usage of each 
method will be different; (c) each researcher is influenced by his prior experiences 
and actions thus, his sample selection, his questions to be asked and his 
interpretations of the results will be different; and (d) findings constantly change 
thus, the results will never be the same (Denzin, 1978, pp.292-293).   
The researcher of the present study, being aware of the fact that he was 
interviewing peers/acquaintances, took a number of measures in order to ensure 
the validity of his results, firstly by stating that he followed a constructivist 
paradigm.  Most importantly though, the author of the present study informs the 
readers by declaring his prior experience and knowledge of the specific industry 
and that he relied on the assistance of his ex-colleagues and acquaintances in 
selecting his sample.  The research methods chosen were structured interviews in 
order to avoid taking too much of the participants’ time and to keep the volume of 
data, to be transcribed, within manageable limits and he chose to interview a high 
number of credit union employees (thirty), so that the results would represent a 
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wide range of opinions regarding the set research questions.  Similarly, three focus 
group interviews were carried out, consisting of ten members each, one in each of 
three towns, in order to ensure that a wide range of opinions and perceptions were 
taken into account.  Moreover, the researcher also set out the data of each method 
separately in order to enhance the validity of the results.  During the analysis of 
data, he used specialised software (N-Vivo) to code and analyse the results and he 
asked an independent researcher to code part of the interviews and the focus 
group transcriptions in order to assess the validity of the researcher’s coding.  
Finally, during the interpretation of the results he asked interviewees to validate 
the results of the interviews.  In order to triangulate the results, he used three 
methods to collect data: he included the dissented opinions and the opinions of the 
minority, assessed the validity of the results by writing them down and then, at a 
later stage, he re-examined the data to assess whether any other interpretation 
was more appropriate.  What is more, the researcher kept the data separately from 
his own interpretations, again allowing the assessment of the results’ validity.  
Despite this attempt, the researcher of the present study recognizes that the 
results may suffer from the subjective meaning and his personal experiences and 
views, a risk however, that is common to any qualitative research study.  Having 
explained the issues relating to the quality of research, the next section deals with 
issues pertaining to ethics. 
 
5.8 Ethical issues 
“Being ethical limits the choices we can make in the pursuit of truth.  Ethics say 
that while truth is good, respect for human dignity is better…” (Bulmer and Ocloo, 
2010, p.1).  Moreover, Principle E of the American Psychological Association (2010, 
p.4) states: “...respect the dignity and worth of all people, and the rights of 
individuals to privacy, confidentiality, and self-determination”.  Ethics are of vital 
importance since participants’ rights are being respected.  Hence, one of the 
primary concerns of the present research was to ensure that ethics have been 
preserved.  The present study has addressed ethical issues through the use of 
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informed consent, access and acceptance, privacy, anonymity and confidentiality, 
as discussed below.  At an initial stage, the researcher of the present study 
obtained approval by the Research Ethics Committee of the College of Social 
Sciences, University of Glasgow.  He then obtained the consent of the participants 
in writing (in Greek, the mother tongue of the participants), clearly indicating that 
participation was entirely voluntary.  In addition, the researcher promised 
participants confidentiality and anonymity of data, a promise that was kept.   
5.8.1 Informed consent 
According to the British Sociological Association (2006, p.4) “participation in 
sociological research should be based on the freely given informed consent of those 
studied”.  That is, participants should be informed about the purpose of the 
research and allowed to participate on a voluntary basis (Bloor et al., 2001; Then 
et al., 2014).  Additionally, and in order to facilitate better comprehension, the 
information provided should be written in the participant’s language (Bloor et al., 
2001; Then et al., 2014).  Moreover, since fully informed consent is almost 
impossible to obtain, the researcher must be aware of his responsibility and, at the 
same time, his powerful position, thus he should take all necessary steps in order 
to ensure that his research is sensitive, reflective and moral (Mason, 2002). 
In the present study, the researcher provided participants with information on the 
purpose of the study giving them the choice as to whether to participate or not.  
Before the commencement of each interview and focus group, each and all 
participants were asked to read the Plain Language Statement and sign the Consent 
Form as required by the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics Committee, of 
the University of Glasgow.  Furthermore, at the beginning of each individual and 
focus group interview, the researcher informed participants about the aim of 
project and what was expected of them, that there were no right and wrong 
answers, that their participation was on a voluntary basis and that they could leave 
at any time.  Additionally, the researcher informed the interviewees and focus 
group participants about the approximate duration of the individual/focus group 
interview.  Finally, the researcher personally promised confidentiality and 
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anonymity, whilst asking the focus group participants to treat the discussion as 
confidential.   
5.8.2 Access and acceptance 
Access is crucial and it can be achieved through “closed”/“private” settings (e.g., 
organizations) asking for permission, to access them, from gatekeepers or; through 
“open”/“public” settings, in which case access is more or less free (Silverman, 
2001, p.56).  Moreover, a researcher can obtain “overt” access, by informing the 
subjects of his research, or “covert” access, in which case subjects are not 
informed according to (Silverman, 2001, p.56).   
As aforementioned (in Section 4.5), the researcher used to work at the senior 
position for a credit union in Cyprus and hence knew most of the other General 
Managers, some of their employees and some of the members of the credit union 
he had worked for.  Hence, he did not have to go through gatekeepers.  
Nevertheless, mainly due to the fear of what the next day (due to the March 2013 
crisis) would bring, the researcher had to try hard to find credit union employees 
and members that were willing to spend personal time to participate in the present 
study. 
5.8.3 Privacy 
“Privacy refers to an individual’s right to be free from intrusion or interference by 
others…  An important aspect of privacy is the right to control information about 
oneself…  Privacy is respected if an individual has an opportunity to exercise 
control over personal information by consenting to, or withholding consent for, the 
collection, use and/or disclose of information…” (Canada Government, 2010, 
pp.55, 56).  Similarly, “privacy is the control over the extent, timing, and 
circumstances of sharing oneself (physically, behaviorally, or intellectually) with 
others” (University of California, 2016).  In terms of privacy therefore, the 
researcher should not publicise information, without the participants’ consent, as 
it is a matter of ‘secrecy’ (Miles and Huberman, 1994).  Privacy can be protected 
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through anonymity, in which case the participants’ identity is not revealed, and 
through confidentiality, where the researcher does not publicise information 
through which participants can be identified (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  
These two issues are further discussed in the following Section.   
5.8.4 Anonymity and Confidentiality 
According to Cohen, Manion and Morrison (2000, p.61) “the essence of anonymity is 
that information provided by participants should in no way reveal their identity”.  
The best way a researcher can achieve anonymity is by refraining from using the 
names or any other method of identification of his participants (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2000).  However, the conduct of face-to-face interviews renders 
anonymity a much more difficult task so, in such a case, the researcher may 
promise confidentiality (Cohen, Manion and Morrison, 2000).  As far as 
confidentiality is concerned, even though the researcher is aware of the personal 
details of a participant, the former takes such measures so as to ensure that the 
participant cannot be identified in any way, in the final report (Cohen, Manion and 
Morrison, 2000). 
The present research has taken many steps in order to retain anonymity and 
confidentiality.  In order to secure the anonymity of the participants, their names 
were removed and replaced by codes, during the transcription, and for 
confidentiality any personal or other information that could reveal their identity 
was either excluded or altered so that once the data from the interviews was 
processed, nobody, apart from the researcher, was able to identify any of the 
participants.  For example, in one of the focus groups, one pensioner shared a very 
funny story, with the rest of the group, relating to an incident during his contact 
with an investor-owned bank.  As the story was very vivid, the author of this 
research changed those details of the story that could unveil the identity of the 
specific credit union member, thus ensuring that nobody, apart from the specific 
focus group, could understand who the participant was.  The next section describes 
the specific research instruments that have been used in the actual collection of 
data for the present study.   
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5.9 Research methods 
For the purposes of collecting data for the present study and for achieving 
triangulation and validity three research methods have been used.  These methods 
include individual interviews with employees of credit unions, focus groups with 
members of a specific credit union and statistics obtained from the previous 
supervisory body, i.e. Co-operative Societies Supervision and Development 
Authority (CSSDA). 
5.9.1 Interviews 
Interviews are useful in terms of understanding the participants’ point of view and 
experiences (Doody and Noonan, 2013).  They can be distinguished in structured, 
unstructured or semi-structured interviews.  Structured interviews aim at ensuring 
that all interviewees receive exactly the same cues (Bryman and Bell, 2011) 
whereas, semi-structured interviews give the sense of “conversation with a 
purpose” to the interviewee (Burgess, 1984, p.102).  Structured interviews enable 
the standardization of both the questions and the answers (Bryman, 2001, p.107).  
Thus, when the focus of the interview is to gain an understanding of a specific 
topic and the researcher wants responses to very specific questions a structured 
interview is the most appropriate method (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  For the 
purposes of the present study, both individual structured interviews and focus 
group interviews were prepared and carried out.  
5.9.2 Individual interviews 
Individual interviews have been criticized the least from all research methods and 
this is probably due to their widespread usage, focusing on in-depth discussion of a 
phenomenon (Barbour, 1998).  However, problems associated with individual 
interviews include issues of assumed ability of participants to orally express 
themselves and to convey their feelings/experiences (Lambert and Loiselle, 2008).  
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Additionally, in some cases participants may not provide the whole picture to the 
researcher and, in others, the interviewer may influence the participant’s 
responses and hence, the results (Lambert and Loiselle, 2008).   
5.9.3 Individual interviews in practice 
Concerning the present research, due to the large number of questions that were 
to be asked, the researcher decided to use structured interviews so as to 
accommodate these questions without taking too much of the participants’ time.  
Structured interviews were chosen also in order to reduce the time needed by 
interviewees to answer all 36 questions and to keep the volume of data to be 
transcribed within manageable limits.  Thus, structured interviews with thirty 
employees from nine credit unions were carried out, as shown in Table 5.1 below: 
Table 5.1: Number of interviewees per credit union per Town: 
 Town 1 Town 2 Town 3 Total 
Credit union     
#1 10 0 1 11 
#2  5  5 
#3  1  1 
#4   1 1 
#5 3  1 4 
#6 1   1 
#7  5  5 
#8  1  1 
#9   1 1 
Total 14 12 4 30 
Initially, a formal letter was sent to ten General Managers, whom the researcher 
already knew, due to his employment at a credit union, and with whom he had at 
least one telephone conversation prior to sending the letter.  This letter informed 
the General Managers about the purpose of the present research, asking them for 
their permission to interview some of their credit unions’ employees and asking 
them to encourage their employees to participate in the interviews.  Following the 
initial one, several other follow-up phone calls took place trying to understand the 
reasons for not replying and for convincing the General Managers to assist the 
present study.  To the researcher’s pleasant surprise, a member of the top 
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management of one of these credit unions called the researcher informing him that 
a relevant email was sent to all of their personnel but only four (including him) 
expressed interest in taking part in the research.  Apart from this incident, and the 
two General Managers that agreed to be interviewed, the specific tactic did not 
bring the desired results most probably because of the uncertain and stressful 
conditions that the financial crisis of March 2013 had caused (with all managers, 
employees and members fearing of what the next day would bring).  To rectify 
things, the researcher recruited ex-colleagues and acquaintances, asking them to 
introduce some of their own acquaintances (snowball approach) that were willing 
to spend about one hour, in total, to take part in an academic research project.  
Apart from the “convenience” of the sample approach, the aim was not to have a 
representative sample, but rather to include people that could contribute to a 
wider range of opinions and perceptions.  The criteria for the sample were based 
on the participants being current employees of any credit union in Cyprus trying to 
maintain a balance between men and women, levels of hierarchy, different levels 
of experience and age groups (as shown in Table 5.2 below). 
Table 5.2: Interviewees demographics: 
 25-39 years old ≥40 years old Total 
 5- 9 years’ 
experience 
≥10 years’ 
experience 
5- 9 years’ 
experience 
≥10 years’ 
experience 
 
Top management:      
Men    4 4 
Women      
      
Line manager      
Men    2 2 
Women    4 4 
      
Other employees      
Men 8 1  1 10 
Women 7 2  1 10 
      
Total      
Men 8 1  7 16 
Women 7 2  5 14 
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The interviews lasted between 18 and 68 minutes as shown in Table 5.3 below: 
Table 5.3: Duration of interviews:  
 18-19 20-24 25-34 35-44 45-59 60-68 Total 
        
No. of interviewees 1 5 14 5 4 1 30 
Once a potential participant was identified, the researcher called him/her and 
explained the purpose of the research; his/her expected contribution as well as the 
approximate duration of the interview.  The time and place of the interview was 
arranged at the convenience of the participant.  Usually known cafeterias at off-
peak hours were selected, but, in some cases, the office of the individual 
participants was used.  In one particular case, a participant had arranged for some 
of her colleagues to come for the interview at her house arranging with them 
convenient timeslots.  In this case, a specific room in the house was allocated for 
the interviews so that people coming in and out did not disturb the interview in 
progress.   
The researcher used a question guide that he had developed based on his 
examination of the literature.  This question guide consisted of thirty six (36) 
questions in total (22 questions for the 1st and 14 questions for the 2nd research 
question - see Appendix 1).  Through these questions the researcher aimed at 
understanding the perceptions of the employees of various credit unions.  
Moreover, the questions aimed at evaluating the adherence to each of the seven 
co-operative principles and consequently at collecting data to answer the two 
research questions.  This question guide was pilot tested with a group of potential 
participants, who were subsequently disqualified from the actual interviews.  The 
sequence, the wording and the phrasing of some of the questions needed to be 
adjusted in order to be comprehensible, clear and in a logical order.  Before each 
interview, the participants read the Plain Language Statement and signed the 
Consent Form as required by the College of Social Sciences Research Ethics 
Committee, University of Glasgow.  During each of the interviews only the 
researcher and the participant were present and at the end, each participant was 
given a pack of two local wines to thank them for their effort, time and for 
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contributing to this research.  All interviews were voice recorded, after securing 
each interviewee’s consent.   
The interviews provided rich data regarding the perceptions of the thirty 
employees of various credit unions in Cyprus on whether the co-operative 
principles are applied in practice and whether members are participating in their 
credit union.  In order to ensure that the views of members were taken into 
consideration and in order to triangulate the results of the employees of credit 
unions, three focus groups with a total of thirty members of a specific credit union 
were also carried out. 
5.9.4 Interviews: Focus Groups 
Focus groups are “a research technique that collects data through group 
interaction on a topic determined by the researcher”, who provides the focus, 
while the participants provide the data (Morgan, 1996; 1997, p.6).  Similarly, focus 
groups are defined as “carefully planned series of discussions designed to obtain 
perceptions on a defined area of interest” (Kruenger and Casey, 2009, p.2).  
Additionally, focus groups are discussions in a group aiming to investigate a specific 
topic regarding people’s experiences and views (Kitzinger, 1994).  In general, focus 
groups are a type of group interview (Morgan, 1996; Doody, Slevin and Taggart, 
2013a) and they should be distinguished from other methods and from “naturally 
occurring group discussions” where nobody acts as a moderator (Morgan, 1996, 
p.130).  Their distinction from other types of interviews lies in the fact that group 
dynamics and interaction (“safety in numbers”) are put into effect in order to 
gather insights and data on issues that would not have been possible otherwise 
(Kitzinger, 1994; 1995; Morgan, 1997, p.2; Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook, 2007; 
Lambert and Loiselle, 2008; Doody, Slevin and Taggart, 2013a; 2013b).  The 
methodology of focus groups enables the researcher to better understand the issue 
of interest by listening to participants’ contradictions, challenges and discussions, 
while the more views are heard, the more perspectives the researcher gains 
(Morgan, 1997; Liamputtong, 2011).  Moreover, participants in such a case tend to 
question the reasoning of each other thus; the outcome of the group is more 
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refined and better thought of (Bryman and Bell, 2011).  They allow the researcher 
to interact with the interviewees, to ask questions on the spot following the 
discussion flow and to identify issues that he had not anticipated in advance 
(Mason, 2002).   
Focus groups work best when the researcher is interested to ascertain the 
perceptions of people regarding a specific issue (Kruenger and Casey, 2000; 2009).  
Moreover, they are particularly good in cases where the researcher is interested in 
participants’ opinions, experiences and perspectives (Morgan, 1997; Plummer-
D'Amato, 2008a; Then, Rankin and Ali, 2014), attitudes, practices and knowledge 
(Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1996).   
In practice, it is very common for focus groups to be used in combination with 
other research methods (Barbour, 2005), with the most common being interviews 
(Morgan, 1996; Barbour, 2007).  This is because interviews allow a more in-depth 
analysis and focus groups a more broad analysis (Morgan, 1996).   
What is more, focus groups and individual interviews may produce different results, 
without entailing that each of these methods provides better results than the 
other.  Rather, each of the two methods is able to tap into different data thus, 
providing different aspects of the same issue (Morgan, 1997).  Hence, each method 
is better suited for a specific type of research, with focus groups providing 
“synergistic” benefits to the researcher as they can efficiently gather vast amounts 
of data that cannot be generated through individual interviews (Kitzinger, 1995; 
Morgan, 1997; Kamberelis and Dimitriades, 2008, pp.393, 396).  Moreover, this 
method assists participants to unearth their shared experiences which may seem 
trivial to any individual participant, but which may be important for the group as a 
whole (Kitzinger, 1995; Kamberelis and Dimitriades, 2008).   
The advantages of this method include: (a) fast and somehow cheaper collection of 
data; (b) the researcher can more easily prompt and ask for clarifications from 
interviewees rendering the discussion more interactive; (c) the collection of rich 
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and large amounts of data is enabled; (d) flexibility; and (e) results that are easy 
to understand (Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook, 2007).   
However, focus groups are not free from problems and their major criticisms 
concern their lack of generalizability beyond the specific focus group because of 
the limitations in the sample size and the way the sample is chosen (not random).  
Thus, the researcher should only ensure that the sample is a “good approximation 
of the population” of interest (Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook, 2007, p.45; Bryman 
and Bell, 2011, p.503).  Moreover, participants may respond to questions in a 
different way than they would behave in real life (e.g., saying what is socially 
acceptable rather than saying how they actually behaved) (Kruenger and Casey, 
2009; Bryman and Bell, 2011).  The reliability of the results is also impaired by the 
fact that the moderator is thought to influence participants’ responses (Morgan, 
1996; Barbour, 2007; Bryman and Bell, 2011).  Additionally, group norms (peer 
pressure) may prevent somebody from expressing his views, especially if they are 
different from those of the group, while confidentiality is sacrificed due to the 
presence of others (Kitzinger, 1994; 1995; Morgan, 1997).  However, this cannot 
render the data collected as invalid as people never operate in a “cultural vacuum” 
(Kitzinger, 1994, p.117).  Another disadvantage includes the pressure on 
participants to explain themselves to the moderator and the disruptions of the 
discussion by the moderator (Morgan, 1996).  Finally, the discussion does not occur 
“naturally” as the group exists only because the researcher has convened it 
(Kitzinger, 1994, p.105; 1995, p.299).   
5.9.5 Focus groups: Recruitment 
Another concern related to interviews is the selection of interviewees.  This is 
called sampling and can be based on probabilities.  When selecting a sample for 
focus groups, the aim is not to produce a representative sample of the population, 
but rather to ensure that a diversity of opinions and experiences will be heard 
(Kitzinger, 1995; Kruenger and Casey, 2000; Barbour, 2005).  Non-probability 
sampling can be convenient or opportunistic depending on the availability of 
people to be interviewed or, it can be a snowball sampling (Burgess, 1984; Bryman, 
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2001).  Qualitative research has a logic that does not particularly fit well with the 
use of probability sampling and hence, it is the least used sampling method in 
qualitative research (Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1997; Mason, 2002; Hair et al., 
2011).   
Focus group sampling is purposeful as the researcher selects participants based on 
their knowledge, experience and their ability and willingness to contribute to the 
topic of interest, i.e. they are “information rich” participants (Stewart and 
Shamdasani, 1990, p.53; Morgan, 1997, p.17; Patton, 1999; Kruenger and Casey, 
2000, pp.2, 6, 26; Horsburgh, 2003; Kruenger and Casey, 2009, p.21; Doody, Slevin 
and Taggart, 2013a), enabling sufficient diversity of views (Bloor et al., 2001).  
Therefore, convenience sample is the most popular method for recruiting focus 
group participants (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990).   
The composition of a focus group’s participants is important as this will give rise to 
the discussion, the interaction and hence, to rich data (Hair et al., 2011; 
Liamputtong, 2011).  A group should be collected so that participants, on the one 
hand, have enough in common (in order to feel comfortable to discuss) and, on the 
other hand, their experiences and background will enable the emerging of a range 
of opinions (Barbour, 2007).  Participants can be selected to be homogeneous or 
heterogeneous (Liamputtong, 2011).  Homogeneity refers to common cultural and 
social background, having something in common , e.g., similar (a) experiences 
(Liamputtong, 2011), (b) occupation, (c) past usage of a service or programme, (d) 
age, (e) gender, (f) family characteristics (Kruenger and Casey, 2009).  Sampling 
should have the purpose of the research in mind and participants should share 
common background (but should not share the same attitudes) so as to provide rich 
data (Kitzinger, 1995; Barbour, 2005; 2007).   
Concerning the issue whether participants should be strangers or acquaintances, 
the criterion should be whether individuals feel comfortable discussing the topic of 
interest amongst them (Morgan, 1997) and that the selection of either is in line 
with the objectives and the nature of the research (Liamputtong, 2011).  Pre-
existing groups have the advantage of warming up much faster (Bloor et al., 2001; 
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Liamputtong, 2011).  They require less time and effort to be convinced and they 
are more likely to show up for the focus group session (Bloor et al., 2001).  
Additionally, in pre-existing groups, the group dynamics tend to encourage 
members to justify and explain themselves (Bloor et al., 2001) and are more 
naturally inclined to question and prompt each other, making reference to shared 
stories and experiences since in such a case, familiarity is the key for the flow of 
the discussion (Liamputtong, 2011).  When the researcher does not want to 
contrast and compare based on any participants’ features, then a single category 
design is sufficient (Kruenger and Casey, 2009).  In qualitative research what is of 
importance is whether participants generate data that is useful for the purposes of 
the specific research (Popay, Rogers and Williams, 1998).   
5.9.6 Focus groups: Size 
Regarding the number of participants in each focus group, a researcher should 
ensure that there are enough people, so that diversified views are heard but, at 
the same time, the focus group is small enough so that each participant is 
comfortable to express his/her views (Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009).  Additionally, 
sample size should be such that permits the researcher to make “meaningful 
comparisons” (Mason, 2002, p.136).  The factors to be considered when deciding 
the actual focus group size include (a) the purpose of the research, (b) 
participants’ expertise, (c) participants’ passion regarding the topic and, (d) the 
number of questions to be asked (Morgan, 1997; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009; 
Kruenger and Casey, 2009; Doody, Slevin and Taggart, 2013a).   
The problems associated with larger groups include the boredom of participants 
that have to compete to speak, the discussion may be too noisy, smaller sub-groups 
may be created and hence valuable data may be lost (Morgan, 1997; Bloor et al., 
2001; Kruenger and Casey, 2009; Liamputtong, 2011).  There is little agreement in 
the literature with regards to the optimal size of focus groups (Tang and Davis, 
1995).  Different researchers, suggest different ranges of participants in each focus 
group: three to eight (Barbour, 2007); four to eight (Kitzinger, 1995); six to eight 
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participants (Bloor et al., 2001) whereas, Stewart and Shamdasani (1990) suggest 
six to twelve participants.  
5.9.7 Focus groups: Number of focus groups 
With regards to the number of focus groups needed in order to obtain sufficient 
data, a researcher should continue until saturation of data is achieved, i.e. no new 
data is collected from the new focus group, taking into account the limited 
resources regarding personnel, budget and time (Morgan, 1997; Kruenger and 
Casey, 2000, Bloor et al., 2001; Kruenger and Casey, 2009; Bryman and Bell 2011, 
Liamputtong, 2011; Then, Rankin and Ali, 2014).  Typically, when the level of 
standardization is lower, a higher number of groups are needed (Morgan, 1996).  
Usually, the more homogeneous the focus groups are and the simpler the research 
question is the more topics can be covered during the specified time (Stewart and 
Shamdasani, 1990).   
Opinions on the number of focus groups vary accordingly.  Most researchers employ 
only a few focus groups and some combine the results of focus groups with other 
methods (Kitzinger, 1995), while others support that two to four focus groups 
should be carried out in order to identify consistencies in the opinion of 
participants (Stewart and Shamdasani, 1990; Kruenger and Casey, 2009; Hair et al., 
2011).  Morgan (1996; 1997) argues that three to six sessions are enough, while 
Kitzinger (1994) talks about having fewer than four to five groups, since it is a 
matter of whether the sample can achieve diversity of views.   
5.9.8 Focus Groups: Duration 
Focus groups normally last around one and a half hours, but they can be shorter or 
longer depending on the willingness and ability of interviewees to continue the 
discussion (Liamputtong, 2011), but they may vary from one hour to two hours and 
a half (Kitzinger, 1995; Morgan, 1997; Bloor et al., 2001; Stewart, Shamdasani and 
Rook, 2007; Kruenger and Casey, 2009; Liamputtong, 2011).  What is of importance 
is that a researcher should look for signs of fatigue and/or unwillingness of 
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participants to continue the discussion as they may have other obligations, they 
may become tired or may have run out of new ideas (Liamputtong, 2011).  
Additionally, a researcher must stick to the timeframe promised, allocating enough 
time for the group’s warming up and for opportunities for deeper discussion of 
certain issues (Liamputtong, 2011).   
 
5.9.9 Focus groups in practice 
When planning for the focus groups, the researcher of the current research 
initiated some long and sincere talks with key informers, i.e. credit union members 
whom the researcher knew for many years and were subsequently removed from 
the pool of potential focus group participants.  More specifically, they advised the 
researcher on the most promising days and times of the week to conduct the focus 
groups, dates that popular professional events would take place as well as 
convenient and appropriate places for the interviews.  They also informed the 
researcher about possible problems that could arise with the participants and how 
to avoid or to overcome them.   
The researcher decided that for the specific research, the focus groups’ 
participants should comprise of members of a specific credit union.  For this reason 
a purposive sampling was aimed at, recruiting members that were able and willing 
to provide data that were useful in answering the research questions.  Additionally, 
participants were recruited so that a wide range of opinions and views could be 
expressed concerning the perceptions of members regarding the practical 
application of the co-operative principles and the participation of members in their 
credit union.  Moreover, the participants were homogeneous in the sense that they 
belonged to the same profession and were members in the same credit union.  As 
the researcher was not interested in differences in perceptions among men and 
women or differences in the age groups of members, the focus group consisted of 
people who could contribute to a wider range of perceptions on the research topic.   
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To assess the possibility of carrying out focus groups with the members of a specific 
credit union, at the beginning of the recruitment process, the researcher contacted 
the General Managers of various credit unions by phone asking for their assistance 
in attracting members to participate in the focus groups.  As in the case of 
individual interviews, even though there was genuine interest to assist in the 
research, it soon became evident that it would be rather impossible to identify 
enough members to take part in the focus groups probably because of the 
uncertain and difficult climate of the days, the changes that took place as a result 
of the mergers among credit unions and the changes in their organisational chart.  
Hence, the credit union that the researcher had worked for four years was 
selected.  Some of the researcher’s acquaintances and ex-colleagues in four towns 
were kindly asked to identify potential participants so as to carry out three to four 
focus groups of around ten people each, in any one town.  However, even with the 
assistance of the researcher’s ex-colleagues, soon it became evident that it was 
not plausible to carry out three to four focus group interviews in any individual 
town due to the limited number of possible participants.  Thus, it was decided to 
carry out only one focus group per town.  Hence, the participants that had already 
been identified by the researcher’s acquaintances and ex-colleagues were 
considered for the focus group of their town.   
Then, the researcher discussed the personal characteristics of each of the potential 
participants with the informers (the researcher’s social acquaintances and ex-
colleagues).  If the researcher considered that a specific person could add to the 
discussion by offering a new perspective and that his/her character and personality 
was compatible with the rest of the group, he asked the informer to contact the 
specific person.  The informer then asked permission from the prospective 
participants to be contacted by the researcher, by phone, in order to establish 
rapport and explain to them the nature of the research and what was expected of 
them.  In order to have a good mixture of participants only a couple of participants 
were chosen from each informer.  Potential participants were then contacted and 
asked whether they could attend the specific focus group at a set date and time.  
When the researcher phoned each of the prospective participants, he informed 
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them about the reasons the researcher thought that they could significantly 
contribute to the research.  Some retired participants actually expressed gratitude 
for selecting them and for believing that they could provide useful insights for the 
specific research.  Moreover, when potential participants agreed to participate in 
the focus groups, the researcher asked them to identify any other potential 
participants (snowball sampling) (Bloor et al., 2001; Kruenger and Casey, 2009).  
Finally, apart from the initial telephone discussion, three or four days prior to the 
focus group, the researcher gave a warm and sincere follow-up call to the 
participants asking them to confirm their attendance (Kruenger and Casey, 2009).  
This was followed by a sms (or a third call on a land line to a couple of members 
that did not have a mobile phone) reminding them about the time and venue of the 
focus group the following morning.   
For the specific research ten participants per focus group were arranged (Stewart 
and Shamdasani, 1990; Tang and Davis, 1995; Morgan, 1997; Bloor et al., 2001; 
Rabiee, 2004; Stewart, Shamdasani and Rook, 2007; Kruenger and Casey, 2009; 
Bryman and Bell, 2011; Hair et al., 2011, p.191; Liamputtong, 2011), but twelve 
members were invited (i.e. over recruited by 20%) in order to make up for any 
participants not managing to attend the actual focus group (Popay, Rogers and 
Williams, 1998; Rabiee, 2004; Barbour, 2007; Kruenger and Casey, 2009).   
All participants were members of the same professional credit union and they were 
of the same profession, hence the participants were homogeneous with regards to 
these two parameters (Kruenger and Casey, 2009).  During the third focus group, 
the researcher felt that a fourth focus group would not contribute as no new topics 
were raised by the participants.  In all three focus groups, the majority of the 
participants already knew of each other, either because they had worked at the 
same location, or because they were acquaintances or they had common friends.  
This assisted the group interaction as within 10 minutes all participants seemed to 
feel comfortable to express their opinion and to participate in the discussion.  It 
can be said that the common (professional) background and the similar experiences 
in dealing with their credit union facilitated the smooth flow of the discussion. 
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Each of the three focus groups lasted for about one hour and a half to one hour and 
fifty minutes.  More specifically, the first one lasted for one hour and fifty minutes, 
the second for a little longer than one hour and a half and the third for one hour 
and forty minutes.  During the first focus group, the researcher tried to extend the 
duration of the focus group beyond the promised duration of one hour and a half, 
but to the researcher’s surprise, fifteen minutes after the promised time, he 
noticed that participants had already started to collect their belongings and made 
signals to each other indicating that it was time to leave.  Soon after these signals, 
the researcher realized that the participants were very conscious of the time and 
thus, he let the discussion reach its end (Liamputtong, 2011).  After this incident, 
the researcher tried to stick to the promised time. 
The participants of the three focus groups were both male and female, active and 
retired members of the specific profession and members of the specific credit 
union, aged 30 to 70 years old (Table 5.4).  Even though the researcher tried to 
maintain a balance, most participants were retired men probably because they had 
more leisure time at their disposal.  The researcher is aware that the results 
cannot be generalized to the general population because of the small number of 
participants and because of the high contextualization of the results (due to the 
specific formation and direction of discussion in the specific focus groups).  
However, an informed reader could find comparable situations where the results 
may be used as a guide or make “logical generalizations to a theoretical 
understanding of a similar class of phenomena rather than probabilistic 
generalizations to a population” (Popay, Rogers and Williams, 1998, p.348). 
Table 5.4: Age and sex of focus group participants: 
 Town 1 Town 2 Town 3 Total 
Men     
In profession 2 2 3 7 
Retired 4 5 4 13 
     
Women     
In profession 2 2 2 6 
Retired 2 1 1 4 
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With regards to the location, the researcher identified a number of possible 
venues, with the thoughtful assistance of the key informers.  Hence, the focus 
groups took place in neutral locations, i.e. in the conference room of well-known, 
reputable cafeterias, in each of the three towns and in areas which were easily 
accessible by the participants (Barbour, 2007).  The conference rooms were 
isolated from the cafeterias and were visited by the researcher prior to the actual 
focus group to ensure that the size, tone, character and temperature of the room 
was such so as to provide the participants with a friendly and comfortable 
environment (Kruenger and Casey, 2009; Doody, Slevin and Taggart, 2013b; Then, 
Rankin and Ali, 2014).  Additionally, the venues were selected aiming at places 
with minimum distractions, where the participants could sit in a round or quasi-
round table enabling them to have eye contact with each other and with the 
researcher (Morgan, 1997; Bloor et al., 2001; Then, Rankin and Ali, 2014).   
Coffees, teas, juices as well as biscuits were offered to the participants.  This was 
done in order to thank the participants for attending and spending about two hours 
for the specific research (Bloor et al., 2001; Barbour, 2007; Liamputtong, 2011; 
Then, Rankin and Ali, 2014).  At the end of each focus group, each participant was 
given a pack of two local wines, to show the gratitude of the researcher as 
according to Kruenger and Casey (2009, pp.77, 79) “it would be next to impossible 
to conduct focus groups without incentives”.  This was a symbolic present and it 
was clearly stated as such since the researcher considered that a monetary 
compensation of similar value could have offended the participants.  Local wines 
were suggested by the key informers and judging by the faces of the participants 
when handed the wines, the suggestion was very good.  
Each session was voice recorded using two different voice recorders following the 
consent of the participants.  One ex-colleague/informant per town acted as a 
research assistant, drawing a sketch of the table with the seat of each participant 
and took notes of the sequence with which the participants talked in order to assist 
with the transcription of each focus group.  Additionally, to further assist with the 
transcription of the focus groups’ discussion, the researcher asked the participants 
to mention their names each time they spoke, but as the focus group progressed 
Page 124 of 297 
 
and they felt more comfortable in expressing their opinion, this was not followed 
as participants interrupted each other, added comments, completed the phrase of 
the previous person, murmured in agreement or voiced their disagreement. 
Based on the examination of literature and the results from the interviews with the 
employees of various credit unions, the researcher prepared a discussion plan 
(topic guide) setting out 24 questions in total (Appendix 3), in a logical sequence, 
starting from more general and moving to more specific questions.  The discussion 
plan included the questions that the focus groups should try to answer allowing the 
flexibility to the researcher to ask additional questions as he got the opportunity to 
do so while he was “thinking on his feet” (Barbour, 2005; 2007, p.85).  These 
questions were pilot tested with a few potential participants (that subsequently 
were disqualified from the actual focus groups) and the phrasing and sequence of 
some of the questions were adjusted in order to become clearer and sequenced in 
a more logical manner.   
During the focus groups, the researcher was aware of the need to remain as neutral 
as possible and to be systematic with the procedures he used.  For this reason, 
following the consent of the participants, he voice recorded all focus groups and 
tried to engage all participants in order to capture as many views as possible and in 
the exact wording of the participants used.  Moreover, the researcher asked 
probing questions in order to indicate to the participants that more explanations 
were needed and prompted in order to encourage all to express their views.  In 
some instances, the researcher summarized the discussion in order to ensure that 
his understanding was correct, highlighting the different and conflicting views. 
Having worked for the specific credit union, for almost four years, the researcher 
was familiar with some of the issues that could have been raised by the 
participants, so rapport with them was established very easily and very quickly.  
Additionally, the researcher was already familiar with the language of the 
participants thus, gained more time for the questions in the topic guide.  Although 
knowledgeable of the topic, the researcher had never seen things from the 
members’ perspective and could not understand the reasoning for some of their 
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requests, or the way they viewed their membership, thus, he could not be 
considered as a “native” or an “insider” with regards to membership issues. 
Overall, the researcher is confident that the findings are reflections of what was 
discussed during the focus groups and he ensures that all participants’ views were 
taken into account and weighed equally.  Additionally, the researcher ensures that 
any dissenting views have been included in the results so as to operate as a 
checking mechanism.  Hence, all results have been included, not omitting any 
views that were not in line with his own.  Additionally, the results of the individual 
interviews and the focus groups were not combined so that the reader can have 
access to the results of each of the two methods independently.  The researcher 
also attempted to distinguish between findings (Chapter 6) and his interpretations 
(Chapter 7) keeping in mind that in qualitative research one can never be 
completely independent of the data he analyses and that each researcher may 
interpret the same data differently because of his own background and personality.   
5.9.10 Analysis of data 
The analysis of the data started right after the transcription of the individual and 
focus group interviews, as the researcher tried to identify data that would answer 
the research questions.  Both the individual and focus group interviews were voice 
recorded, with the consent of the participants, and the data collected from each of 
the two methods was analysed independently using a transcript based analysis 
(verbatim transcription), i.e. word by word transcription of voice files (Bryman, 
2001; Barbour, 2007; Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009).  The verbatim transcription of the 
voice recordings was then imported in N-Vivo.  During the verbatim transcription of 
the focus groups, an audit trail was created (by taking note of the reading of the 
electronic voice recorder before each participant’s transcription) hence, enabling 
the researcher to speedily go from the voice recording to the transcription and vice 
versa.   
The first step was to repetitively read the transcription in order to gain a holistic 
view of the data.  Then common concepts, themes and patterns in the transcribed 
Page 126 of 297 
 
text were identified.  This was done to ensure that the concepts that emerged 
were supported by the available data, thus enhancing the validity of the reported 
results.  During the whole process of going forwards and backwards in the 
transcribed text, the researcher wrote the research aim on a piece of paper and 
every now and then he read it in order to remind himself of what he was aiming at.  
The researcher particularly looked for themes and patterns across the focus groups 
aiming at understanding the way people perceive the issues that he was interested 
in, in a group context (Kruenger and Casey, 2009).  Additionally, minority or 
individual opinions were distinguished from group consensus, as well as the 
opinions that did not match the rest (dissenter views) (Kitzinger, 1995; 
Onwuegbuzie et al., 2009).  When analysing the results, the researcher tried to 
make sense of the data, excluding irrelevant and additional data, in an attempt to 
understand the situation (Doody, Slevin and Taggart, 2013c).   
During the second step of the data analysis, the concepts retrieved from the focus 
groups/interviews were used to code the data.  That is, the sentences with the 
same meaning were placed under the same code, irrespectively of the length of 
these sentences, so as to describe the data accurately.  A problem with this kind of 
coding is that the meaning of each chunk of data can be subjective and thus, care 
was taken to include those codes that described the data unambiguously and 
completely.  Additionally, to ensure that any dissenting or minority views were not 
lost in the data, more codes were used than initially intended.  For example, when 
coding the replies of the credit union employees during the individual interviews, 
regarding the reasons for members’ lack of participation, fourteen codes were used 
in total, six of which consisting of either one or two quotations.  While moving 
forwards and backwards in the data, new ideas were identified which sometimes 
meant that chunks of data were re-coded under a new code; or these new and 
wider codes were used as categories where more than one code (concept) could 
fall under.  To deal with the problem of the coder’s subjectivity, in December 
2013, an independent researcher coded 4 out of the 36 questions (around 11% of 
the data), using N-Vivo and the Cohen’s Kappa (inter-rater reliability) was 
calculated as 0,78, with 0,75 being considered as very good.  The same process was 
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then followed in summer 2014, when the transcription of the focus groups was 
completed.  In the case of focus groups, the independent researcher coded 3 out of 
the 24 questions (around 12% of the data), using N-Vivo and the Cohen’s Kappa 
(inter-rater reliability) was calculated as 0,73 which is considered as good.  Once, 
the entire interview transcriptions were coded and no new codes could be 
identified, these were extracted from N-Vivo to MS word.   
Then, during the third step, the codes were grouped together based on the 
relationships among them and each code was allocated to the most relevant and 
logical categories/themes.  The determination of the importance of each 
idea/category was attempted by assessing the number of interviewees that 
supported the specific idea.  Care was taken to include the ideas and/or 
contribution of any minorities or individuals that could potentially serve as deviant 
cases in order to check the validity of the findings.  In some cases, these deviant 
cases seemed to honestly express their views (without fear or without trying to be 
politically correct or to obey to the group norm) mentioning specific instances that 
are not so glorious for the credit unions.  The high volume of data was difficult to 
manage at first, but once common themes started to emerge, irrelevant chunks of 
data were ignored, allowing concentrating on what was important for this research.  
The whole process of data analysis was to enable the researcher to make sense of 
the data, to “negotiate his way through the large volume of information” (Doody, 
Slevin and Taggart, 2013c, p.267) and finally, to bring meaning to the specific data 
set.  This data elimination process led to the final document which the researcher 
used to write up the results (Chapter 6).  During writing up the results, an attempt 
was made to achieve a balance between a summary of the results and direct 
quotations of group discussions (Morgan, 1997).   
It should be noted that both the individual and focus group interviews were 
conducted in Greek (mother tongue of both the participants and the researcher) 
thus, the verbatim transcription, coding and analysis was done in Greek.  The parts 
of the transcriptions that have been included in the report were translated by the 
researcher into English.  This translation was verified and corrected by an 
independent, to this research, English language instructor.  Moreover, some of the 
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parts that were translated in English were translated back to Greek in order to 
ensure that the translation was correct.   
5.9.11 Use of documents (statistics) 
The reliability of findings can be enhanced by using sources of data such as 
statistics (official and unofficial) (Popay, Rogers and Williams, 1998).  To this 
effect, the author of the present study discussed with an officer from the 
Commissioner of the Co-operative Societies Supervision and Development Agency 
(CSSDA) the purpose of this study and the possibility of obtaining statistics from 
them with regards to the number of members attending AGMs, voting at and 
standing for election for the Board of Directors.  Once the officer was satisfied with 
the explanation given about the use of such statistics, the green light was given to 
the researcher to send a formal letter requesting them.  Following the letter and a 
couple of more phone calls, the author of the present study had to visit the office 
of the Commissioner in order to obtain the aforementioned statistics and for a 
second time in order to obtain some missing data.  The statistics were finally 
handed to the researcher on the 25th September 2013, and provided data on a 
sample of twenty credit unions including small, medium and large ones covering 
credit unions that served professional groups and credit unions serving members of 
a specific geographical area.  The statistics related to the three previous elections 
and AGMs, but in some cases not all data were available for all twenty credit 
unions, so the researcher used the data available stating each time the number of 
credit unions for which data were available.  These statistics were used in verifying 
the data obtained from both the interviews (questions 32, 33 and 34) and the focus 
groups (questions 20 and 21).   
 
5.10 Effect of research methods on research questions 
As discussed in the previous Sections (5.2- 5.6) the present study is qualitative and 
it lies in the constructivist paradigm.  This is because the present study is 
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interested in the perceptions of people (employees and members of credit unions) 
as it is constructed from their interaction with the researcher during the interviews 
and the focus groups.  Based on these and further to Section 4.5 the first research 
question becomes:  
“What are the perceptions regarding the practical application of the co-
operative principles?” 
Similarly, the second research question becomes: 
“What are the perceptions regarding the active democratic participation of 
members?” 
 
5.11 Summary 
In this Chapter the focus was on the issues relating to ontology and epistemology as 
well as to quality, ethics and methodology of the present study.  For the purposes 
of collecting data for the present research, individual and focus group interviews 
were used in order to provide a complete picture of the perceptions of employees 
and members regarding the adherence of credit unions to their principles and the 
engagement of members with their credit union.  Additionally, documents (data on 
a sample of credit unions) were obtained in order to triangulate part of the 
findings.  The results of the present study will be analysed in the next Chapter and 
they will be discussed and compared to existing literature in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 6: Research results 
6.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 5 there was a discussion of issues relating to ontology and epistemology 
as well as to quality, ethics and methodology of the present study.  For the 
purposes of collecting data for the present research, individual and focus group 
interviews were used in order to provide a completer picture of the perceptions of 
employees and members regarding the adherence of credit unions to their 
principles and the engagement of members with their credit union.  Additionally, 
documents (statistics on a sample of credit unions) were obtained in order to 
triangulate part of the findings.  The results of each of these three methods are set 
out, in this Chapter, separately in order to better inform the reader, enabling the 
comparison of the data from each method.  It should be further noted that firstly, 
the results of the interviews and secondly, the results of the focus groups are 
grouped based on each of the seven co-operative principles.   
 
6.2 Structured interviews’ results 
For the first part of the field work, structured individual interviews with thirty 
employees from nine credit unions, in three towns, were carried out (see Section 
5.9.3).  It should be noted that the results obtained from these interviews took 
place in September 2013, only six months after the deposit haircut and the 
heightening of the problems in the financial sector, in Cyprus.  Hence, the results 
should be examined considering the restrictions on cash withdrawals and the high 
insecurity, fear and anger that people felt.   
6.2.1 General awareness of co-operative principles 
In an attempt to assess credit union employees’ awareness of co-operative 
principles, their replies to Questions 1 and 2 were examined (Appendix 1).  Only 
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five of the interviewees replied recalling from their memory the co-operative 
principles.  The rest felt more comfortable choosing from the printed paper that 
the researcher provided them with.  During the few moments of unrecorded 
conversation most interviewees admitted that they felt uncomfortable trying to 
recall the co-operative principles and the majority said that even though they used 
them in their day-to-day work, they could not explain or associate all of them with 
the ones provided in the printed copy.  Overall, the three most popular co-
operative principles that were mentioned by the interviewees were the 7th 
principle “Concern for the community”, the 2nd one “Democratic member control” 
and the 3rd one “Autonomy and independence”.  It is worth mentioning that 
(“Equality”) was ranked amongst the most popular principles even though it is 
merely a co-operative value.  The interview results for each of the seven principles 
are presented below. 
6.2.2 1st principle: “Voluntary and open membership”  
The adherence of credit unions to the 1st co-operative principle, “Voluntary and 
open membership”, was assessed based on credit union employees’ responses to 
Questions 7 and 8 (Appendix 1). 
According to the data, credit unions seem to follow this principle as none of the 
interviewees claimed that someone was forced to become a member.  Having said 
that, some interviewees said that, in some cases, people are “forced” to become 
members in order to obtain a loan or to be able to co-sign for someone they know:  
“Forced? No.  Simply, one must be member in order to be able to obtain a 
loan”, (IR28)  
“…they are forced to become members in a credit union when they need a 
loan or when they want to offer personal guarantees for the loan of someone 
else” (IR10) 
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Nevertheless, some interviewees said that in some cases people are “forced” to 
become members to be able to vote for someone they know, as indicated by IR9 
and IR12, the latter of which said:  
“Unfortunately when we have [Board of Directors’] elections, some members 
influence others to become members in order to vote for someone…”  
Another participant even said that some people had to become members to obtain 
financing because banks forced them to: 
“Some people were forced to come to us because the banks would not serve 
them the way they should.  This however, does not mean they were forced 
to become members” (IR21) 
With regards to exiting the credit unions, twenty nine out of the thirty 
interviewees claimed that they were not aware of any member who was forced to 
do so.  Having said that, some interviewees claimed that, in some cases, people 
exited voluntarily, e.g., in the cases when they felt that their credit union was 
giving them a hard time: “in the cases where we give a hard time to our members 
in respect to the pre-conditions asked…” (IR21), or because they found better 
terms in investor-owned banks: “in some cases some members were struck off, 
because they found better terms in another bank and they transferred their 
business to this bank…” (IR19).  Another reason presented was to access their 
“permanent” deposits: “no, apart from some cases where some members were 
struck off in order to obtain their permanent deposits” (IR14), while IR6 indicated 
that other members exited as a reaction to a credit union’s decision: “I am aware 
of some instances where members were struck off as a reaction to the decision of 
the credit union to take legal action against them…”.  In some extreme cases, 
members were more or less “forced” to exit the credit union because of 
psychological problems: “members were convinced to be struck off due to their 
psychological problems” (IR7) rendering them incapable of managing their financial 
affairs.  Finally, IR18 said that in the case a member was sentenced by a court, the 
Board of Directors of the credit union struck off the specific member from the 
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registry: “yes, in the sense that a member was sentenced by a court or a court 
decision, that forced the Board of Directors to take a decision and strike the 
specific member off the members’ registry”. 
6.2.3 2nd principle: “Democratic member control” 
The 2nd co-operative principle, “Democratic member control”, was examined 
through credit union employees’ responses to Questions 32, 33, 34, 35 and 36 
(Appendix 1).   
With regards to the number of members voting at the Board of Directors’ elections, 
it seems that it is not the majority of members that participate.  Eleven 
interviewees specifically claimed that the participation of members was less than 
30%, eight of which specifically indicated that participation was less than 25%.  
Two other interviewees (IR28 and IR6) said that around 30% of the members voted 
at the previous Board of Directors’ elections, while IR24 stated that the percentage 
of members voting at the Board of Directors’ elections was close to zero: “…It was 
around 0,03% of the members”.  However, views varied.  Seven interviewees 
indicated that member participation in the Board of Directors’ elections was more 
than 50%, as in the case of IR12 who at the same time admitted that the same 
people served for fifteen years on the Board of Directors: “… the majority votes.  
Of course there were some elections where the number of candidates was exactly 
the same with the number of available positions, so there were no elections… we 
might have had the same people as Board of Directors for 15 years (with each term 
being for 3 years)”.  Ten interviewees did not give an answer stating that they did 
not know the answer.   
With regards to the interest of members to be elected in the Board of Directors 
seventeen interviewees indicated that there were two or fewer candidates for each 
available position on the Board of Directors and that sometimes no elections took 
place as the number of candidates was exactly equal to the number of available 
positions: 
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“If I remember correctly, the candidates were double the available positions” 
(IR30)  
More specifically, IR5, IR24 and IR28 said that there were 7-8 candidates for 5 
positions: 
“more or less there were 7- 8 candidates for 5 positions but in the last 20 years we 
only had three elections [each term is for three years] because there were only 5 
candidates all of them suggested by the political parties” (IR5)  
On the other hand, three interviewees claimed that there were more than two 
candidates for each available position on the Board of Directors: 
“There were double or triple candidates for each available position” (IR18)  
IR6 specifically said that there were around 15 candidates for 7 positions, while ten 
participants did not give an answer claiming that they did not know the answer.   
Finally, with regards to the number of members that attend the General Meetings 
the data obtained show that only a minority of members attends.  In particular, 
according to fifteen interviewees the percentage was close to zero:  
“Very few [members attend the General Meetings].  Below 1%” (IR28) 
Additionally, six interviewees stated that the percentage of members attending the 
Annual General Meetings (AGM) was less than 25%, e.g., IR16 and IR20 said that it 
was 5%- 10%: 
“It can be around 5%- 10%” (IR20)  
“Around 5%” (IR16) 
On the other hand, though, there were participants who pointed that attendance 
was high, without specifying an approximate number or percentage: “all of the 
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seats of the theatre hall where our General Meeting was held were full.  I do not 
know the exact number but there were also some members standing” (IR30), while 
IR23 said that attendance was around 65%: “… Normally it is the 2/3”.  Seven 
interviewees did not provide an answer, claiming that they did not know.    
 
6.2.4 Members’ lack of participation 
Overall, the data collected indicates that member participation is generally low.  
The reasons for this low percentage participation could be viewed through the 
replies provided in Question 28 (Appendix 1).  The most popular reasons for the 
lack of members’ participation with their credit union mentioned by the 
interviewees are the lack of interest and lack of personal benefit (being referenced 
eleven times): 
“…Generally, the lack of interest” (IR28)  
“During the last few years we saw people generally not to be interested…” 
(IR24) 
“People are not interested anymore … because they do not even have a 
motive to be interested in these things…” (IR12)  
“…as soon as a member realizes that he has nothing to gain, that he has no 
personal benefit, if he attends the General Meeting…” (IR16) 
“… maybe if members had a personal benefit when their credit union did 
well, e.g., a dividend just like investor-owned banks, people would be more 
active…” (IR9)  
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Particularly, IR4 said that that someone becomes member of a credit union only if 
he has something to gain, e.g., to obtain a loan, without being interested in 
anything else.   
A second reason mentioned, indirectly, eight times was members’ free riding:  
“The reasons for the distancing of members are not necessarily linked to the 
credit union itself.  I believe that the most common reasons are related to 
the lack of time on behalf of members”, (IR30) 
Additionally, IR18 and IR10 pointed out that members are too busy in their 
everyday lives that they do not have time to get involved with issues concerning 
their credit union: 
“The fast pace of our lives does not allow many of our members to get 
involved because they consider this as a luxury they cannot afford” (IR18) 
“Unfortunately, as long as nothing happens, members do not have any 
interest, as long as they see that they are represented by the Board of 
Directors, that everything goes well, and runs smoothly…because they feel 
secured.  Why should I go and lose my time…?” (IR22) 
Another reason mentioned five times, was that members fear that even if they 
participate they will not be able to influence things: 
“…causes people to alienate because you see things which you cannot 
change” (IR29) 
“…our members, just like all of us, are disappointed with the whole situation 
and knowing that they will not be able, anymore, to influence the decisions 
through their vote, things are becoming even more difficult” (IR25)  
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“…very few members are interested.  This is because members feel that 
they cannot impose their views” (IR15) 
Moreover, members would stop participating in their credit union because of their 
dissatisfaction with the decisions taken by the credit union (referenced five times). 
For example, IR23 noted that a member will distant himself “when a member is not 
satisfied, when he is not served properly, when it has needs that are not met by 
the credit union…”, while IR11 said: “a credit union takes some decisions that do 
not satisfy the member and the member will show his dislike by becoming distant 
in relation to his credit union”.   
The fifth reason mentioned four times is the loss of credit union’s local culture: 
“…in the past societies were more closed, every credit union operated 
within its society, its community and people were more interested.  
Nowadays, the area in which credit unions operate has enlarged to a great 
extent…” (IR26) 
A sixth reason for the lack of members’ participation mentioned, by three 
participants, was the involvement of the political parties: 
“…the involvement of political parties in all sectors of our lives, controlling 
everything and resulting in the advancement of the least capable is what 
stops members from participating in their credit union” (IR29) 
“…whenever the political parties were involved we had a high percentage of 
members attending, while when the political parties were not involved it 
was difficult for us to find candidates for the Board of Directors’ elections” 
(IR19) 
Finally, a reason that was mentioned was the lack of marketing/promotion of 
credit unions’ products.  IR29 argued that credit unions may have the same or even 
better products/services to offer than investor-owned banks, but credit union 
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members consider these of lower quality just because investor-owned banks 
promote their products intensively: “some younger people… consider that having a 
credit union [debit/credit] card in their wallet is a bad thing and they would 
preferred if they had the corresponding card of an investor-owned bank….”.  
Concerning the possible ways members can come closer to their credit unions, six 
responses showed that it is the responsibility of the Board of Directors and the 
credit union to activate their members: 
“…from the credit union’s side we do not cultivate our members that they 
must be active” (IR28) 
“…credit union’s response to its members.  If the opinion of the member is 
heard [then the member will remain active]” (IR27) 
A seventh response, provided by interviewee IR25, indicated that one way to 
increase members’ participation in their credit union is by offering small gifts to 
members at the various events organised: “…we have solved the problem of low 
member participation, by offering gifts to them.  When we had a General Meeting 
where a gift would be offered, the participation increased a lot”.   
6.2.5 3rd principle: “Member economic participation” 
As far as the 3rd principle, “Member economic participation”, is concerned, it was 
examined through credit union employees’ responses to Questions 9 and 10 
(Appendix 1).  
Sixteen interviewees stated that members will not buy shares to assist in the 
recapitalization of their credit union unless they are “forced” to do so: 
“The members are negative …complaining for forcing them [to buy shares]” 
(IR8)  
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Fourteen interviewees claimed that members will only show limited interest and 
thus, credit unions’ recapitalization will not be achieved: 
“I believe that during this phase … there will be limited response which will 
not contribute significantly to the recapitalization of credit unions” (IR28) 
With respect to the reasons behind members’ unwillingness to contribute 
financially to their credit unions, seventeen responses show that members will not 
buy shares because of the loss of their trust in the financial system: 
“In the last five months [March to August 2013] there was a very intense 
scenario, with people withdrawing their deposits and taking them to their 
homes, resulting in the loss of many deposits” (IR24) 
“… the whole climate is negative.  Banks have closed down, there was a 
deposit haircut and people are affected negatively” (IR8)  
Nine interviewees argued that members will not contribute financially because of 
the bad financial conditions of these days.  For example, IR28 said “because people 
do not have any more available money to invest…”, while IR25 stated that “… 
people are afraid because of the financial crisis…”.  
6.2.6 4th principle: “Autonomy and independence” 
Moving to the assessment of whether credit unions follow the 4th co-operative 
principle, “Autonomy and independence”, this was based on credit union 
employees’ responses to Questions 11- 19 (Appendix 1).   
Various concerns were raised by the interviewees:  
(a) the possible loss of credit unions’ independence following the transfer of 99% 
of their shares to the Cyprus state, through the Co-operative Central Bank; 
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(b) the possible loss of credit unions’ independence through the issuance and 
selling of class B’ shares (i.e. shares that are entitled to a fixed dividend per 
year but carry no voting rights) to non-members enabling them to put 
pressure on credit unions to concentrate only on profits and to ignore their 
social cause;  
(c) the possible demutualization of credit unions following pressure from non-
members; 
(d) possible shrinkage of credit unions and/or their transformation into investor-
owned banks and; 
(e) possible loss of the independence of credit unions due to the financial 
assistance they will need as a result of the high level of non-performing loans. 
More specifically, interviewees raised concerns regarding the independence of 
credit unions following the transfer of 99% of credit unions’ shares to the Cyprus 
state (for €1,5 billion for a period of five years).  In this case, seventeen 
interviewees claimed that the loan was a better alternative than the sale of credit 
union shares as with a loan, the independence of credit unions would not be 
jeopardized:  
“A loan because if they [the state] get your shares then you are cancelled as 
a Board of Directors, as management team and your independence is 
impaired.  I believe that a loan would have been a better solution” (IR30)  
“I would prefer a clear cut loan… because I would not lose my 
independence…” (IR25)  
“I believe that the loan would have been a better choice because by giving 
your shares; the government at any moment, can sell the shares to private 
investors who will take control of credit unions, destroying whatever was 
build up to now” (IR9)  
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Seven responses however, showed that the transfer of the shares was a better 
alternative than the loan because it would be easier for credit unions to buy back 
their shares than to repay the loan: “between a loan and selling the shares I prefer 
the shares… I think that with the shares, slowly, slowly we would buy them back…” 
(IR29); and the 10% return on the loan, would result in higher interest rates for 
members rather than if the shares were transferred to the government: “… if it was 
a loan and you had all the time the 10% charge, the cost would have been 
transferred to the loan interest rates which would have climbed to 14%- 15%…” 
(IR26).   
Moreover, three interviewees agreed that none of the two alternatives is good 
enough:  
“in both cases, the state has … a saying…it is a knife that cuts both ways 
because if you consider that credit unions will have to pay around €140- 
€150 million per year out of their profits when in the good times… the credit 
unions never had profits over €120- €130 million this means that more 
measures will be taken and that is for sure” (IR18).  
Finally, three interviewees argued that there should have been more alternatives 
than a loan or transfer of shares only.  For example, IR15 suggested the netting off 
of the amount that the government has owed credit unions for a number of years, 
with the amount the credit unions owe the government: “… the government owes 
money to the credit unions.  Why didn’t they firstly net off the debt and only then 
receive the additional amount needed by selling a percentage of the shares to the 
government?  There is something wrong here…”. 
A second fear that was expressed by interviewees is related to the possible loss of 
credit unions’ independence through the issuance and selling of class B’ shares 
(which would not carry voting rights) to non-members, enabling them to put 
pressure on credit unions to pursue profits.  Twenty eight interviewees claimed 
that non-members could indeed do this:  
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“If this happens, credit unions will lose their principles, hence it would not 
be a good thing”, (IR27) 
“Credit unions will have to maintain their anthropocentric character.  If 
credit unions lose this, they will also become banks and this will make things 
worse for the ordinary people in the street. People will lose the 
counterweight that keeps the banks under control” (IR26) 
However, one interviewee (IR14) suggested that if credit unions become for-profit, 
it will be for the benefit of credit unions as they will become more financially 
viable: “it is positive for credit unions to increase their profits.  Even though credit 
unions declare that they should not make profits, without profits they cannot 
survive”.  IR15 further argued that it would not be necessary for non-members to 
put pressure on the credit union to become for-profit because through their own 
actions credit unions would become banks, without the interference of anybody 
else:  
“I think that it will not be necessary for non-members to put pressure; we 
will become banks on our own, from the laws that our Parliament is voting”.  
On the other hand, another interviewee (IR5) expressed the opinion that non-
members would not be able to put pressure on credit unions as Cypriots have a 
much better opinion about credit unions than investor-owned banks and as the 
former have different objectives.   
What is interesting is that even though twenty eight interviewees, as 
aforementioned, feared that the sale of shares to non-members may cause the 
transformation of their credit union to for-profit, when they were asked directly 
whether they are in favour or against the possibility of their credit union selling 
class B’ shares to non-members, twenty four of them were in favour most probably 
because of the financial strengthening of their credit union: 
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“If this was said to me previously, I would not have accepted it however, 
today I wish that people are found either inside or outside the credit unions 
[to contribute financially to the strengthen of our credit union]” (IR29)  
“They will assist in the recapitalization of credit unions, thus it would be for 
the best if non-members could buy as well” (IR27)  
In addition to the twenty four interviewees that agreed, five expressed their 
disagreement with non-members buying class B’ shares, fearing that this may result 
in the loss of members’ control.  For example IR13 said: “it sounds negative to 
me… From the moment non-members will be allowed to buy shares in the credit 
unions, the latter will cease to belong to their members”, while IR12 claimed that 
this move would have negative consequences in the future.  That is, their credit 
union would be transformed into an investor-owned bank: “… this will give rise to 
future problems for the co-operative movement … for sure we will be transformed 
into an investor-owned bank…” (IR12).   
A third issue that was raised by twenty nine interviewees regarding the possible 
loss of credit unions’ independence was through the issuance and selling of class B’ 
shares (which would not carry voting rights) to non-members enabling them to put 
pressure on credit unions to demutualize:   
“The danger exists and is real.  We see it, we know it, we realize it…” (IR29)  
“In the long term this could happen.  It would be a negative consequence 
because as we have already mentioned, we want to keep our 
[anthropocentric] character” (IR28)  
“…If we get to the point where…credit unions will be transformed into 
investor-owned banks it will be as if credit unions lost their substance, lost 
their essence, lost their face” (IR23) 
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Three interviewees had the opposite view, claiming that if credit unions do sell 
class B’ shares to non-members, it will have a positive effect because credit unions 
will become financially stronger and will be better managed.  IR20 specifically said: 
“I am positive about this only to the extent that this will enhance the financial 
position of the credit unions and their ability to issue shares whenever they need a 
capital injection”, while IR15 argued that “if this is for the benefit of the [co-
operative] movement and its cleaning up… I believe it is a good effort”.  
Additionally, IR5 said that he did not agree with the above statement arguing that 
class B’ shares could be used to attract capital in credit unions, but could not put 
pressure on the credit union to demutualize or to be transformed to an investor-
owned bank, as the shares would not carry any voting rights. 
This last point takes us to a fourth concern raised by interviewees, that is, the 
possibility of their credit unions shrinking and/or being transformed into investor-
owned banks: 
“…at some point in time, in a few years credit unions will cease to exist in 
the shape and form that we know today… in the long-term credit unions 
might disappear altogether” (IR30)  
“…  I am not optimistic at all.  I am not sure whether we will manage to 
survive, whether we will have the same character as before but I think that 
we will not have the same market share as we used to have.  We will shrink 
a lot…” (IR29) 
“…they can sell [credit unions] to anybody in order to create a large 
investor-owned bank…  Even if it is called a credit union, it will not be a 
credit union… it will be an investor-owned bank whatever its name will be” 
(IR22) 
Moreover, there were four interviewees claiming that the future of credit unions in 
Cyprus would be to merge into a single credit union: 
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“It looks as if there will be a move towards the investor-owned banks.  I 
believe that sometime in the future all the credit unions will merge into a 
single one, which will operate like the [investor-owned] banks, losing its 
current identity” (IR7)  
Finally, the interviewees raised concerns about the possible loss of credit unions’ 
independence as a result of the losses and the financial assistance that they may 
require due to the high level of non-performing loans.  Twelve respondents claimed 
that the reason for the high percentage of non-performing loans was the 
borrowers’ inability to repay their loans because they borrowed too much: 
“I believe that one of the reasons is the large amount of loans that each 
member has borrowed which should have been limited” (IR11) 
Another reason for the high percentage of non-performing loans (referred to ten 
times) was the lack of pressure on members to repay their loans: 
“…we gave the message to our members that by taking a loan from a credit 
union no one would put pressure or force them to repay it, that they would 
repay as much of the instalment as they wanted, whenever they wanted.  
We did not chase them…” (IR29) 
“...credit unions were more humanistic and they just let people a bit more 
time, they did not force them to repay their loan instalments…” (IR26) 
Apart from being lenient about the payment of instalments, there was also lack of 
control as to who obtained loans and the Board of Directors granted loans based on 
criteria other than the ability of the borrower to repay them (mentioned nine 
times).  For example, IR29 said: “… there was not enough checking about the 
financial position of the clients… and members did not check on the Board of 
Directors…”, while IR30 pointed out that the Board of Directors granted loans to 
people that “did not have the ability to repay their loans”.  What is more, IR19 
noted that the high level of non-performing loans was due to “the bad management 
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of every credit union and the uncontrollable granting of loans: acquaintances, 
relations…”   
Finally, what led to the high percentage of non-performing loans (mentioned by 
five interviewees) was the change in the method used in calculating the non-
performing-loans: 
“…until two years ago, a loan was considered as non-performing if it had 
more than nine instalments delayed.  Suddenly, we went to three 
instalments…” (IR22) 
“… The calculation method for the non-performing loans changes all the 
time, becoming stricter and stricter…” (IR13) 
6.2.7 5th principle: “Education, training and information” 
For the purpose of examining the application of the 5th co-operative principle, 
“Education, training and information”, by credit unions the responses to Questions 
20-24 (Appendix 1) were considered. 
The data gathered indicate that credit unions do not organize training/seminars for 
their employees or if they do so, this is done very rarely.  This view was supported 
by twenty seven responses.  
“…there are no seminars on these issues.  They just gave us the principles 
and they told us to study them and to follow them…” (IR22) 
“Personally, I attended some seminars, mainly when I started working for a 
credit union, that is, a few decades ago” (IR19)  
“On co-operative ideology or co-operative principles: no training at all…” 
(IR10)  
“…  I never had one.  Whatever I learned; I learned it on the job” (IR8).   
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On the other hand, five interviewees claimed that credit union employees are 
trained in the co-operative principles and other co-operative issues indirectly.  In 
other words, they are trained by other employees, on a one-to-one basis or during 
staff meetings:  
“…in many staff meetings, issues like this, pop-up and are discussed also 
because of the culture of our organization” (IR24) 
“There are no seminars but there is the everyday interdepartmental 
[training]” (IR11)  
“It is through indirect ways, not direct ways of learning…” (IR9). 
However, when interviewees were asked about the possible usefulness of such co-
operative-related training/seminars, twenty eight claimed that such training would 
indeed be useful:  
“They would be useful especially for the younger and for the older ones that 
have “departed” [distanced themselves from the co-operative principles]” 
(IR29)  
“During this period and in order to preserve these principles we must make 
this [co-operative related training] compulsory.  … in order to preserve the 
credit unions’ character” (IR25) 
“For sure training would be useful because it could lead all credit unions to 
the same direction and to cultivate the co-operative principles…” (IR13).  
In particular, IR5 said that such training would be useful because they would wake 
up the co-operative spirit in employees, who would transfer it to the clients, hence 
strengthening the whole idea of co-operatives.  Even though IR26 claimed that, co-
operative related training would be useful, nevertheless, added that from now on, 
the Central Bank will set the rules: “I think yes [co-operative related training 
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would be useful] but things are changing, we enter in other situations.  From now 
on we will follow the principles of the Central Bank and not the co-operative 
principles, thus…”.  Contrary to all other interviewees, IR10 claimed that such 
training would not be helpful “I think that at the stage that the credit unions 
reached it will not be useful.  As we know the way we operate, I cannot imagine 
how the training would help us any more”. 
With regards to whether credit unions provide co-operative-related training for 
existing and potential members, the data collected indicate that credit unions do 
not do so.  More specifically, twenty six interviewees claimed that credit unions do 
not organize training for their members or potential members at all or, in case they 
do, they do so very rarely: “… I do not remember any effort to come closer to our 
members through a seminar…  I do not remember a seminar for the members” 
(IR15) and; “unfortunately, we never undertook such seminars.  The members know 
our philosophy but we never did this properly.  This is one of the mistakes we 
made” (IR12).  On the other hand, there were four interviewees who claimed that 
the credit unions train their members and their potential members indirectly: “…to 
some member groups yes, I think, e.g., to pensioners, newly hired members are 
given such training” (IR11) and; “at least once a year.  We organize events… it is 
not something directly where they explain things but something indirectly” (IR9). 
Despite the above responses, twenty nine interviewees claimed that credit unions 
take measures to inform and attract the new generations, but some doubt can be 
discerned in their responses as to the adequacy and the effectiveness of these 
measures.  From these, thirteen respondents pointed out that credit unions attract 
younger generations by offering products that are suitable for their age.  For 
example:   
“We try to contact them through our products.  For a younger person to 
enter a bank, it is certain that it is products he is looking for…” (IR29) 
 “Mainly through products targeting the younger generations: student loans, 
cards, internet cards, internet banking…” (IR28) 
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“… in the past and as far as I know, there were various attempts towards 
helping setting up new businesses…” (IR26)  
“Some measures that we took 3- 5 years ago targeted the university 
students…” (IR10).   
Seven interviewees highlighted that their credit unions inform younger generations 
through advertisements and leaflets only:  
“Only through advertisements…  Only through leaflets” (IR27) 
“… we have sent to our potential members, leaflets with advertising 
material…” (IR15) 
Moreover, five interviewees indicated that their credit union approached younger 
generations through their younger employees.  For example, IR12 said: “through 
our younger colleagues because in the closed communities that we live, it is… 
through the word of mouth…”, while IR1 argued that information to potential 
members is given primarily by the employees in their social circles.  Additionally, 
four interviewees pointed out that credit unions approach new generations by 
visiting their working place: “visits in their working places… they informed 
members and potential members…” (IR22).   
On the other hand, however, seven interviewees claimed that their credit union did 
not take any measures to approach younger generations: “Nothing.  We still have 
the same leaflets that we used to have [many years ago]” (IR17) and “I think that 
we have a little problem because… society believes that credit unions do not offer 
all the products that the banks do” (IR9).  Finally, IR3 pointed out that not only did 
their credit union not take any measures, but also that some people systematically 
tried to stop their credit union from informing or attracting the younger 
generations.   
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As to whether credit unions informed and guided the Cyprus government on co-
operative-related issues, during the negotiations with Troika, nine interviewees 
claimed that this role was undertaken by the Co-operative Central Bank (and/or 
the Central Body), seven interviewees said that it was undertaken by the Co-
operative Central Bank and the CSSDA Commissioner whereas, seven indicated that 
all authorities, including the Co-operative Central Bank, the Central Body, the 
Pancyprian Co-operative Confederation and the Commissioner CSSDA informed and 
guided the Cyprus government:  
“The co-op Central Bank I think”, (IR30) 
“I knew that it was the Co-operative Central Bank that informed the Cyprus 
Central Bank.  And the Commissioner to some extent” (IR23) 
“If I am not mistaken it was all of Co-operative Central Bank, Central Body, 
Pancyprian Co-operative Confederation and the Commissioner CSSDA that 
informed…” (IR26) 
However, four interviewees stated that they did not know which co-operative body 
was responsible for informing and guiding the Cyprus government regarding the co-
operative movement.  For example, IR6 said that, during the negotiations with 
Troika, it was a confusing situation because each of the co-operative bodies 
announced something different and that personally was very sorry to say this.  
Moreover, two other interviewees claimed that during the negotiations of the 
government with Troika, nobody took into account what the co-operative 
movement had to say: “all the efforts to inform about the idea of co-operation 
were unsuccessful.  If you set as your objective to destroy the movement in order 
to control it and to have political benefits in the future, no matter what the other 
person tells you…” (IR24). 
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6.2.8 6th principle: “Co-operation among co-operatives” 
To assess whether the credit unions follow the 6th co-operative principle “Co-
operation among co-operatives”, the responses to Question 25 (Appendix 1) were 
taken into consideration.   
Concerning the mergers among credit unions, twenty three interviewees considered 
that they will be for the best and only seven interviewees claimed that the mergers 
will be for the worse.  Out of the twenty three responses in favour of the mergers, 
eight references were made to these as having a positive impact on the 
professionalism and the organizational structure of the credit unions: “I do not 
consider them as bad.  I agree because for sure they will assist us in working more 
correctly and… if they are executed in the proper way and the proper operation 
and the proper organization is achieved then for sure it will be for the best (IR28).  
Moreover, IR5 agrees with credit unions merging into a single one as this would 
mean better organizational structure, while IR2 agrees that they will have a 
positive effect because credit unions will work more professionally.  In particular, 
five references were made to the mergers as a means of strengthening credit 
unions:   
“… they [credit unions] should be reduced in order to become stronger, to 
recapitalize and to continue to operate under these difficult financial 
conditions…” (IR13) 
“I believe that it will be for the better if credit unions are modernized, 
become bigger and stronger entities…” (IR20)  
“At least for us, the merger was necessary, due to the age and the number 
of our members…”  (IR16). 
Although five interviewees claimed that the mergers will be for the best, some of 
these were concerned about the fast speed of implementing the mergers fearing 
that not enough time will be allowed for the assimilation of the different cultures:  
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“I believe that the mergers should take place, but I am a bit concerned that 
they are done in a very fast pace something which may lead to problems in 
the future…” (IR25); 
“The mergers are not bad as long as they will be done on the right basis and 
time will be given for the assimilation of the different cultures…” (IR24)  
“…The mergers could have started from before or be given more time to 
ease the merger…” (IR11). 
The idea that mergers will have a positive impact and that they will assist in the 
survival of credit unions was raised by four interviewees, e.g., IR12 said: “I believe 
that the mergers were needed… reducing the number of credit unions, which will 
become larger and will meet the banks’ criteria”.  In addition, the alignment of 
credit unions and the reduction of expenses as positive outcomes of the mergers 
were raised by four interviewees: “It can be for the best because this way the 
expenses are reduced with the only bad thing being the possibility of layoffs” 
(IR27), while IR6 said that a result would be that some of their older colleagues will 
retire, leaving space for the advancement of younger colleagues and newer ideas.   
On the other hand, four other respondents showed that the mergers will have a 
negative impact, leading to the loss of the local identity of new credit unions:  
“…in some mergers, the area that will be served by the new credit union will be 
vast and the local character… will be lost” (IR21) and “… in the past the local 
credit union had a local identity and assisted the local community, but now … 
gradually will lead to the loss of the social role of credit unions” (IR9).  In addition, 
three interviewees claimed that the mergers will have a negative impact as they 
may lead to employee layoffs: “…the bad thing is that there will be employee 
layoffs” (IR22). 
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6.2.9 7th principle: “Concern for the community” 
Considering the 7th co-operative principle, “Concern for the community”, it was 
examined based on credit union employees’ responses to Questions 26 and 27 
(Appendix 1). 
Even though employees said that their credit unions were willing to assist their 
members to weather the financial crisis, when deciding on the criteria for the 
closure of branches, they considered the financial criteria as more important than 
the social ones.  More analytically, thirteen interviewees suggested that credit 
unions could assist their members by adjusting the credit unions’ demands to the 
abilities of their members through the reduction of interest rates and charges, 
extending repayment periods, restructuring loans, etc.:  “basically through the 
products in order to financially assist the members: the interest rates… the loan 
instalments, by granting grace periods…, without charging them huge amounts as 
bank charges” (IR28).  IR26 moreover, argued that credit unions could adjust their 
demands to what borrowers can repay to credit unions: “…I will assess how I will 
serve my client best, over the next two years, whilst my client is facing 
difficulties…”, while interviewee IR25 suggested a form of long-term sale and 
leaseback scheme with a re-purchase option to safeguard the homes of the 
borrowers: “…the members that cannot pay their loan instalments, could choose a 
sale and leaseback scheme, similar to what exists abroad…”.  Finally, IR10 
recommended the restructuring of non-performing loans: “…loan restructuring 
would assist a lot”.   
Furthermore, eleven responses showed that credit unions could assist their 
members to weather the financial crisis by maintaining their social contribution. 
For example, IR30 said: “by returning part of their profits… something that will be 
more direct than the interest rate reductions”, whereas, IR28 and IR29 questioned 
the ability of credit unions to continue their social contribution because of the 
restrictions imposed on them.  In particular, IR28 said: “through social 
contribution, something that is more difficult today because the money available 
for these purposes is limited”.   
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On the other hand, in deciding which branches to close down there were thirty two 
quotations referring to financial criteria and only twenty quotations mentioning 
social criteria.  From the thirty two quotations, twenty showed that the criteria 
should include the financial viability of each branch: 
“…you should have financially viable branches” (IR25) 
 “… this moment, the criteria should be purely financial…  It is how financially 
viable is the keeping of some branches at their current locations…” (IR29)  
“I believe that the most important social criterion is the future survival of the 
specific credit union... because if there is no financial viability…” (IR11).   
Another eight quotations from those in favour claimed that this criterion should 
depend on whether the premises of a branch are owned or rented, e.g., “Certainly, 
the financial criterion is whether they are owned or rented as this influences the 
expenses” (IR30) and “Financial: for sure the rented ones must close down” (IR17).  
Finally, IR10 argued that the branches that should be kept should be those that are 
working properly, with experienced and trained personnel, with a history of good 
management and not of mismanagement or fraud: “I believe that they have to 
check how the employees are performing their duties, if they know how to do their 
job well, or if there was mismanagement or fraud or if the employees are 
trained…”.   
On the other hand, twenty quotations indicated that the criteria for closing the 160 
branches should be socially-related and more specifically regarding the best serving 
of members.  Some interviewees even went a step further suggesting ways to serve 
members without the credit unions incurring high expenses, for example, the 
opening of some branches a few days per month or using “branches on wheels”: “… 
there must be a social criterion, e.g., how will the older people be served” (IR26) 
and “Serving people better …” (IR24).  IR21 and IR5 said that the criterion should 
be the location of the branch, making sure that, even if it is for some days per 
week, the branches in remote villages should be kept open:  “… there should be a 
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branch open even for some days per week” (IR21) and “… in the towns there are a 
lot of branches from where people can be served but in the rural areas however 
there should be branches to serve people even if this would mean that they will 
open only a few days per month” (IR5).  Another suggestion provided by IR12 was 
the use of “branches on wheels” (vehicles transformed into branches): “the 
solution exists abroad and is the ‘branches on wheels’…”. 
 
6.3 Interviewees’ validation 
In order to enhance the credibility of the results, a brief summary was prepared 
(Appendix 2).  This was translated in Greek by the author and it was corrected, by 
an independent from the specific research English instructor.  The summary in 
Greek was sent, by email, to seventeen (out of the thirty) participants asking them 
to state whether the researcher’s understanding of their perceptions was correct 
and to provide any corrections they considered necessary.  Additionally, the 
interviewees were asked to comment on why they held these specific perceptions.   
All seventeen participants confirmed the researcher’s understanding and that these 
results reflected the reality of what happens today in credit unions, in Cyprus.  
Five of these seventeen participants analysed the "whys" behind their perceptions 
with one interviewee (IR15) arguing that the “picture” is such because credit 
unions have lost their social character, while another participant (IR1) said that the 
cause for today’s situation is the culture that has been cultivated, during all these 
years, a culture that now is shaking the foundations of the co-operative movement.  
Three participants (IR7, IR26 and IR29) suggested that these results were due to 
the uncertainty and fear associated with the financial crisis of March 2013, the 
demands of Troika and the transfer of the ownership of credit unions to the state, 
resulting in restrictions on credit unions’ autonomy and independence and in 
members not being able to influence decision-making.  One of these three 
interviewees (IR26) thought that the results indicating that most participants were 
not optimistic about the future of the co-operative movement in Cyprus contradict 
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the finding that the majority of interviewees were in favour of the mergers 
between credit unions.  The researcher, having confirmed that these findings 
corroborated the data collected, explained this as being an indication of the 
uncertainty that employees felt, hoping that the mergers will financially 
strengthen their credit unions and thus secure their jobs.  When this was 
communicated back to the specific interviewee, the latter agreed that this 
explanation does make sense.   
 
6.4 Use of documents (statistics) 
As indicated in Section 5.9.11, the office of the Commissioner of the Co-operative 
Societies Supervision and Development Agency (CSSDA) provided data on the last 
three elections and AGMs on twenty credit unions (from all of credit unions that 
existed at the given time), including small and large regional credit unions as well 
as some of the professional ones that operate in all of four provinces under the 
control of the Cypriot government.  The researcher of the present study used these 
data to calculate relevant statistics for each of Questions 32, 33 and 34 (Appendix 
1).  It is noted here that, in some cases, not all data were available for all twenty 
credit unions of the sample.  Hence, the researcher used the data that was given, 
clearly indicating the number of credit unions on which data was available. 
In examination of the statistics, it can be seen that the average member 
participation in the last three Board of Directors’ elections was only 7%, with three 
out of twelve credit unions having participation of 1% and two having participation 
of 3%.  That is, five out of twelve credit unions (or 42% of the available data in the 
sample) had participation lower than 3% of their registered members.   
With regards to the number of candidates in relation to the available positions on 
the Board of Directors, it seems that there are fewer than two candidates for each 
available position.  This is because, based on the data on nineteen credit unions, 
the average number of candidates, in the previous three elections, was only 1,5 
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times more for each available position, with four credit unions having just as many 
candidates as available positions and hence, no elections took place.  In only two 
credit unions there were more than 2 candidates per position, one with 2,6 
candidates per position and the other with 2,8 candidates per position.   
Finally, with regards to the percentage of members attending the AGMs, according 
to the data on seventeen credit unions, the average percentage of members 
attending the last three AGMs of their credit union was just 8%.  Nine of the 
seventeen credit unions had less than 4% attendance (four credit unions having an 
average of less than or equal to 1% and another five credit unions with an average 
between 2% and 4%), whereas only two credit unions exceeded 20% (one with 23% 
and the other with 30% attendance). 
 
6.5 Focus Groups’ results 
For the last part of the field work, focus group interviews with thirty members of a 
specific credit union (case study design) were carried out (Section 5.9.9), aiming 
partly at achieving data completeness and triangulation.  The topics that were 
researched were drawn from the literature review, the structured individual 
interviews’ results and the statistics obtained from the office of the Commissioner 
of the Co-operatives Supervision and Development Authority.   
The focus group interviews were held in March 2014 and aimed at understanding 
the perceptions of members regarding the practical application of co-operative 
principles and the reasons for the (lack of) participation of members with their 
credit union.  The results from the focus groups for each of the seven co-operative 
principles are provided below. 
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6.5.1 1st principle: Voluntary and Open Membership 
The examination of the adherence of the specific credit union, under study, to the 
1st co-operative principle, was based on the relevant participants’ responses to 
Question 8 (Appendix 3).  Some participants argued that this principle is followed 
and that it will continue to be followed, e.g., “FGL10: I believe that it will not be 
affected”.  However, other participants were much more sceptical with some 
arguing that, up until now, this principle has been followed, but from the moment 
the state starts controlling their credit union, this principle will no longer be 
applied.  This is because, it will be the government that will decide who is going to 
become a member: “FGL11: … However, when the shares will be transferred to the 
government, it will be the government that will have the upper hand and thus it 
will be the government that will decide who will register as a member and who will 
unregister”.  Additionally, participants argued that even if the state does not 
influence who will become a member, people will not want to become members 
anyway, as they will have no control over their credit union:  
“FGP6: It will be directly affected.  When your opinion only counts to 1%, 
then what is the reason to be a volunteer?  This will disappear one way or 
another. 
FGP3: We fully agree.  We agree. 
FGP1: We agree” 
6.5.2 2nd principle: “Democratic member control” 
The adherence of credit unions to the 2nd co-operative principle was assessed based 
on the specific credit union members’ responses to Questions 15-21 (Appendix 3). 
Firstly, participants do not attend the General Meetings, setting out a number of 
excuses for not attending, i.e. free riding, lack of time, having other things to do, 
laziness, lack of interest in the subjects discussed, member indifference, members 
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trusting their representatives and General Meetings being held far away from 
members’ homes: 
“FGN3: No, we do not attend the General Meetings 
FGN3: They will go through the balance sheet.  There is no reason why we 
should attend 
FGN11: It takes 3- 4 hours.  It takes too long.  We do not have time for this.” 
“FGP1: We are occupied  
FGP10: Our indifference 
FGP3: We trust the people we elected [on the Board of Directors] 
FGP11: The General Meetings are held far away from where we live.” 
However, members were willing to stop free riding and actually engage in their 
credit union, in cases where they felt that their personal interests were hurt:  
“FGP11: “Up until now we felt that our representatives in the Board of 
Directors were worthy and thus we felt secured.  [In the past] We did not 
feel that we had to protest, to shout, because everything was fine.  Now, it 
seems that we must start attending.” 
Other reasons mentioned by participants included the lack of volunteerism and of 
younger generations’ interest in the founding ideas of the co-operative movement: 
 “FGL7: …there is a phenomenon that keeps expanding.  When 
volunteerism faces capitalism, capitalism and the sense of personal 
gain always win.  Credit unions in Cyprus depend a lot on volunteers 
and solidarity.  These ideas are fading away among young people.  We 
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are so much into personal benefit.  This is why I see no future for 
credit unions in Cyprus. 
FGL1: A few years ago the motto “one for all and all for one” was 
adhered to with religious devotion. 
FGL8: Now, nothing. 
FGL1: 30- 40 years ago people in the villages only had their church 
and their credit union.” 
With regards to whether members are active in relation to their credit union issues, 
participants said that their activity was restricted to being clients only as they did 
not attend the General Meetings often.  Additionally, participants argued that they 
tried to encourage non-members to become members at their credit union:   
“FGN11: We are active in the sense that we are clients.  That means that we 
do not often attend the General Meetings.  Only as clients. 
FGN4: This means that the members are not as active as they should have 
been.” 
Moreover, members argued that in the past, when their credit union ‘belonged’ to 
them, they were more active, but at the end they confessed that they have always 
been inactive and that they only went to vote at the elections for the Board of 
Directors.  This is of course if someone they knew asked them to do so. 
“FGL10: When our own credit union existed we were active.  Now we are 
not. 
FGL2: “But even when it existed, we cannot say that all of us were active. 
FGL5: But we only went at the elections.” 
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 “FGP1: We used to be [active].  Now we are not. 
Researcher: That means that in the past you were active? 
FGP1: In comparison with now, yes. 
FGP5: No, no [even then] we were not active. 
FGP1: Even if you only go to vote, you are active.  This is because you vote 
for the Board of Directors.” 
Concerning the incentives that the credit union should provide to its members in 
order to activate them, participants said that, as members, they would like to 
meet with management more often and to be updated in a more casual way, e.g., 
over a cup of coffee and in simple, layman terms: 
“FGN2: An update.  We, as ordinary members, would like to have an update 
every now and then in simple language.  An “off the records” updating, over 
a cup of coffee. 
FGN4: [The board] could ask the members to attend a more face to face 
meeting in smaller groups.” 
Some participants said that the most important incentive is to be heard: 
“FGP3: the motive for me is for my voice to be heard”. 
Members said that they would take part in these kinds of meetings as long as 
management actually spent time to make it happen and personally talked to 
members in order to engage with them:  
“FGN4: … You could personally phone 40 members, personally, and invite 
them.  You should communicate with the members in order for them to hear 
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your voice.  You oblige him a great more deal if you call him…  Members like 
to have personal contact….” 
Finally, some participants asked for financial motives, e.g., lower interest rates on 
loans, higher interest rates on deposits and easier granting of loans in order to 
make members more active: 
“FGP8: Honestly?  Loans with lower interest rates. 
FGP1: The lower the interest rate, the better.” 
Secondly, considering the percentage of members that participate in the Board of 
Directors’ elections, respondents gave a wide range of replies ranging from 18% to 
80%, with most participants considering that only a 30%- 40% of members actually 
vote during the Board of Directors’ elections.  Some participants argued that, as 
members, they had an obligation to attend the voting, but they voted only when 
someone they knew was running as a candidate: “FGL1: We had personal contact 
with the candidates, e.g., the existing Board member Mr X.  We had personal 
contact and we were obliged [to vote] but above all we had personal contact with 
the members of the Board”.  Finally, a participant said that he did not know the 
percentage of members that voted simply because he did not vote: “FGN12:  We do 
not know because we do not attend [the elections]”. 
Thirdly, it was highlighted that not a lot of members are interested in getting 
elected on the Board of Directors as only 1- 2 candidates run for each available 
position: “FGN11: 2,5 candidates for each available position”.  The reason for this 
is the fact that the political parties agree upon the candidates they will support 
and thus very few candidates run independently.  From what participants said, it 
seems that the existing Board Members have a clear advantage in relation to 
newcomers and that candidates backed up by the political parties have an 
advantage in relation to independent candidates.  The result is that newcomers 
and independent candidates run the risk of being humiliated and thus, not many 
stand as candidates. 
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“FGP8: The reason behind the low number of candidates is the fact that the 
political parties agreed on the candidates they would support thus reducing, 
to the minimum, the number of independent candidates. 
FGP1: This is correct. 
FGP8: They [the independent candidates] did not stand a chance on their 
own.” 
“FGL10: But you had to risk in order to get elected. 
FGL1: To risk being humiliated you mean.” 
Additionally, it seems that the existing Board members had a clear advantage over 
newcomers as they knew “all the tricks of the trade” and because existing Board 
members had already spent considerable amount of time visiting the working 
places and talking with their colleagues: 
“FGL12:  Everyone managed to get something out of the Board members.  
Everything through a telephone call.  
FGL1: Thus, this put off new candidates to run for the elections because the 
existing Board members were already there and performed their duties very 
well. 
FGL10: No, no.  If you wanted.  If you acted in the same way as they did, 
i.e. if you went to the working premises, to meet with your colleagues, to 
talk to them, to devote time and effort you would have been elected.  You 
have never devoted time.  How could you get elected?  Afterwards, you 
would complain that you did not get elected.  How did you expect to be 
elected?  You never did anything towards this, how did you expect to be 
elected?” 
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6.5.3 3rd principle: Member Economic Participation 
As far as the adherence of the specific credit union to the 3rd co-operative 
principle, “Voluntary and Open Membership”, is concerned, it was examined 
through the responses retrieved from Question 8 (Appendix 3). 
Based on the members’ responses, it seems that members were reluctant to 
financially contribute to their credit union.  In particular, some participants argued 
that since members have only 1% ownership in their credit union, it should not be 
them that should have the responsibility of contributing: “FGN6: But how will the 
members contribute?  We only have 1% [ownership].”   
Other participants were worried about this sudden possibility to have to financially 
contribute to their credit union, with one of them asking whether there is such a 
plan and another proposing that their credit union should attract deposits and not 
ask its members for financial contribution:  
 “FGN4: This is the target. 
FGN3: Is there such a possibility? 
FGN12: [Our credit union] should attract deposits.” 
Some other participants did not even consider a possibility to contribute financially 
for the strengthening of their credit union.  A lively conversation started as a result 
of this question and, in the end, participants not only stated that they would not 
financially contribute, but they also questioned their credit union’s reasoning for 
not stopping to collect their “permanent” deposits every month:  
 “FGP6: We will not do this [to contribute financially to their credit union]. 
FGP1: But when will this happen? 
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FGP2: Every month, they withhold an amount from my account 
[“permanent” deposit].  Why should they deduct this amount from me? 
FGP5: Indeed.  They must stop.” 
6.5.4 4th principle: “Autonomy and independence” 
Moving to the examination on the adherence of the specific credit union to the 4th 
co-operative principle, “Autonomy and independence”, this was done based on the 
participants’ replies to Questions 6, 7, and 9 and through the relevant participants’ 
responses to Question 8 (Appendix 3). 
The most important issue that participants raised is that now members trust their 
credit union less than before because of its inter-dependence on all the other 
credit unions and the Co-operative Central Bank: 
 “FGL7: I do not trust it [my credit union] because it belongs to the Co-
operative Central Bank as all other credit unions, some of which are not 
reliable at all... 
FGL3: … at this moment, personally, I do not trust credit unions…  Thus, 
clearly we are in the footpath of the bank that went bankrupt and closed 
down…” 
Some participants though, said that their trust in their credit union may be 
regained sometime in the future: “FGN11: I would not dare to say that we trust 
more our credit union.  Unfortunately, this is the truth.  However, we do want to 
believe that it could regain our trust.  I am optimistic…  However, we want to 
believe that things will change for the sake of our children” and especially, if the 
wrongdoers that brought the credit unions to this situation are punished: 
“FGN9: I believe that to regain our trust all of these people that obtained 
such large loans… 
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FGN5: To pay for them.  To take them to prison. 
FGN9: They are wealthy.  Most of them have the money, they have property.  
The state should sell their property in order to pay for the loans they got.” 
What is more, following the transfer of 99% of the ownership of credit unions to the 
state, participants were sceptical about their role as members since they would 
have no say in the running of their credit union, i.e. they are not able to influence 
it (the interest rates, the pricing policy etc.).  This is because the state has 
become almost the sole owner and takes all the decisions and members’ shares 
have been transferred to holding companies which own just 1% in the credit union.  
Hence, members control the holding companies only: 
 “FGN4: Since the state owns 99% of the shares of the credit unions, they 
control them.  The members cannot do anything.  Thus, it [the credit union] 
will be absolutely controlled by the government... 
FGN3: Practically nothing.  We will have no power as members…” 
 “FGP6: I believe that it will be affected and for sure in a negative way... 
FGP3: This government will serve its voters and the next government will 
serve its own voters.  Let’s put it this way. 
FGP6: …  Our influence will be very limited.  We might be able to vote but 
our representative will only be a marionette since he will not be able to 
influence decision-making.” 
Additionally, participants felt that they will never get their credit union back as 
they will never be able to repay the €1,5 billion (plus 10% a year interest) to the 
state.  Credit unions will remain a state bank: “FGL12: …. I believe that there are 
no credit unions and there is no Co-operative Central Bank.  It is a state bank.  We 
are owned by the government and we will never manage to get our credit unions 
Page 167 of 297 
 
back...  First of all, where will the credit unions find the €1,5 billion plus 10% 
interest per annum to pay back?  Where will credit unions find €2 billion in 5 
years?”.  Furthermore, participants argued that only if effective corporate 
governance rules are implemented credit unions will grow under the state’s 
ownership: “FGP7: If, finally, in this country, corporate governance rules are put 
into effect (even if the government is in control), maybe it will be for the best as 
there will not be any favourable treatment for some members.  If supervision is 
done properly then things will become fairer and thus, the new situation will be 
preferable”.  This is because history has proven that the state cannot manage well 
the organisations it owns: “FGP7: I believe that the state… proved that it cannot 
manage the semi-governmental organisations and the fact that it has taken 
gradually over credit unions as well, until we are able to stand on our own feet, 
makes me feel uncomfortable…  The political parties hire people without any plan 
and this will cause the collapse of these organisations.” 
Concerning the impact of transferring the 99% of the shares to the state on the 
credit union employees, some participants considered that the employees have 
become slower in their work as there seems to be something that distracts them.  
In particular, participants guessed that this was the result of the changes in the 
employees’ work place and the result of uncertainty that exists with regards to the 
future of credit unions: 
 “FGN11: I have noticed that employees are slower, not because they want 
to, but because something is holding them back and instead of needing an 
hour to finish a task it takes them a whole day.  Not because they want to, 
but because something is holding them back. 
FGN2: They must be affected from all the changes that are taking place. 
FGN5: There is depression in all layers of our society.  Thus, it is only 
reasonable that credit union employees are affected as well. 
FGN4: For sure there will be a stage where your productivity will fall. 
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FGN2: ….  Most probably the employees feel uncertain about their future 
and the possibility that some day 
FGN4: … they may lose their job.” 
“FGL4:  It is normal for credit union employees to feel insecure as well, as 
they do not know how this thing will end.” 
On the other hand, other participants did not notice any change as they considered 
that credit union employees were as willing to serve the members as always: 
“FGN12: No.  I consider that the credit union employees operate in the same way 
as they always did.  Always willing to serve you.” 
6.5.5 5th principle: “Education, training and information” 
Questions 10 and 11 (Appendix 3), in the focus group interviews, retrieved replies 
on the adherence of the specific credit union to the 5th co-operative principle, 
“Education, training and information” and are displayed below. 
Respondents considered that their credit union should have already taken measures 
to inform and attract younger generations since most members were older:   
 “FGN4: It has been noticed that the members of our credit union are of an 
old age.  We did not attract young colleagues… 
FGN3: It is only us the old members. 
FGN4: That means that a policy must be implemented by the new credit 
union.” 
According to the participants, the reason for this is the lack of incentives and lack 
of any marketing effort on behalf of their credit union in order to attract younger 
members.  On the other hand, participants considered that investor-owned banks 
were very effective targeting and attracting the younger generations.   
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 “FGL5: But the investor-owned banks have very effective advertising 
mechanisms to attract younger generations. 
FGL8: Very effective. 
FGL5: And they attract them.  When did the credit unions ever have a good 
marketing campaign? 
FGL10: Never.  Banks attract people in their 20s, 22s and they grant them 
loans in order to keep them close to the banks.  The youngsters cannot 
escape.” 
Another possible reason is the fact that the new recruits in the profession, which 
the specific credit union serves, are between 35-45 years old, meaning that they 
have already created obligations in other financial institutions and hence, it will be 
very difficult to move these to their professional credit union: “FGN4: …  Our new 
colleagues were of older age when they got jobs in our profession.  Because of this, 
when they… were entitled to become members in our credit union, they had 
already loans and obligations in investor-owned banks and in other credit unions 
thus, it was very difficult for them to transfer to our credit union.  This is the 
issue.” 
The only way out, according to participants, is for their credit union to offer 
effective incentives to non-members in order to encourage them to become 
members: 
 “FGL2: If credit unions do not manage to differentiate in the eyes of the 
youngsters and if they do not offer what banks are already offering, then 
they will have no incentive to become members in our credit union.” 
 “FGP1: If the situation changes now, stopping the credit unions from 
becoming impersonal, then it is worthwhile.  If not then what is the reason?  
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It depends on how the situation will be.  Why should I turn to a credit union 
and not to a bank?” 
However, the most important incentive would be the preservation of the 
differentiating factor of credit unions: “FGP11: If there is no reason, if there is no 
incentive for non-members to become members why will they do so?  If credit 
unions start operating just like investor-owned banks, what will be the benefit?  
Back then, we did have benefits to become members.”  Moreover, participants 
considered that it would be too difficult for the credit union to attract new 
members because the state will control it and thus, this will act as a de-incentive 
for people to become members: 
 “FGL8: … I do not think that this is the right time. 
 FGL8: …  And what motives can you offer to them in order to attract them?  
FGL10: It will be the state that will appoint the Board of Directors. 
FGL8: There are no motives to influence non-members to become 
members.” 
With regards to organizing training/seminars on co-operative-related issues, 
participants said that their credit union had never organized any such training for 
them, even though all of the participants admitted that these would have been 
useful.  They particularly considered that it was the management’s fault: 
 “FGN5: Zero seminars.” 
“FGN3: Yes, they would have been useful.” 
 “FGL5: Never!” 
 “FGP3: It is the management’s fault if there were no seminars.” 
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6.5.6 6th principle: “co-operation among co-operatives” 
The adherence to the 6th co-operative principle, “co-operation among co-
operatives”, was examined according to members’ responses to Question 12 
(Appendix 3). 
From the focus groups participants’ replies, it can be ascertained that members do 
not agree with the proposed mergers as they will be unfair and cause problems.  
Most probably participants thought so, because they saw that their influence on the 
new entity was minimal and thus, their prerogative was impaired.  Other 
participants considered that the merger was useful because it would lead to the 
closure of branches and savings in running expenses. 
More analytically, the participants that argued that the mergers were necessary 
explained this by saying that there were too many branches and this meant that 
the running expenses (salaries for cashiers and branch manager, rent, heating, 
electricity etc.) of credit unions were high: 
 “FGN12: It seems that the mergers were necessary… 
FGN3: Only in the area where I live, there are 3- 4 branches. 
FGN6: One next to the other. 
FGN12: …  In every branch you need a branch manager, you need this, and 
you need the other.  Now with the mergers, everything is tightening up.” 
The participants in one of the focus groups were more sincere and immediately 
said that they did not agree with the merger of their credit union, claiming that 
the merger caused the decline of the financial stability of their credit union: 
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“FGP6: For the members they [mergers] are not useful at all.  On the 
contrary, our credit union was strong and healthy and, now, after the 
merger we are turning into a very 
FGP8: Impersonal. 
FGP3: Problematic. 
FGP6: Yes.  Problematic [credit union].” 
One participant even said that he felt as if their credit union was punished because 
other credit unions were not doing what they were supposed to do: “FGP1: It 
reminds me of the times we were still in school.  When a student did something 
wrong and the teacher did not know who did it, he punished the whole classroom 
and not only the specific student.  It is the same logic behind the mergers today”.  
Finally, others simply claimed that mergers were unfair and problematic: 
 “FGL5: Many problems. 
FGL2: Unfair. 
FGL8: Unfair, unreasonable and problematic. 
FGL5: No co-ordination, no organisation whatsoever… 
FGL8: Superficiality.” 
Inferring from the responses of the participants who considered that mergers were 
unfair and that they caused problems, it can be said that they were expressing 
their anger and frustration.  This seems to be so because these members were not 
happy at all by the fact that their credit union was forced to merge and also that it 
was the other credit union’s Board of Directors and management that had the 
upper hand during and after the merger. 
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6.5.7 7th principle: “Concern for the community” 
Finally, the specific union’s adherence to the 7th co-operative principle, “Concern 
for the community”, was examined based on the focus groups’ responses to 
Questions 13 and 14 (Appendix 3).  
Based on the focus groups, credit unions could assist their members in weathering 
the financial crisis mostly by adjusting their demands to the abilities of their 
members, by restructuring loans, reducing interest rates and the amount of 
installment and extending the repayment period: 
 “FGL8: To reduce the interest rates on loans and to restructure our loans 
reducing our loan instalments…” 
“FGP10: Better loan repayment terms. 
FGP3: Interest rate reductions. 
 FGP1: Longer payment period. 
FGP3: Reduce our loan instalments in line with our salary cuts.” 
As for the criteria to be used in deciding which branches to close down, 
participants considered both social and financial criteria, as well as merging the 
weaker and smaller credit unions.  Members considered that the first criterion 
would be the best serving of members: 
 “FGL8: To ensure that people will continue to be served.  This is very basic. 
FGL10: Basically, the better service of clients.  This is the first and most 
important reason.” 
 “FGP11: Serving us, the clients.” 
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While, some participants talked about providing good service to members, others 
referred to the geographical position of each branch: 
 “FGL8: The first criterion should be the position of each branch. 
Researcher: What do you mean by “position”? 
FGL8: The branches should be in central locations.  Not to be far away from 
the town center. 
FGL2: Geographically.” 
The second criterion mentioned was the financially-related, such as, the level of 
running expenses of each branch:  “FGP12: ...  If some branches are more costly 
than others, they should sell them and buy other branches that will be cheaper to 
run”, the use of mobile units [branches on wheels] in an attempt to reduce 
expenses: “FGL1: Mobile units”, the operations of the branch: “FGP11: the criteria 
should be the operations of the branch” and the turnover and the number of clients 
each branch serves: 
 “FGN5: The turnover of each branch. 
FGN7: The number of clients of each branch.” 
Additionally, within the financial criteria, it was argued that the branches with the 
lowest running expenses should be kept and the rest should be closed down: 
 “FGP3: Since we are talking about financial aspects, we should talk about 
reducing our expenses.  We should maintain the branches with the lowest 
running expenses.  
FGP2: The most important criterion should be the economic usage of the 
branch.  Otherwise, you will close down.” 
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A third criterion, which is neither financial nor social, suggested for the 
strongest/most influential credit union to be in control after the merger:   
 “FGP7: The fact that we were the weaker in this merger has negatively 
influenced the decision regarding the branches to be closed down. 
FGP8: What is important is that the decision was taken by the Board of 
Directors and the General Manager of the credit union we merged with. 
FGP11: For sure, our opinion was not taken into consideration in the 
decision.” 
 
6.6 Summary of findings 
In the examination of the results from the individual structured interviews, the 
statistics obtained from CSSDA and the focus group interviews, it can be concluded 
that four co-operative principles were followed up to the time of the crisis, but as 
a result of the subsequent events, since the 2013 crisis (e.g., the disappointment 
and fear that people felt regarding a second deposit haircut, the possibility of 
further salary cuts and layoffs, as well as the granting of 99% shares in credit 
unions to the Cypriot state), these may not be followed in the future.  More 
specifically, the 1st co-operative principle, “Voluntary and open membership”, is 
followed, even though some argue that this may change in the future due to the 
99% ownership of the Cypriot state.  Additionally, the 2nd co-operative principle, 
“Democratic member control”, seems not to be followed as less than 30% of 
members vote during the Board of Directors’ elections, as there are two or fewer 
candidates for each available position on the Board of Directors and only 25% of 
members attend the AGMs.  Furthermore, the data collected shows that credit 
unions used to follow the 3rd co-operative principle, “Members’ economic 
participation”, but they may have stopped following it, as members are no longer 
willing to invest more in their credit union mainly due to the uncertainty and the 
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chaos that the financial crisis of 2013 (and the subsequent deposit haircut), in 
Cyprus, has caused.  In relation to the data on the 4th co-operative principle, 
“Autonomy and independence”, it can be said that, even though in the past it was 
followed, it is not followed now as credit unions are no longer independent due to 
the 99% ownership of the Cypriot state and due to the fear that credit unions will 
lose their anthropocentric character and hence, the support of their membership.  
Concerning the 5th principle, “Education, training and information”, the data 
collected seems to support the view that it is not followed although members 
consider that the employee, management and members’ training is very important.  
In contrast credit unions seem to provide such co-operative relative training very 
seldom.  However, the 6th principle, “Co-operation among co-operatives” is 
followed at least with regards to the imposed mergers among credit unions.  
Finally, the data on the 7th co-operative principle, “Concern for the community”, 
show that, even though this was followed in the past, nowadays, as a result of the 
granting of the 99% of the shares in credit unions to the state, it will not be 
followed anymore, as most interviewees and focus group participants place more 
emphasis on the financial rather than the social criteria on choosing which 
branches to close down.  Similarly, it seems that from now on, credit unions will 
not be in the position to offer their services to their surrounding communities 
because of restrictions imposed by Troika, in line with the obligation of credit 
unions to repay the €1,5billion and the associated 10% interest.  A summary of the 
results of the structured individual interviews, the focus group interviews and the 
data obtained from the office of Commissioner of the Co-operatives Supervision 
and Development Authority can be found in Appendix 4.  
As seen above, the three different methods have produced similar results, 
confirming each other, and all of them confirming the findings of researchers such 
as Novkovic, 2006; 2008; Wilson and MacLean, 2012; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko 
and Plummer, 2013; Kelly, 2014, who claim that co-operatives do not adhere to 
their founding principles, or at least not to the level that is proclaimed in the 
literature.  The comparison and the discussion of the results of the three methods, 
in relation to existing literature will be carried out in the next, final Chapter, 
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clearly stating the contribution of the present study to existing literature and to 
practice.  Finally, the limitations of the present study will be set out and 
explained, indicating possible areas for further research.  
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Chapter 7: Discussion 
7.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 has focused on co-operatives and their governance, briefly touching on 
the research aim, research questions and the intended contribution to the 
literature and to practice.  Chapter 2 extends the examination of the existing 
literature on co-operative governance, analysing and explaining the seven co-
operative principles.  Following, in Chapter 3, the research questions were 
formulated and the intended contribution to the existing literature and to practice 
was highlighted.  Moreover, in Chapter 4 Cyprus was set as the geographical 
location of the present study, while credit unions were set as the specific co-
operative type to be used in this study.  Chapter 5 discussed quality, ethics and the 
research design and methods that have been used for the present study.  In 
Chapter 6, the results of this research were analysed, while in this Chapter 
(Chapter 7), the results of the present research are discussed in relation to the 
existing literature, aiming at contributing to academic knowledge by answering the 
two research questions.  More specifically, the results of the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th 
and 7th co-operative principle are used to address the 1st research question, while 
the results relating to the 2nd co-operative principle are used to address the 2nd 
research question.  Finally, the limitations of the current research as well as 
suggestions for future research are also discussed. 
 
7.2 1st research question: “What are the perceptions regarding the practical 
application of the co-operative principles?” 
The aim of the first research question was to gain an understanding of the 
perceptions of employees and members regarding the adherence of their credit 
unions to the co-operative principles.  As discussed in Chapter 2, the co-operative 
principles represent a set of guidelines on how a co-operative and its members can 
interact with each other (Nilsson, 1996).  Furthermore, the co-operative principles 
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must be consistently and continuously applied in the day-to-day operations of co-
operatives (Parnell, 1995; Co-operative Commission, 2001) and they must be 
adjusted to the lives of their members (Parnell, 1995).  For example, by being 
transformed into tangible products and services that better serve the needs of 
their members (Davis and Worthington, 1993).  This means that co-operative 
principles must not remain on paper, but must be kept alive to guide the daily 
operations and management of a credit union.   
Concerning the results of this research, one of the first findings is that the 
employees of credit unions did not remember (all) the co-operative principles, 
possibly indicating that credit unions do not put these into practice, despite being 
of great importance.  Following is a discussion on the literature review (Chapter 2) 
and the findings for each of the six co-operative principles (excluding the 2nd 
principle) in an attempt to answer the first research question. 
7.2.1 1st principle: “Voluntary and open membership” 
As discussed in Chapter 2, in the case of the first principle, “Voluntary” refers to 
potential members deciding whether and when to become members and “Open” 
refers to the co-operative being able to accommodate new members that are 
willing to undertake the responsibilities that membership entails (Papageorgiou, 
2004).  The open membership policy has economic value to future members (Fulton 
and Giannakas, 2012).  On the other hand, exiting the co-operative may be free but 
only once certain obligations are met, such as the repayment of members’ 
obligations to the co-operative (Papageorgiou, 2004).  Finally, the decision as to 
when someone will become a member or will exit a co-operative can be taken only 
by the specific individual.  Not even the government can force a person to either 
become a member or exit (CSSDA, 2005).   
The data obtained from the interviews show that the employees of credit unions 
consider that credit unions follow the first co-operative principle as there was no 
evidence that anyone was forced either to become member or to exit their credit 
union.  This is in line with the existing literature and the researcher’s expectations.  
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Specific interviewees considered that sometimes people are “forced” to become 
members in order to obtain a loan, to co-sign a borrowing facility or to vote for 
someone they know, but this does not invalidate the rule, as they do so voluntarily.  
Additionally, in some cases, interviewees considered that specific members exited 
voluntarily because they felt that their credit union gave them a hard time (e.g., 
by not serving them right away or by not meeting their needs) or because they 
found better terms elsewhere.  In some extreme cases, a credit union convinced 
specific members to exit because of mental health problems or because of a court 
conviction.  Again, these exceptions seem reasonable as the specific member as 
well as the rest of the members are protected.  Indeed, credit unions follow the 
first co-operative principle, but consideration should be given to the 
implementation of this principle in the future, as discussed in the focus groups’ 
results, especially since 99% of credit union shares have been transferred to the 
state. 
The focus group results support the findings from the individual interviews, with 
participants arguing that this principle is followed.  However, specific participants 
argued that this principle may no longer be followed due to the state owning 99% 
of the shares in credit unions, enabling it to decide who is going to become a 
member.  Additionally, participants argued that no matter what the state does, 
people may not want to become members anyway, as members will have no control 
over their credit union (1% member ownership as opposed to the 99% ownership of 
the state).  This may have very negative consequences for credit unions as people 
may be discouraged from becoming members and existing members may become 
suspicious of the state’s intentions and thus exit.   
It is the researcher’s personal belief that the state intervention and the possible 
deterrent of new members and/or the exit of existing members will have an 
adverse effect on credit unions.  Moreover, the restrictions on new members may 
cause the apathy of the remaining members thus, reducing the number of 
candidates that run for the Board of Directors and the control of members on the 
Board of Directors.  Even worse, these could allow a small group of members (an 
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“elite” group) to control the credit union or reduce the control over management, 
allowing the latter to shift their focus away from members’ needs.   
Based on the above findings, it can be said that, up to the point the state obtained 
a 99% ownership in credit unions (through the Co-operative Central Bank), the first 
principle was followed.  These findings are in line with existing literature as 
voluntary and open membership is expected (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005; 
ICA, 2012a).  As to the possible restrictions on this principle, Oczkowski, 
Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013) found that in general the 1st principle is 
followed except in some specific types of co-operatives, e.g., housing and 
agricultural where membership is restricted.  Similarly, Novkovic (2006) found that 
only 85% of her respondents believed that membership is open and voluntary in 
their co-operative.  However, the findings of the present research identified that 
members fear that, from the moment the state obtained control of their credit 
union, this principle will no longer be followed.  This pessimistic stance of 
members may be directly linked to the difficult financial situation at the time of 
the individual and the focus group interviews, causing the heightening of 
uncertainty and the fear for the future.  It looks as if credit unions may be entering 
a vicious circle with younger people not entering and existing members exiting, 
reducing even more the effectiveness of the governance system of credit unions.   
7.2.2 3rd principle: “Member economic participation” 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the third principle entails that “members contribute 
equitably to, and democratically control, the capital of their co-operative” (ICA, 
2012a) and that the amount of share capital to be invested in a co-operative is 
decided by members and is formulated in accordance to their current and future 
needs (CSSDA, 2005).  Co-operatives aim to increase the well-being of their 
members by compensating them, based on their value of transactions 
(Papageorgiou, 2004).  Additionally, a co-operative will pay only as much as it has 
to pay in order to attract enough capital to finance its activities (Birchall, 1997; 
Papageorgiou, 2004), a principle that enabled co-operatives to build a sense of 
belonging and, at the same time, to rapidly grow their operations (Birchall, 1997).  
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On the down side, as a co-operative grows, members may be unable or reluctant to 
contribute to the increase of its share capital (Bijman et al., 2012b), causing the 
need for alternative sources of finance.   
The data of the individual interviews, with the credit union employees, indicate 
that currently the majority of the members are not willing to contribute financially 
to the strengthening of their credit union, for example, by acquiring class B’ 
shares.  The majority of the interviewees believed that, even if the need arose, the 
existing members would not purchase class B’ shares because they either lost their 
trust or they suffered financial loss themselves, rendering them incapable of 
contributing to their credit union, or they were kept back by the uncertain future 
or any combination of the three.  The reasons of these responses are mainly due to 
the financial crisis, the instability of the economy, the deposits’ haircut and the 
difficult economic climate.   
The employees’ perceptions regarding the unwillingness of members to financially 
contribute to their credit union were confirmed by the members themselves, in the 
focus group interviews, who argued that that this is because they only have 1% 
ownership.  Some other focus group participants were worried even with the idea 
that one day they will be asked to financially contribute to their credit union, 
while others complained about the monthly contributions of €70 to their 
“permanent” deposits.  This finding may seem radical but one should consider that 
the focus group interviews were held only a year after the crash of the financial 
sector in Cyprus and that people were still worried about the safety of their 
deposits, their ability to repay their loans, as a result of the salary cuts and 
unemployment, and even about the possibility of a second deposit haircut.  All 
these factors increased their insecurity and fear of what the future would bring, as 
well as their frustration about the non-punishment of all that were involved in this 
financial tragedy. 
Based on the above findings, it can be said that credit unions used to follow the 3rd 
principle, but, nowadays, mainly due to the uncertainty that existed after the 
financial crisis of March 2013, in Cyprus, it may not be followed anymore.  These 
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findings do not concur with the existing literature which assumes that in case of 
need, members will provide additional capital to their credit union (Papageorgiou, 
2004; ICA, 2012a; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013).  However, 
under certain conditions (e.g., due to the portfolio - Section 2.2.4- and horizon - 
Section 1.3.2- problems) members are “forced” to behave according to their own 
best interests and not as they are expected as members of a co-operative, with 
regards to investing in their co-operative (Harte, 1997).  Apart from the 
uncertainty and fear, these results may also be linked with the findings of the 5th 
co-operative principle: “Education, training and information” and the lack of 
training of members in co-operative-related issues.  This lack of training may have 
caused the loss of cohesion among members, diminishing the Cypriot co-operatives’ 
moto “one for all and all for one”.  Moreover, the above results seem to be 
congruent with those of the 2nd co-operative principle “Democratic member 
control” (Section 7.3) as members are not involved with their credit union, do not 
take part in the AGMs and they do not participate in and do not stand for the 
elections for the Board of Directors.  It may be concluded therefore, that when 
members lose their cohesion and they forget the ideological differences of credit 
unions, they start behaving according to their self-interest, ignoring their common 
good. 
Furthermore, one could argue that the perceived unwillingness of members to 
financially support their credit unions, may reflect the current unstable and 
insecure financial situation, but it may also indicate a deeper reason.  Using S-D 
Logic, it might be the case that over the 100 years of their existence, credit unions 
may have displaced their members from their top priority, that is, to support the 
co-creation activities of their members (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000; Payne et 
al., 2009), possibly considering members as external to them, and not as their co-
creators of value (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).  If this holds true, then members may 
have been convinced that their credit union does not meet their needs anymore, 
i.e. it does not contribute to their co-creation activities, thus, members move to 
other organisations that do so (Payne et al., 2009; Lusch, Vargo and Tanniru, 2010; 
Lusch and Vargo, 2011).  If credit unions focused on their members and on their 
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needs, members would have wanted to support their credit unions, to the extent 
that they could do so, financially or otherwise.  
 
7.2.3 4th principle: “Autonomy and independence” 
According to the literature on the 4th co-operative principle, in Chapter 2, co-
operatives ensure their autonomy and independence by relying on the financial 
contribution of their members, for their initial share capital and thereon, on the 
surpluses of the co-operative.  In other words, co-operatives do not depend on non-
members or any other organization for their financing needs (CSSDA, 2005).  In 
cases when the co-operative must borrow money from non-members, including the 
government, it does so ensuring that its independence and autonomy are not 
jeopardized (CSSDA, 2005).  Co-operatives should remain independent (even in 
relation to governments) because any kind of dependence, apart from co-operative 
members, may create a false feeling of success, gradually leading to economic 
dependency and finally to the failure of a co-operative (Papageorgiou, 2004).  
Finally, the first co-operatives described themselves as “societies” in order to 
stress the importance of their self-governance, in contrast to quasi-governmental, 
governmental or non-governmental entities (Atherton et al., 2011, p.9), a 
description which is still used in Cyprus.  For example, the name of the ex-
supervisory authority of co-operatives was “Co-operative Societies Supervision and 
Development Authority”.   
The data obtained from the interviews with the credit union employees indicate 
that in the past the 4th co-operative principle was followed, however this is not the 
case anymore.  This is because the interviewees considered that if non-members 
invested in credit unions, by buying Class B’ shares; this investment would enable 
non-members to put pressure on credit unions to act like investor-owned banks.  
Moreover, the investment by non-members could result in the existing members 
completely losing control over their credit union, that is, credit unions could be 
demutualized.  However, the interviewees believed that by granting to the state 
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99% of the shares in co-operatives (for an amount of €1,5 billion), the latter will 
lose their autonomy and independence as from then on the state will take 
decisions, constraining members from democratically controlling their credit 
unions.  When the interviewees were asked about the future of credit unions in 
Cyprus, they said that credit unions would cease to exist in the shape and form 
that they are known today.  Rather, they would become investor-owned banks or 
work as if they were for-profit banks, continuing to merge among them and 
reducing in number, reaching below eighteen. 
The data from the focus group interviews showed that the specific credit union, 
used to follow the 4th co-operative principle, “Autonomy and independence”, in 
practice, but they feel that from now on this will change.  This is because members 
lost their trust in their credit union as it has become inter-dependent with all other 
credit unions, including the not so financially strong ones, something that could 
even cause the failure of their own credit union.  Additionally, members perceived 
that the transfer of 99% of the ownership to the state has almost eliminated the 
ability of the members to influence their credit union’s decisions, causing its 
complete dependency on the state.   
The above results do not concur with the existing literature (CSSDA, 2005; Atherton 
et al., 2011; ICA, 2012a), according to which one would expect credit unions to 
have obtained the €1,5billion loan ensuring their autonomy and independence in 
relation to the Cypriot state.  This however, did not happen in reality as the loan 
was obtained after the state was given 99% ownership of credit unions, through the 
Co-operative Central Bank.  It seems that even a loan of such a big value would 
more or less have the same result, i.e. the loss of credit unions’ independence and 
autonomy, because of the collateral that would have been requested and the 
influence that this lender, the Cypriot state, would have asked for, in an attempt 
to protect its investment.  Moreover, members felt that the dependency on the 
state may even cause the failure of credit unions, as predicted by Papageorgiou 
(2004).  Additionally, Novkovic’s (2006) results were opposite to the above findings 
as 93% of her respondents said that their co-operative was indeed autonomous and 
independent.  However, the results of the present study are in line with part of the 
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findings of Novkovic (2006), in the sense that 52% of her respondents reported that 
the decisions of their co-operative were influenced by creditors and financial 
institutions.   
If the present research’s results, aforementioned, are combined with those 
addressing the second research question, and more specifically that in some credit 
unions the political parties predetermine the names of the candidates for the 
Board of Directors (indicated by both members and employees), it may be the case 
that credit unions are not only dependent on the Cyprus state for their financing, 
but also on the political parties as to who will be elected on their Board of 
Directors.  This dependency could indicate that political parties can influence the 
direction of credit unions and their management (Korres, 1999; Stefancic, 2011) 
and this kind of influence may even cause the breaking up of credit unions to many 
smaller groups (Papageorgiou, 2004).  Finally, by combining the results retrieved 
for the fourth principle with those of the third and fifth ones, it can be concluded 
that due to the lack of co-operative-related training of members and everybody 
else involved (including governmental officials), members have lost their cohesion 
and their belief in the differences of credit unions in relation to organisations of 
other forms.  This may have led to the unwillingness of members to financially 
contribute to their credit union and ultimately to the loss of credit unions’ 
autonomy and independence.   
7.2.4 5th principle: “Education, training and information” 
Concerning the 5th co-operative principle, “Education, Training and Information” 
(see Chapter 2), ICA (2012a) states that “co-operatives provide education and 
training for their members, elected representatives, managers, and employees so 
they can contribute effectively to the development of their co-operatives” and 
that they “inform the general public -particularly young people and opinion 
leaders- about the nature and benefits of co-operation”.  Furthermore, the 
Rochdale pioneers quickly understood the need for education and training that, in 
the 1850s they allocated 2.5% of their surpluses for this purpose (Birchall, 1997).  
Moreover, in Mondragon Corporación Cooperativa, 2% of the gross profit is used in 
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providing research and development as well as co-operative education (Bakaikoa, 
Errasti and Begiristain, 2004).  This is because co-operative training enhances the 
co-operation spirit among members and it opens the doors to non-members to 
become members (Papageorgiou, 2004).  Similarly, S-D Logic refers to knowledge 
as one of the core competences that are necessary for the provision of service 
(Vargo and Lusch, 2004; 2008a; 2010; Lusch, Vargo and Wessels, 2008).  Without 
the training of members, personnel, management and the Board of Directors, co-
operatives can be mistaken as normal economic organizations, forgetting their 
important ideological differences from the other business forms (Papageorgiou, 
2004).  On the contrary, by training employees and managers, they can “think 
anew how their personal ideas and behaviour” are measuring in relation to the co-
operative principles and values and how they can integrate these in their day-to-
day work (Bickle and Wilkins, 2000, p.199).  Additionally, training renders 
membership more effective and facilitates democratic control (Birchall and 
Ketilson, 2009).  Furthermore, the behaviours, structures and values must mutually 
reinforce the message that is sent by co-operatives to the society (Bickle and 
Wilkins, 2000), something that can be achieved only through training.  Finally, S-D 
Logic talks about the need for an organisation to learn the competences and skills 
of its customers so that it can educate the latter and increase their value creation 
capabilities (Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Normann, 2001) and hence to increase 
the volume of transactions with their credit union. 
Based on the results of the individual interviews, it can be said that credit unions 
did not provide any co-operative-related training to their employees despite that 
all, but one employee, considered that training on co-operative principles and 
other co-operative specific areas is very useful and necessary.  In the cases where 
employees had received such training, this took place many years ago and/or was 
part of their induction training.  Specific interviewees considered that training 
could be replaced through on-the-job training or through discussions during staff 
meetings.  From those that thought that training would be useful, some considered 
that it would particularly assist in strengthening the co-operative idea, especially 
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during these difficult times, while others thought that it could align employees and 
bring uniformity, for example, in the way clients are handled. 
Furthermore, with respect to the provision of such training to existing or potential 
members, the interview results have shown that credit unions did not provide any 
such training and they did not take measures to inform younger generations.  More 
specifically, with regards to training existing or potential members, almost all 
interviewees said that their credit unions had never provided training on co-
operative issues to their existing and/or prospective members, with the minority 
arguing that their credit unions did so but indirectly.  However, other interviewees 
argued that their credit union provides some kind training for certain member 
groups, e.g., retired or new members.  When participants were asked about the 
measures, if any, that their credit unions took to inform and/or attract younger 
generations, the majority of the interviewees argued that their credit union 
provides relevant information on its website, advertises in newspapers, sends 
brochures and; offers products and services that meet younger generations’ needs.  
However, a small minority of interviewees indicated that their credit union does 
not take any such measures to attract younger generations, with specific 
respondents explaining that this was due to the fact that some people do not want 
the younger generations to be informed. 
The focus group data support the individual interview findings as they indicate that 
the specific credit union under study does not follow the 5th co-operative principle.  
Moreover, it seems that this credit union has never tried to attract younger people 
and encourage them to become its members something that may be indicated by 
the older age of most of its members.  Members considered that their credit union 
should take measures in order to inform and attract younger people and this should 
have started more than a decade ago.  According to the members interviewed, the 
reason for this situation is the lack of incentives and marketing effort on behalf of 
their credit union, something that investor-owned banks are very successful at. 
Based on the above, it can be said that the credit unions of the participants in the 
individual interviews and of the focus group respondents do not follow the 5th co-
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operative principle.  This is because these credit unions have (almost) never 
offered any co-operative-related training to their employees and (potential) 
members.  In some exceptional cases, these credit unions offered co-operative-
related training to their employees but this was many years ago.  Moreover, as 
indicated by the data obtained, these credit unions do not even attempt to 
educate the general public and especially younger generations with the result 
being that existing members are of an older age, leaving younger generations in the 
hands of investor-owned banks.  The above findings do not coincide with the 
existing literature which assumes that credit unions train their members, 
personnel, management and the Board of Directors in order to enhance the co-
operative spirit and attract new members (Birchall, 1997; Papageorgiou, 2004; 
CSSDA, 2005; ICA, 2012a, Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013).  
Birchall and Ketilson (2009) consider training as a commitment of the co-operative 
to render membership more effective and to facilitate democratic control, but 
clearly this is not the case with the credit unions that were included in the sample 
of the present research.  However, the above results are in line with those of 
Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013), who found that not all co-
operatives engaged in the training and education of their customers, suppliers, 
employees, management and directors.  Similarly, Novkovic (2006) found that none 
of the co-operative in her sample, engaged in education activities for the general 
public.  The lack of training could lead to the loss of trust among members and 
their co-operative and hence, opportunities should be provided for face-to-face 
contact in informal environments (Gall and Schroeder, 2006).  
By combining the results of the present research on the 5th principle with those of 
the 2nd principle and according to the existing literature (see Chapter 2), it can be 
said that without the training of members, personnel, management and the Board 
of Directors, credit unions could be mistaken as normal economic organizations, 
forgetting their important ideological differences from all of other business forms 
(Papageorgiou, 2004).  This finding is crucial for the effectiveness of the 
governance structure, the success and the long-term survival of credit unions. 
Without providing co-operative-related training to all stakeholders including the 
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Board of Directors, the latter may not set up the necessary governance structure.  
What is more, management may not provide the proper direction, allowing to the 
credit union to depart from its founding principles, to set sub-optimal targets 
and/or even targets that remove the well-being of members from its top priority.  
Similarly, when a credit union does not train or educate its existing members, the 
latter will lose their cohesion and pursue their own self-interest, resulting to the 
lack of participation of members and allowing a small group (“elite”) to control the 
credit union (Itkonen, 1996; Birchall, 1997; Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, 2004a; 
2004b; FSA, 2007).  However, these findings contradict the S-D Logic as credit 
unions do not to consider knowledge as one of the core competences that are 
necessary for the provision of service (Vargo and Lusch, 2004; 2008a; 2010; Lusch, 
Vargo and Wessels, 2008) and are not eager to develop those competences and 
skills in their members (Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Normann, 2001).   
Training and education in co-operative-related issues do not seem to be high in the 
priority list of credit unions and, due to the financial crisis and the control by the 
state; it is highly unlikely that this will change in the years to follow.  However, 
without training their potential members, credit unions cannot alter the 
routines/customary actions of the latter and hence will not encourage them to 
become members (Payne et al., 2009).  It is the researcher’s belief that the failure 
to educate potential members and society in general, regarding the potential 
benefits of membership, may restrict credit unions from increasing their 
collaboration with existing members (net depositors or net borrowers), thus 
constraining their future growth.  Hence, as most existing members are either 
retired or approaching the retirement age, credit unions should take every possible 
opportunity to educate and attract potential members, especially of younger age in 
order to secure their long-term existence and viability.  Similarly, it has been found 
that credit unions did not educate governmental officials.  This is evident by the 
results, i.e. when credit unions needed to increase their capital, the government 
instead of assisting credit unions whilst safeguarding their autonomy and 
independence, it provided an increase of share capital obtaining 99% of the shares 
in credit unions, restricting members’ shares to just 1%.  In the past, co-operative-
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related training was important as people needed to be educated on the merits of 
credit unions, but once the latter reached beyond this point, the importance of 
education seems to have been downgraded.  This is, true even though the financial 
climate these days sometimes seems not to be very different from what existed a 
hundred years ago, when co-operatives were introduced to the island.   
7.2.5 6th principle: “Co-operation among Co-operatives” 
This principle (see Chapter 2) encourages the co-operatives to co-operate amongst 
themselves on a local, national and international level to promote their joint 
interests, to better serve their members and to promote the co-operative 
movement (CSSDA, 2005).  The extent of the practical application of this principle 
deals with whether co-operators consider themselves to be part of the larger co-
operative movement or not (Birchall, 1997) hence, co-operatives must continuously 
and sincerely co-operate amongst themselves despite any difficulties (CSSDA, 
2005).  This principle can be seen as a strategy to ensure the economic success of 
co-operatives (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009), for example, to transfer knowledge and 
knowhow from advanced co-operatives to less advanced co-operatives 
(Papageorgiou, 2004).  The idea of co-operatives co-operating amongst themselves 
is also supported by S-D Logic, which argues that to survive, credit unions must 
form interdependent networks/alliances (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000; Vargo, 
2009) or “constellations” where credit unions share the collective knowledge that 
is available amongst themselves (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000).  This is 
necessary for credit unions to make their own value propositions better and more 
attractive to existing and potential members (Normann and Ramirez, 1993; 
Normann, 2001; Spohrer et al., 2007; Vargo, Maglio and Akaka, 2008).  
The data obtained from the interviews show that almost all credit union employees 
that were interviewed considered that the proposed, by Troika, mergers among 
credit unions have a positive impact, as they contribute to the financial 
strengthening and the viability of their credit unions.  Additionally, the 
respondents considered that, through the mergers, better organizational structures 
could be created and that professionalism could be enhanced.  Moreover, they 
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stated that the mergers could better align the credit unions, as well as, assist in a 
more effective control and reduction of expenses.  On the negative side, 
interviewees worried about the possibility of layoffs in credit unions, the closure of 
branches as well as the loss of the local character of their credit unions. 
According to the focus groups results, members considered that the mergers were 
useful because they would lead to savings in running expenses, while other 
members argued that the mergers were necessary for their long-term survival and 
thus they should be carried out.  However, other respondents considered that the 
mergers were unfair and problematic, whereas specific participants clearly stated 
that they did not agree with this change.  With some hindsight, it can be inferred 
that these negative responses, most probably, expressed the anger and the 
frustration of members as in a recent merger of their own credit union with a 
stronger one, they had to accept what the other credit union imposed on them.  In 
this case, it seems that these members reacted negatively because they would lose 
their influence on the Board of Directors and on management, fearing that their 
demands would not be met as easily anymore.  It may be further inferred that 
despite being members in a credit union, these participants put their personal 
interest, i.e. their loss of power and influence, higher than the common interest 
and the long-term survival of their own organization, the organisation that 
supported them for so many years. 
Considering the data obtained from the focus groups, it may be said that credit 
unions follow this principle, even though some members did not agree with the 
merger mainly because of the loss of influence and power over the new credit 
union’s Board of Directors.  On the other hand, based on the individual interviews 
almost all employees were in favour of the mergers as they considered that through 
these, the new credit union(s) will become even more professional, will have a 
better organisational structure and will be stronger, more viable; hence their jobs 
will be safeguarded.  The findings from the individual interviews are in line with 
the existing literature, in which it has been noted that credit unions must 
continuously and sincerely co-operate among them in order to overcome common 
problems, to exchange knowledge and experiences and to manage change (CSSDA, 
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2005).  However, part of the results from the focus groups, referring to the fact 
that members consider their self-interest as more important than the common 
good, do not coincide with the relevant literature that assumes that the co-
operative principles and values act as catalysts in aligning members’ interests and 
in allowing them to function together towards the fulfilment of their common goals 
(Nilsson, 1996; Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013).  However, the 
findings are in line with Novkovic (2006), who indicates that even though co-
operatives had co-operation with other co-operatives, this was superficial without 
any clear benefits for the organisations involved.  Moreover, the adverse opinion 
towards the mergers may have been the result of low trust among members of 
various credit unions as “trust and cooperation are needed to “oil the wheels” of 
information exchange” (Gall and Schroeder, 2006, p.34).  Finally, it can be said 
that the above finding is in line with Papageorgiou (2004) and Spear, Cornforth and 
Aiken (2009), who support that allowing a few members to take decisions that 
serve their own interests and not that of the members at large, may indicate the 
beginning of a credit union’s failure.  The findings on the 5th principle “Education, 
training and information” may be of use here again, as it may be concluded that 
any kind of co-operative training would have brought members closer, increasing 
their cohesion and reminding them about the importance of taking decisions for the 
common good rather than for their personal interest.  
It seems that co-operation among credit unions is not an option but rather a need 
as, according to S-D Logic, credit unions should create constellations enabling all of 
them to benefit from the exchange of their knowhow and experiences (Normann 
and Ramirez, 1993; Lusch et al., 2007), rendering their service propositions better 
and more competitive than those of their competitors.  Additionally, to better 
serve their members, credit unions should constantly update their service and 
value offerings, continually creating, transforming and integrating their 
competencies (Lusch et al., 2007).  By reconfiguring their own resources, people 
and infrastructure, credit unions could remain at the forefront of competition 
(Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000; Lusch, Vargo and Tanniru, 2010).  Finally, credit 
unions should put pressure on themselves to constantly enlarge their knowledge 
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base and re-establish the way they approach their members (Normann and 
Ramirez, 1993). 
7.2.6 7th principle: “Concern for the community” 
Apart from their primary purpose which is to best serve the interests of their 
members, co-operatives also aim at the development of the societies in which they 
operate (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005 – see Chapter 2).  Co-operative 
members must identify and identify with the wider community (Birchall, 1997) as 
there is a strong interconnection between the success of a co-operative with that 
of the community in which the former operates (Birchall, 1997; Lusch et al., 2007; 
Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  Finally, the loss of the local character of co-
operatives, e.g., through expansion into new areas, can cause the dilution of 
members’ involvement and commitment (Fonteyne and Hardy, 2011).   
In line with the above, the data obtained from the interviews with the credit union 
employees indicate that credit unions should assist their members by becoming 
socially active, by offering to the unemployed and by making donations.  
Additionally, given the difficult financial situation that the financial crisis of March 
2013 has caused, respondents suggested that credit unions should reduce the loan 
instalments and the interest rates on loans, extend the period for the repayment of 
loans, offer new products and even ask for a change in the legislation in order to 
introduce a “sale and lease back” option to protect the homes of borrowers.  
Concerning the criteria for choosing which branches to close down, the data show 
that employees mainly considered the economic criteria, e.g., the number of 
clients that are served by each branch and the financial viability of each branch.  
With regards to the social criteria, participants considered the geographical 
location of the branch, in the sense that those that are more convenient for the 
members should remain open and that more branches should be closed in towns, 
where there is a much higher density of bank branches.  They even suggested a 
possible solution to the social problem of serving clients, in the rural areas, 
indicating that this can be done by the branches opening only for a few days per 
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month, with one interviewee suggesting the use of movable bank branches 
(“branches on wheels”). 
Similarly, based on the data collected from the focus groups, the intentions of the 
specific credit union to provide to the society were evident, e.g., by lowering the 
loan interest rates or by providing scholarships.  However, due to the transfer of 
99% of the shares to the state, members felt that they would not be able to decide 
for themselves about the kind and extent of social expenditure.  Additionally, the 
focus group participants argued that, even if members could decide for 
themselves, the need to repay the €1,5 billion together with the 10% interest per 
annum, would restrict the available amounts for social expenditure to the 
minimum.  Finally, others considered all three, social, financial and political 
criteria in deciding which branches to close down, and not only social criteria, as 
one would have expected. 
Based on the above, it can be said that credit unions followed the 7th principle, but 
this may not be the case in the future.  The existing literature refers to the need 
for credit unions to assist/contribute towards the development of the societies, in 
which they operate, something that credit unions did in the past, for example, by 
providing scholarships, contributions towards theatres, football clubs and provision 
of dancing lessons.  These findings are very similar to those of Oczkowski, 
Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013) who found that the majority of co-operatives 
undertook community assistance, such as, financing community groups, schools, 
welfare, sporting and providing scholarships.  What was different in Oczkowski, 
Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer’s (2013) research was that in some of their cases, 
co-operatives perceived the concern for the community as a marketing/advertising 
expenditure and not as a genuine philanthropic gesture.  Similarly, Novkovic (2006) 
found that 95% of her respondents considered this principle as important, that their 
co-operative’s decisions were influenced by their concern for the community and 
that co-operatives usually made donations of services, employee time and goods, 
they financed projects involved in community development and provided 
scholarships.   
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With regards to the criteria to be used in deciding which branches to close down, 
the focus group participants’ perceptions are in line with those in Osterberg and 
Nilsson’s (2009) study.  That is, a large percentage of members assess their credit 
union with respect to social criteria rather than economic criteria.  However, based 
on the data collected, both interviewees and focus group participants were 
pessimistic with regards to the continuation of offering to the wider community as 
the passing of 99% ownership to the state in combination with the financial crisis of 
2013, would radically reduce the funds available for such donations.  One way to 
continue to serve the community, without credit unions suffering high expenses, is 
by following the suggestion of interviewees, i.e. to open remote branches only for 
a few days per month and organize social events in order to raise funds for social 
purposes.  Furthermore, employees and members could carry out social work on a 
voluntary basis for the community.  Some of the pessimism expressed by both 
employees and members may have been caused by the bad financial position that 
created a lot of uncertainty regarding the jobs of both employees and members, 
forcing them to consider only their own basic needs.  Provided that credit unions 
had the possibility to do so, these difficult financial times, could prove to be a 
good opportunity to strengthen their membership basis and cultivate the co-
operative spirit.  This could be achieved by making donations, lowering their loan 
interest rates and providing for the needy, through training on the benefits of 
credit unions, as well as capital, especially to the unemployed, in order to set up 
new co-operative businesses. 
7.2.7 Conclusion for the first research question 
A general conclusion for the first research question, “What are the perceptions 
regarding the practical application of the co-operative principles?”, that may be 
drawn is that the short period between the individual interviews and focus groups 
and the financial crisis of March 2013, in Cyprus may have acted as a multiplier for 
the pessimism, fear and uncertainty the interviewees and participants expressed.  
However, these were their perceptions, at the time.  To the present study author’s 
knowledge, this may be the first research carried out on the adherence to co-
operative principles in a time of a crisis.  Just six months before the first data 
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collection (through interviews), Cyprus experienced probably the worst financial 
breakdown in its history, matched only by the consequences of the Turkish invasion 
in 1974.  This happened as Cyprus (as all other countries) was trying to navigate 
through the consequences of the 2008 crisis.  That is, Cyprus had a disastrous local 
financial crisis whilst being in the middle of an international one.  The collection of 
data during this crisis may be the most important contribution of the present study.   
Considering the data from the individual interviews and focus groups, it can be 
concluded that the 1st co-operative principle was followed in practice; at least, up 
to the moment the state became 99% owner of the shares in credit unions.  People 
feared that, from that moment onwards, it would not be up to credit unions to 
decide who and when will become a member or leave.  The existing literature 
assumes that credit unions ensure voluntary and open membership, but according 
to the results of the present research, this may not be true anymore, due to the 
loss of the autonomy and independence of credit unions. 
With regards to the results on the 3rd co-operative principle, these do not seem to 
be in line with the existing literature as members have indicated that they are no 
longer willing to participate in the financial strengthening of their credit union.  In 
other words, this principle used to be followed in practice, but not anymore, due 
to the results of the financial crisis of March 2013.  Part of these perceptions may 
be due to the feelings of insecurity and pessimism following the deposit haircut, 
the salary cuts, the fear of layoffs, the pessimism and the high level of uncertainty 
as was expressed by both the employees and members of Cypriot credit unions.  
In an examination of the 4th co-operative principle, the results indicate that credit 
unions used to follow this principle in practice, but now have lost their autonomy 
and independence since the state has become 99% shareholder in credit unions 
leaving only 1% to members.  Both interviewees and participants feared that from 
now on it will be the state that will take all the decisions regarding credit unions 
and that the latter are financially dependent on the state for their survival.  With 
regards to the future of credit unions, the replies were pessimistic, expressing 
concerns that credit unions will start operating just like investor-owned banks, 
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irrespectively of how they will be labelled (credit unions or anything else).  
Additionally, focus group participants were worried about the loss of their 
independence and autonomy due to the mutual support arrangements among credit 
unions, forcing them to become inter-dependent with the rest of the credit unions 
(viable and non-viable).  It could be inferred that the concern about specific credit 
unions becoming less financially viable, through their interdependence with others, 
is an indication of the self-centred way of seeing things.  Under normal conditions, 
one would expect that members would aim to co-operate even more closely with 
the less viable credit unions, in order to transfer knowhow and experiences, to 
strengthen them and not to worry about the survival of their own credit union, as 
was the case in this research. 
The results indicate that the 5th co-operative principle is not applied in practice as 
credit unions do not seem to provide any co-operative-related education or training 
to their employees, members and society in general.  This does not concur with the 
existing literature (Birchall, 1997; Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004; Cabo and 
Rebelo, 2014) which supports that training is important for co-operatives and that 
the latter provide training and education to their employees, management, 
members and governmental officials.  Credit unions should train and educate their 
members in order to enhance their members’ competencies in an attempt to serve 
them better.  The lack of co-operative-related training may be one of the reasons 
behind the inability of credit unions to attract younger generations, “handing” 
them to investor-owned banks.  Additionally, the lack of such training could be the 
reason behind the imposed granting of the 99% of the shares to the state for 
€1.5billion, when possibly, other solutions, e.g., a loan could have been chosen 
which could have ensured the autonomy and independence of credit unions.   
Moreover, the results of the current research indicate that the 6th co-operative 
principle “Co-operation among co-operatives” is followed in practice and this can 
be evidenced by the continuous mergers among credit unions reducing their 
number to just eighteen.  According to the data obtained, it can be seen that 
employees and members had diverse opinions regarding the appropriateness of the 
mergers.  On the one hand, the employees of credit unions were in favour of the 
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mergers, which is in line with the existing literature (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 
2005; Birchall and Ketilson, 2009), as through them they hoped for stronger, more 
financially viable and more professional credit unions.  On the other hand, the 
members were not in favour of the merger of their credit union arguing that it was 
unfair and would cause problems, a finding which is not supported by the existing 
literature as a merger is a way through which credit unions can co-operate amongst 
them (CSSDA, 2005), transferring knowledge and knowhow (Papageorgiou, 2004) 
and thus ensuring the success of co-operatives (Birchall and Ketilson, 2009).  
However, it seems that this reaction is directly linked to the fact that their credit 
union was absorbed by a stronger credit union thus, they did not have a lot of 
saying during the merger process and most importantly, they lost their influence 
and control over management and the Board of Directors. 
Finally, the findings about the 7th co-operative principle, “Concern for the 
community”, indicate that this principle was followed, up until the moment that 
the state became 99% shareholder in credit unions, something that may not be true 
in the future.  The practical application of the principle, e.g., the provision of 
scholarships, contributions to charities, theatres and football clubs is in line with 
the existing literature (Jones, 1999; Papageorgiou, 2004; Crespi, Garcia-Cestona 
and Salas, 2004; CSSDA, 2005; Valor et al., 2007; Brannen and Ibrahim, 2010) and is 
common practice among credit unions.  Based on the current study, a possible 
reason for the cessation of these provisions to the surrounding communities include 
the possibility that the control over related decisions has been passed from credit 
unions to the state, as it has become the major shareholder in credit unions.  
Additionally, the loss in community-related expenditure may be related to 
restrictions on expenses imposed by the state in the light of the repayment of the 
€1.5 billion, plus the 10% interest per annum.  However, based on the current 
study’s results it is not necessary for credit unions to donate (all the) funds 
themselves as this can be replaced by fundraising activities and volunteer work.  As 
for the criteria to be used in deciding which branches to close down, the 
employees considered firstly the financial ones and then the social ones, whilst 
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members considered firstly the social criteria, e.g., servicing of members, and then 
the financial ones. 
Examining the results on all of the above six co-operative principles, the answer to 
the first research question is that both those employed and the members of credit 
unions consider that the 6th co-operative principle is followed whereas, the 5th co-
operative principle has never been followed in practice.  Additionally, in the past, 
four co-operative principles (1st, 3rd, 4th and 7th) were followed but now, due to the 
transfer of 99% of the shares to the state, it is feared that they will not be followed 
anymore.  It must be noted that the negative responses should be explained in 
relation to the negative climate and the fear and uncertainty people felt, as a 
consequence of the financial crisis of March 2013, in Cyprus.  These results 
therefore, support the notion that the non-adherence of the co-operative 
principles by credit unions could render their governance structure ineffective.  
These results are in line with those of Wilson and McLean (2012), that is, as time 
passes, the co-operative principles become less important for members.   
 
7.3 2nd research question: “What are the perceptions regarding the active 
democratic participation of members?”  
As discussed in Chapter 2, in addition to the need for co-operatives to adhere to 
their founding principles, members themselves must adhere to their co-operative 
as members’ loyalty and active participation are vital for the effectiveness of the 
governance system of their co-operatives (Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2009), as 
well as for the overall success of their co-operative (Hakelius, 1996, cited in 
Bhuyan, 2007).  “Democratic Member Control” entails that all members have the 
same voting rights, usually on the basis of “one-member, one-vote”, but some 
members serve as elected representatives for the rest (Reynolds, Gray and 
Kraenzle, 1997; ICA, 2012a), rendering co-operatives “practicing democracies” 
(Papageorgiou, 2004, p.50).  The distinctive character of a co-operative is created 
by the participation of members in its governance (Gray, 1998).  In other words, 
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members could be perceived as active actors that aim to improve their well-being 
(Vargo, Maglio and Akaka, 2008, Vargo and Lusch, 2011).  Additionally, according to 
S-D Logic, credit unions must recognise that customers are co-creators of value and 
that their involvement must be maximised (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).  As the 
customers/members are involved in value co-creation, according to their abilities 
and knowledge (Wind and Rangaswamy, 2001), co-operatives must find ways to 
engage with their members, for the long-term, enabling them to find out and then 
meet the changing needs of their members (Vargo, 2009, Vargo and Lusch, 2010).   
The ultimate control over a co-operative is exercised by members during the AGM 
during which members exert control over management’s decisions, decide on 
policy and other important issues (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005).  The most 
important aspect at the AGM is the participation, of most of the members, in the 
democratic procedures (Papageorgiou, 2004), e.g., ensuring that their co-operative 
has followed the co-operative principles (CSSDA, 2005).  Active participation can be 
measured based on two axes: how many members are involved in relation to the 
membership base and how active they are (Birchall, 1997).  Two of problems faced, 
in trying to increase people’s motivation to participate, are people’s belief that 
even if they participate they could achieve nothing and people’s free riding 
(Edwards, 2013).  In Cyprus, all decisions at the AGM are taken based on the notion 
of one-person, one-vote and management decisions are assessed by the elected 
Board members (CSSDA, 2005).  Moreover, in Cyprus, all members of a co-operative 
have the right to elect and to be elected on the Board of Directors (CSSDA, 2005).   
Co-operative members must understand that it is to their self-benefit and that of 
the wider society to engage and support their financial co-operative as this will 
ensure that the financial institutions will not engage in high risk activities 
(Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011).  The most effective way to deal with the above 
problems/challenges, i.e. of strengthening the co-operative governance structure, 
could be the solving of the free riding problem and hence convincing members to 
participate in the democratic control of the co-operatives (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, 
Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009; Spear, Cornforth and 
Aiken, 2009).  Additionally, Hakelius and Hansson (2016) having studied the changes 
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of members of Swedish farmer co-operatives in 1993 and 2013, suggest that co-
operatives should adjust/update their governance in order to build and/or develop 
their members’ trust.  Moreover, co-operatives could increase the number of active 
members by, for instance, stimulating the use of mobile phones and the internet 
for banking activities (Spear, 2004a) as well as by promoting interaction through 
social media (e.g., Twitter, Facebook, blogs, online forums, scheduled chat 
sessions), having always in mind that smaller communities enhance people’s feeling 
that their opinion counts (Edwards, 2013).  Furthermore, based on data from the 
UK, co-operatives could promote membership, by introducing a dividend card 
(Spear, 2004a) or even by offering value for money quality financial products 
(Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011).  Additionally, to encourage members’ participation 
in their co-operatives the power gap between co-operative leaders and members 
must be bridged (Birchall, 2003; Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2011) and this can only 
happen through long-term, focused training and education (Birchall, 2003; 
Papageorgiou, 2004; Xiang and Sumelius, 2010; Sacchetti and Tortia; 2012; 
Edwards, 2013), e.g., of younger people, building a sense of community (Edwards, 
2013).  Moreover, it is important for co-operatives to maintain their roots in and 
good knowledge of the local communities they operate in (Alexopoulos and Goglio, 
2011).  Finally, the problem of members’ lack of participation could be overcome 
by the alignment of management’s objectives to those of the co-operative 
(Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012) hence, increasing members’ trust towards their co-
operative.  This is because, based on the results from a sample of 259 members in 
France in 2007- 2008, trust was considered as the cornerstone of the explanation of 
members’ favourable behaviour towards their co-operative (Barraud-Didier, 
Henninger and El Akremi, 2012).   
As members seem to be willing to bind themselves to democratic control if the 
reasoning for decisions is explained to them and they are given the opportunity to 
influence decision making (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009), one of the most effective 
ways to increase the participation of members with their co-operatives is to 
promote democratic involvement (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009).  That is, co-
operatives should encourage their members to participate in the co-operatives’ 
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management (Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009; Xiang and Sumelius, 2010) and hence, 
exert real control over the members of the Board of Directors and management 
(Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009).  Moreover, members’ participation could be 
enhanced by the alignment of management’s objectives to those of the co-
operative (Xiang and Sumelius, 2010), e.g., through the punishment wrongdoers or 
the implementation of suitable incentive schemes (Sacchetti and Tortia, 2012).  
Moreover, management should aim to balance the short-term benefits to members 
with the long-term survival of credit unions, e.g., by distributing part of the profits 
(Papageorgiou, 2004).  Moreover, members’ participation could be enhanced by 
providing adequate channels (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009) for managers to 
communicate with members (Xiang and Sumelius, 2010) in an active way and by 
organizing debates between members and management (Sacchetti and Tortia; 
2012).   
Based on the data from both the individual interviews and the focus groups, it can 
be said that the 2nd principle is not followed.  The credit union employees do not 
consider that there are a lot of members that participate in practice.  More 
specifically the majority of the employees interviewed argued for a participation 
rate of less than 25% and only the minority of the employees considered that more 
than half of the members vote during the elections for the Board of Directors.  
These findings may be disappointing, but they have been confirmed by members 
and the statistics that the office of CSSDA has provided.  Additionally, the results 
of the present study, confirm that the majority of members does not actively 
participate in their credit union (Spear, 2004a).  This possibly indicates the 
beginning of co-operative’s failure (Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, Cornforth and 
Aiken, 2009).  The above findings concur with the rest of the findings of the 
present research and especially the unwillingness of members to contribute 
financially to their credit union, in order to save its independence.  Additionally, 
the data collected on the 2nd principle may be linked to the finding on the 5th 
principle, that is, that credit unions do not provide any co-operative-related 
training to their employees, Board of Directors, members, or the general public.  
As already discussed (Section 7.2.4), the lack of training could wipe off the 
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important ideological differences between credit unions and other institutions, 
mistakenly rendering credit unions as normal economic organizations 
(Papageorgiou, 2004).  In particular, in order to assess members’ participation, 
three aspects of democratic member control are analysed below: participation in 
AGMs, members voting at the Board of Directors’ elections and number of 
candidates in relation to the number of available positions in the Board of 
Directors. 
7.3.1 Participation in Annual General Meetings (AGMs) 
With regards to members’ participation in the AGMs, almost half of the 
interviewees claimed that the percentage was between 0% and 1%, whereas a 
minority claimed that it was between 2% and 25%.  On the other hand, only a very 
small number of interviewees argued that the attendance was high however, 
without specifying an approximate number or percentage.  Moreover, there was 
very limited evidence that members were actively involved, with some 
interviewees arguing that those who attend AGMs are controlled by management 
and that only in very rare cases members asked for a topic to be included in the 
agenda of the AGM.  The low participation of members was also confirmed through 
the data that were obtained from the office of the Commissioner of the Co-
operative Societies Supervision and Development Authority, in September 2013 
(Sections 5.9.11 and 6.4) and the responses of the participants in the focus groups.  
According to the data on seventeen credit unions, which were obtained from the 
office of CSSDA, the average percentage of members attending the last three AGMs 
of their credit union is just 8%, with four credit unions having an average of less 
than or equal to 1%.  During the focus group interviews, participants said that they 
did not attend the AGMs because it was easier to free ride and the way they got 
invited was not such as to encourage their participation.  Members set out a 
number of excuses for not attending, including lack of time, having other things to 
do, laziness, not being interested in the topics discussed, indifference, trust in 
their representatives and long distance to the venue where the AGM was held.   
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This low participation of members in Board elections is not in line with the 
literature that assumes that it is the majority of members that interact with their 
co-operative (Jones, 2001; Fonteyne, 2007).  However, the results of the present 
study coincide with those of Spear (2004b) who found that, in 2001, in Democratic, 
Member-based Organisations (including co-operatives) in the UK, only around 3% of 
members attended and voted at AGMs.  Similarly, in 2007, only 3,6% of members 
attended the meetings of the Swedish Farmers' Supply and Crop Marketing 
Association (Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009).  Furthermore, the members’ 
participation at the General Meetings of Spanish Credit Co-operatives, in 2004, was 
only 6.1% (Chaves, Soler and Sajardo. 2008), whereas in Mondragon Corporación 
Cooperativa in 2002, it was only 38% (Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004).   
7.3.2 Members voting at Board of Directors’ elections 
Based on the data from the individual interviews, it has been found that employees 
do not consider that it is the majority of members that participates in the elections 
for the Board of Directors.  This is because the vast majority of interviewees 
claimed that the participation of members was less than 30% (or even less than 
25%), with the minority supporting that the participation was more than 50%.  The 
results of the focus groups coincide with those obtained from the interviews as 
they considered that only a 30%- 40% of members actually vote during the Board of 
Directors’ elections.  Specific participants stated that, as members, they had an 
obligation to attend the voting, but they voted only when someone they knew was 
running as a candidate.  Finally, a participant specifically said that he was not 
aware of the percentage of members that voted, simply because he did not attend 
the elections himself.  The data from the office of CSSDA (Section 6.4) also 
confirmed the results of the individual interviews and the focus groups.  That is, 
for a sample of twelve credit unions the percentage of members that voted at the 
last three Board of Directors’ elections was just 7% with five of these credit unions 
having an average participation of less than 3%.  These findings are in line with 
similar findings, for example 1%- 5% in consumer Co-operatives rendering the 
elected Board of Directors unrepresentative of membership (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, 
2004b). 
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7.3.3 Number of candidates Vs. available positions 
With regards to the number of candidates in relation to the available positions for 
the Board of Directors’ elections, the interviewees replied that the number of 
candidates is approximately twice the available positions.  However, some 
interviewees argued that no elections were held for a number of years, as the 
number of candidates exactly matched the number of available positions.  
Additionally, some interviewees said that they did not have contested elections, as 
they had the same people on the Board of Directors for a number of years, e.g., for 
a decade (in Cyprus, the Board of Directors can serve for an unlimited number of 
three year terms three years).  These results were confirmed by the focus groups, 
during which the members argued that they are not interested in getting elected at 
the Board of Directors and that 1- 2 candidates run for each available position.   
It has been pointed out that a possible reason for this could be that the political 
parties agree on the names of the candidates rendering very difficult, if not 
impossible, for anyone who runs as an independent candidate to get elected.  
Additionally, it seems that the existing Board members have a clear advantage over 
newcomers as the former know “all the tricks of the trade” and have already spent 
considerable amount of time visiting the working places and talking with their 
colleagues/voters.  Finally, even if the newcomers believed they could do much 
better than the existing Board members, they were very reluctant to stand as 
candidates, as they risked losing face if they did not get elected.  The above 
findings were also confirmed by the data that were obtained from the office of the 
CSSDA (Section 6.4), which showed that the average number of candidates in the 
previous three elections is only 1,5 times the available positions, with four credit 
unions having just enough candidates to fill in the available positions (and hence no 
elections took place).  In only two out of the nineteen credit unions, from the 
CSSDA sample, candidates were more than double the available positions (i.e. one 
credit union with 2,6 candidates per position and the other with 2,8 candidates per 
position).   
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The above results are not supported by the available literature which assumes that 
it is the majority of members that participate with their credit union, including 
voting at the Board of Directors’ elections.  However, the low participation of 
members in the elections of the governing body concurs with the findings of 
Novkovic (2006), who claims that very low participation was evident in large 
financial co-operatives.  Nevertheless, when a need arises, members become 
involved in their credit co-operative, a finding that coincides with that of Chaves, 
Soler and Sajardo (2008).  Similarly, Spear (2004b) argues that contested elections 
allow real choice to members enhancing the representativeness of the Board of 
Directors.  Based on this, it may be said that in the case of the credit unions under 
study, the Board of Directors were not representative of the membership and that 
members did not have real choice during the elections.  Finally, the long tenure of 
the Board of Directors has also been identified by Cabo and Rebelo (2014) who 
argue that, in Portugal, there is no upper limit for the mandates’ number and 
hence, the majority of Board members remain in office for decades.  As the role of 
the Board of Directors is very important, the next section will provide further 
discussion on the role of the Board of Directors.  Hence, there will be a discussion 
of matters pertaining to participation whilst, summarizing the related findings of 
the present study and that of the available literature. 
7.3.4 Participation and the role of the Board of Directors 
As discussed in Sections 2.2.3, 2.2.4, 4.2, 4.3 and 4.4.6, the Board of Directors is 
elected amongst membership (Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014), and in small 
credit unions it has all executive powers and is engaged in its day-to-day operations 
(Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 2007).  As credit unions grow, salaried management is 
introduced, ensuring the implementation of the Board of Directors’ decisions 
(Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2013).  At a later stage, salaried management takes on all 
decision-making and the Board of Directors undertakes a more strategic role, 
controlling management on an ex-post basis (after decision making) (FSA, 2007; 
Bijman et al., 2012a; Mswaka and Aluko, 2015).  Apart from the literature review 
above, the author served as a General Manager with a large Cypriot credit union 
(from March 2008 to December 2011); it was common practice for the Board of 
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Directors to engage in both operational and strategic decision making. This 
included decisions regarding new membership applications; the granting of 
overdrafts; credit card and loan applications; and matters relating to loan terms, 
collateral and interest rates.  Moreover, the Board of Directors also took 
responsibility for scholarships, donations and staffing.  The General Manager was 
primarily responsible for staff supervision, development and performance, as well 
as the day-to-day management.  This was the typical scenario within the credit 
union industry until the Supervisory Body (CSSDA), together with the Apex 
organisation (Co-operative Central Bank), reviewed corporate governance requiring 
unions to ensure the General Manager was a full member of the Board of Directors 
(around 2010).  Additionally, all decisions regarding loans, credit cards and 
overdraft facilities were transferred to a dedicated staff committee led by the 
General Manager.  The author notes these changes were not generally welcomed by 
the Board and they maintained sole control over recruitment, scholarships and 
donations, as they were outwith the CSSDA/Apex review.  Indeed, the Board 
blocked moves to bring in performance appraisal and greater budgetary autonomy.  
Returning to the literature review, it is suggested that due to the different roles 
that the Board of Directors is called to fulfil, e.g., to control management 
(principal- agent theory, democratic perspective and stakeholder theories), to be 
supportive and partners with management (stewardship theory) (Cornforth, 2002; 
2003; 2004), tensions are created, rendering the role of the Board of Directors 
more complicating and demanding.  This is also worsened by the ambiguous and/or 
multiple accountability of the Board of Directors (Cornforth, 2002).  At the same 
time, the part-time status and the lack of salary, as opposed to the full-time 
salaried status of management (Cabo and Rebelo, 2014; Mswaka and Aluko, 2015), 
renders the Board of Directors “dependent” on management for information and 
suggestions.  Some researchers argue that the Board of Directors merely “rubber 
stamps” management’s decisions (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, Cornforth and Aiken, 
2007).  Moreover, the fact that the rate of renewal of the Board of Directors is very 
low, may mean that any inter-relationships among them and management cannot 
be prevented entirely (Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 2008).  Possible remedies of the 
above problems could be the training of the Board of Directors, enriching their 
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related knowledge and skills (Shaw, 2007) and by permitting to non-members 
experts to become Board members (Bijman, Hanisch and Sangen, 2014).   
The findings of the present study confirm those of previous research indicating that 
members are not actively involved with their credit unions and that they lack 
interest in attending AGMs, voting for and standing for election to the Board of 
Directors.  For example, only 1%- 5% of members of consumer co-operatives vote 
during the Board of Directors’ elections, rendering the elected Board of Directors 
unrepresentative of membership (Itkonen, 1996; Spear, 2004b).  Additionally, the 
low participation of members is true also for their attendance in AGMs.  For 
example, only 30% participate in AGMs of Mondragon Corporación Cooperativa 
(Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004), in Sweden in 2007 it was only 3,6% 
(Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009) and in UK in 2001 the participation in AGMs was 
only 3% (Spear, 2004b) (Section 3.4).  This low member participation effectively 
permits the fall of the co-operative in the hands of an “elite” group or in the hands 
of management (Itkonen, 1996; Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, 2004a; 2004b; FSA, 
2007) (Section 2.2.4).   
It should be stressed here that members delegate/pass on their right to control 
management, and the operations of their credit union, to the Board of Directors 
who act as fiduciaries (Mswaka and Aluko, 2015) for (existing and future) members 
as a body.  Based on this delegation, the Board of Directors also becomes 
responsible for matters pertaining to members’ participation.  What the present 
research adds is that focus group participants consider that as long as members are 
happy with their Board of Directors, they will not participate in their credit union 
(Section 6.5.2).  This finding coincides with that of Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain 
(2004).  Additionally, the present research identifies the side effects from the 
involvement of political parties in selecting candidates for the Board of Directors’ 
elections, i.e. fear and risk of humiliation for the independent candidates (Section 
6.5.2).  Moreover, this thesis notes that the membership contributes little by way 
of formal inputs to AGM’s, even when they feel strongly about an issue they tend to 
let it pass, having no faith that their views will be considered.  To this effect, the 
present study’s findings indicate that the Board of Directors could use today’s 
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technologies, e.g., social media, chat rooms, remote voting, on-line broadcasting 
of the AGMs in order to encourage members’ participation (Section 7.3).  There is 
evidence that technology can assist in maintaining membership participation, as 
can a determination to ensure engagement through more traditional means; 
examples of such practice is provided below.  However, this research did not 
identify a commitment by the Board to engagement, nor a desire to explore 
alternative means of encouraging participation. As noted, this research calls for a 
greater consideration of how best to enhance participation and meaningful 
engagement.  
The renewed Co-operative Group UK has undertaken a number of measures to 
enhance the participation of its members.  These include, the highlighting of the 
members’ ability to have their say on business matters during the AGM, their ability 
to join other members in undertaking initiatives for the benefit of the local 
community, as well as to stand for election and; to elect member-nominated 
directors and their council representatives (Co-operatives UK, 2017a).  The Co-
operative Group UK has created an elected 100 strong Members’ Council, which 
also has representation from colleague members and independent co-operative 
societies (Co-operatives UK, 2017a).  The role of the members’ council is to 
maintain the Co-operative Group UK’s principles, values, purpose and the 
constitution, as well as holding the Group’s Board of Directors to account (Co-
operatives UK, 2017a).  In order to encourage interest in becoming Council 
members, the Co-operative Group UK is offering an annual fee of £3,000 as well as 
covering travelling expenses, granting an employee discount card and offering 
dependent carer and childcare allowance for attending meetings (Co-operatives 
UK, 2017a).  The Co-operative Group UK has also created the Council Senate which 
consists of 15 members of and elected Members’ Council (Co-operatives UK, 
2017a).  The Members’ Council Senate links the Members’ Council, the Board of 
Directors, the executive director and the members of the Co-operative Group UK 
(Co-operatives UK, 2017a).  Moreover, the Co-operative Group UK has introduced 4 
Member Nominated Directors to its Board of Directors who must possess the 
relevant level of experience and skills (Co-operatives UK, 2017a).   
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Finally, the Co-operative Group UK has created the Young Members’ Board which in 
turn created a manifesto for young people.  The manifesto sets out six areas where 
youth innovation and creativity can assist the co-operative movement (Co-
operatives UK, 2017b).  These areas include: (a) product and service development, 
(b) democracy building, (c) challenging perceptions, (d) investment in their future, 
(e) setting out their vision and (f) leading the way (Co-operatives UK, 2017b).  The 
manifesto site mentions that there were 300 candidates for each position and 
states that “when an opportunity is attractively marketed to younger people they 
will seize the chance to make their voice heard” and also “when young people are 
engaged with effectively, they will get involved” (Co-operatives UK, 2017b).  The 
above measures undertaken by the Co-operative Group UK demonstrate that 
members, when genuinely encouraged to engage, will welcome the opportunity to 
be involved. Indeed, the engagement goes far beyond the AGM and illustrates what 
can be done by Boards to reach out to and utilise the membership (Co-operatives 
UK, 2017b).  
Cypriot credit unions may not have the resources to emulate the Co-operative 
Group UK’s endeavours, however, they can do much more to reach out to the 
membership and create active and eager advocates/ambassadors.  Members need 
genuine encouragement to get involved, something that can be achieved through 
other active members, Board members, management and employees.  Credit 
unions can implement a number of different strategies and through feedback and 
trial and error find which is best suited.  Credit unions must listen to existing and 
potential members to shape their product portfolio that creates value for the 
membership. 
However, even if the Board of Directors was more actively involved in encouraging 
members to participate the impact may not be that great.  According to this 
study’s findings, as well as Chaves, Soler and Sajardo’s (2008), this is due to the 
fact that society has changed and cohesion/collectivism have been replaced by 
self-interest (Section 6.2.4) and that nowadays citizens are passive (Bakaikoa, 
Errasti and Begiristain, 2004) giving rise to even more member alienation.  For 
example, the present study has identified that focus group participants supported 
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that they did not attend the AGMs because of lack of volunteerism and absence of 
younger generations who have interest in the founding ideas of credit unions 
(Section 6.5.2).  At the same time, both interviewees (Section 6.2.4) and focus 
group participants (Section 6.5.2) said that, as members, they would stop free 
riding and actually actively participate in their credit union in cases where they 
felt that their personal interests were hurt.  As evidenced in the next section there 
are a number of reasons for members’ lack of participation.   
Please note that this is not to say efforts should not be made to engage, but rather 
given the evidence presented in the following sections, it will require considerable 
effort and time to restore a sense of self benefit rather than at present a culture of 
self-interest. 
7.3.5 Possible reasons for the lack of members’ participation 
Two reasons for members’ lack of participation in their credit union were raised by 
the interviewees: members feel that they are not able to influence the decisions of 
the credit union and they are dissatisfied with specific decisions of their credit 
union.  This was also identified by Hakelius and Hansson (2016) who concluded that 
even though members believe in the idea of co-operatives, nevertheless, members 
trust co-operatives less than before.  This may be because co-operatives do not 
respect and do not take seriously the democratic rights of members or because of 
the general attitude change towards the individualistic rather than the common 
benefit (Hakelius and Hansson, 2016).  Moreover, people’s belief that, even if 
members participate, they could achieve nothing was also identified by Edwards 
(2013) and by Wind and Rangaswamy (2001).  The latter specifically claim that 
credit unions should give more control to their members, in order to effectively 
become agents for the members’ value creation activities.  Additionally, Bhuyan 
(2007) found that members’ dissatisfaction with the management of their credit 
union increases disloyalty and that those who feel that their opinion is not taken 
into account by management are more likely to exit the co-operative.  Similarly, as 
co-operatives become large, management must assume more responsibility thus, 
members feel that they can no longer control their co-operative, they become 
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dissatisfied and they distant themselves (Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009).  
Furthermore, based on the individual interviews, one more reason for refraining 
members from participating in their credit union could be the loss of the credit 
unions’ local identity due to the mergers, reducing the homogeneity of members 
and their social cohesion, issues that were raised also by Birchall (1997) and Nilsson 
and Svendsen (2011).   
In examination of the data from both the individual interviews and the focus 
groups, another possible reason for the lack of participation of members with their 
credit union, could be that members “free ride” or are just too busy living their 
lives that they consider engaging with their credit union a luxury.  The problem of 
free riding of members was also identified by Hakelius (1996, cited in Bhuyan, 
2007) and Edwards (2013).  Moreover, another possible reason, mentioned during 
the focus groups, was the older age of the majority of the Board of Directors, 
seeing things from their own perspective and wanting to obtain the benefits of 
membership as soon as possible, an issue known as “horizon problem” (Section 
1.3.2).  One focus group participant, in particular, argued that their credit union 
did not manage to attract new (and younger) members, something however, that 
did not seem to concern the Board members.  This finding is in line with those of 
Osterberg and Nilsson (2009) and Borgen’s (2004), which indicate that older co-
operative members may free ride or exit altogether due to the shorter investment 
horizon they face.  However, this finding is opposite to what EACB (2010) claims, 
that is, the client/member governance structure of co-operatives enforces a long-
term horizon upon members.   
The focus groups and interviews results also indicate that members may not 
participate because the way they get invited does not encourage their participation 
and that credit unions do not create nor do they take advantage of every possible 
opportunity to communicate (face-to-face), to socially interact and to exchange 
information with their members (identified also by Barraud-Didier, Henninger and 
El Akremi, 2012).  The lack of participation of members, caused by the improper 
communication between the credit union and its members was also raised by 
Hakelius (1996, cited in Bhuyan, 2007), Birchall (1997), Prahalad and Ramaswamy 
Page 214 of 297 
 
(2000) and Payne et al. (2009), indicating that the organisation should provide 
enough opportunities to its members to emotionally engage with their credit union.  
More specifically, Payne et al. (2009) highlighted that the lack of encouragement of 
customers/members to engage with the organisation results to their lack of 
participation and knowledge about the organisation’s service.  Hence, the 
organisation loses contact with its members, is not able to learn about their needs 
and consequently loses the opportunity to serve them. 
Another possible reason for members’ lack of participation that was raised by both 
members and employees was the involvement of political parties in credit unions.  
That is, political parties play a role in deciding which candidates to suggest for the 
Board of Directors’ elections and which employees to hire (raised in the focus 
groups).  In particular, one interviewee mentioned that only when the political 
parties were involved, there was a high member attendance in elections, indicating 
that it was the former and not the credit union that mobilized the members.  
These findings concur with the existing literature as it was noted that political 
influence affects the direction and the management of a co-operative financial 
institution (Korres, 1999; Stefancic, 2011).  The involvement of political parties 
could also contribute to the low rate of renewal of the Board of Directors, leading 
to inter-relationships among them and management (Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 
2008).  On the other hand, these results do not coincide with Papageorgiou’s (2004) 
argument that co-operatives should remain independent of political parties as this 
could break up any co-operative to many smaller groups, and thus weaken it.  
Based on the above findings, it can be said that credit unions may have fallen in 
the trap of depending on political parties for their decision-making, rendering the 
former vulnerable towards the latter and thus leading to the alienation of 
members.   
Another possible reason for members’ lack of participation could be the mismatch 
of what credit unions offer with what their members actually need.  This could be 
caused by lack of innovation (Lusch et al., 2007) or lack of update/upgrade of their 
own competencies, e.g., expertise, technologies and techniques (Normann and 
Ramirez, 1993; Jones, 2004; Jones and Ellison, 2011; Jones, 2012; ABCUL, 2013; 
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Jones, 2016), in adjusting themselves to support the co-creation activities of its 
members (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000; Payne et al., 2009; Lusch, Vargo and 
Tanniru, 2010).  Additionally, credit unions’ offerings could be outdated because 
they do not look outside their comfort zone (Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Lusch et 
al., 2007).  In other words, what they offer is not tailor-made or adjustable to the 
changing needs of their members (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2004).  However, if a 
credit union does not come closer to its members and their needs, then it will not 
be able to prepare value propositions that are accepted by its members (Payne et 
al., 2009).  On the other hand, the mismatch of what credit unions offer with the 
needs of their members could have been caused by the lack of initiatives, on credit 
unions’ behalf, to face the new reality.  In this reality, members are viewed as 
operant resources (Lusch, Vargo and Wessels, 2008), they are better informed 
(Payne et al., 2009), more demanding and more active in the co-creation of value 
that will enhance their well-being (Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000; Normann, 
2001).  Credit unions may have failed to realize that, in this new reality, they just 
offer value propositions (Vargo and Lusch 2004a; Spohrer and Maglio, 2010) and it is 
up to the customer/member to determine the value (if any) of what the credit 
union offers and whether to accept or to reject it (Spohrer and Maglio, 2010).   
Finally, and further to the discussion above and on the similarities between co-
operatives and S-D Logic in Section 2.4, a possible reason for members’ lack of 
engagement with their credit unions could be that the latter do not provide service 
that meets the needs of their members.  This means that only if existing and 
potential members consider that a specific credit union can positively contribute to 
their co-creation activities, will they use its service, otherwise members will add 
other organisations to their value creation constellations.  Hence, credit unions 
should find ways to be of use to existing and potential members, for example, by 
including the credit union in their value creation activities (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).  
In other words, credit unions must understand that it is members who decide 
whether a credit union’s offerings are of value or not (Maglio et al., 2009; Lusch, 
Vargo and Tanniru, 2010; Lusch and Vargo, 2011).  Moreover, credit unions should 
offer their members new ways to co-create value and give them as many 
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opportunities as possible to create meaningful/memorable experiences with their 
credit unions (Payne et al., 2009).  Finally, credit unions could give to their 
members more control over the whole process (Wind and Rangaswamy, 2001), 
making them feel that they really own their credit union.   
It could be the case that, initially members came together to create credit unions 
to assist themselves in enhancing their well-being and to combat opportunism and 
financial exclusion.  Being actively involved in the day-to-day operations of their 
credit union, members were eager and committed to co-create the service that 
would meet their demands and expectations.  However, as the number of members 
increased and credit unions became larger and larger, members were less and less 
engaged with their credit union, especially as professional management entered 
the picture.  Over a certain size, members became even less engaged with their 
credit union, with professional management becoming even more pre-occupied 
with day-to-day operations and even less concerned about members and their 
needs.  This has allowed the fall from tailor-made and purpose-made service to 
meet the needs of specific members to financial products that were mass-produced 
and directed to any customer.  However, this move has led to even more member 
alienation, depriving credit unions from their constant contact with members, 
rendering credit unions incapable of knowing what members need and how to 
deliver it to them.  With hindsight, this could mean that as long as members 
received service that was custom-made and for which they were co-creators, both 
members and credit unions thrived.  However, credit unions’ move from co-created 
service to mass-produced financial products (of the one-size-fits-all type) caused 
members alienation resulting in credit unions being disconnected from their 
membership.  This situation, confirmed by the present study’s findings, became 
even worse when professional management and staff was introduced resulting in 
even more member alienation. 
To summarize, it seems that indeed there are a number of different reasons for 
members’ alienation.  These include the change of societies to more self-centred 
ones, with members free-riding and the Board of Directors having a limited number 
of ways to (partially) influence this trend.  The subsequent involvement of political 
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parties and the lack of credit unions’ technological advancement have both had 
their toll.  However, the biggest effect on members’ lack of participation seems to 
be credit unions’ move from custom-made service that was co-created with their 
members for their members’ specific needs to mass-produced financial products 
that had limited (if any) room for customisation.  This has removed members and 
their needs from the center of attention of credit unions, stripping the latter from 
their differentiating factors and rendering them just another provider of financial 
products.  However, this has resulted in even more member alienation, has stopped 
members from treating credit unions as theirs and hence, members started giving 
more emphasis on their personal interests and not on their common good. 
 
In conclusion, it can be said that based on the data obtained in the present 
research, the answer to the second research question, “What are the perceptions 
regarding the active democratic participation of members?”, is that members 
seem not to be engaged with their credit unions and that it is not the majority of 
members that actively participate in the running of their credit union.   
 
7.4 Conclusions 
Analysing and discussing the data obtained through the individual interviews, the 
focus groups and the data from the office of the CSSDA, it can be concluded that 
the 2nd and 5th co-operative principles are not followed in practice by credit unions.  
However, the 6th principle is followed, while the 1st, 3rd, 4th and 7th principles used 
to be followed, but as a result of the financial crisis and the granting of 99% shares 
in credit unions to the Cypriot state, these may not be followed in the future.  The 
above results are not in line with the literature that supports that credit unions 
adhere to their founding principles, which they apply in their day-to-day 
operations, and that members are active in controlling their credit union.  At the 
same time, though, the findings concur with previous academic research regarding 
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the non-adherence of credit unions to their principles, e.g., because as time 
passes, the co-operative principles become less important for the co-operators 
(Wilson and McLean, 2012).  Similarly, the fact that members refrain from 
participating with their credit union coincides with the literature that indicates low 
member participation in the control of credit unions, especially larger ones 
(Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004; Spear, 2004b; Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 
2008; Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009).  More specifically, in examination of the 
findings and the existing literature, the following conclusions and suggestions may 
be drawn about each of the seven co-operative principles, as seen below.   
With regards to the 1st co-operative principle, “Voluntary and open membership”, 
the results have shown that that this principle may not be valid anymore due to the 
state becoming 99% owner in credit unions.  It is the personal opinion of the author 
of the present study that credit unions should engage in a campaign to attract new 
and preferably younger members, maintaining, at the same time, the existing 
members.  However, this can be achieved only in combination with the 5th co-
operative principle, “Education, training and information”, so that younger people 
learn, and existing members are reminded, about the distinctive characteristics of 
credit unions. 
As far as the 2nd co-operative principle, “Democratic member control”, is 
concerned, it was found that handing 99% of the credit unions’ shares to the state 
has created serious concerns about the ability of members to control their 
organisations.  Credit unions, in close co-operation with the state, should find ways 
to ensure that, even during this phase where the state is the owner of credit 
unions, members control their credit unions.   
Moving to the 3rd co-operative principle, “Member economic participation”, it may 
be suggested that credit unions strive to increase their capitalization through 
members.  It is of great importance that this specific principle is also applied in 
combination with 5th co-operative principle.  Members should understand the 
distinctive nature of credit unions and, at the same time, credit unions should pay 
the appropriate interest rate in order to attract this additional capital.  For 
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example, and to the extent that this is acceptable by members, credit unions could 
pay no dividends to members, could increase the difference between interest paid 
on deposits and interest received on loans, as well as increase the bank charges for 
as long as needed, in order to be able to repay the state the €1,5billion plus the 
10% interest per annum. 
In examination of the 4th co-operative principle, “Autonomy and independence”, 
both interviewees and participants indicated that that credit unions lost their 
autonomy and independence the same moment that the state became 99% owner 
of the shares in their credit unions.  It is suggested that credit unions should 
attempt to gain back their shares, while, in the meantime, being in close co-
operation with the state, ensuring that credit unions are quasi-autonomous and 
quasi-independent, of course keeping in mind the limitations set out by the 
agreement of the Cypriot state with Troika. 
With regards to the 5th co-operative principle, “Education, training, and 
information”, the results of the present study indicate that credit unions do not 
provide any co-operative-related education to either their employees or their 
members.  In some cases, credit unions may have provided such training to their 
employees but this was a long time ago.  Additionally, the author of the present 
study considers that credit unions should use every available opportunity aiming at 
coming closer and communicating with its existing and potential members.  
Furthermore, credit unions could increase the cohesion among members, through 
the provision of co-operative-related training.   
Additionally, as seen from the findings on the 6th co-operative principle, “Co-
operation among co-operatives”, credit unions collaborate amongst them in the 
form of mergers.  This kind of co-operation could create constellations/networks 
(Prahalad and Ramaswamy, 2000; Vargo, 2009), and hence, improve credit unions’ 
offerings, rendering them more attractive to existing and potential members 
(Normann and Ramirez, 1993; Normann, 2001; Spohrer et al., 2007; Vargo, Maglio 
and Akaka, 2008).  Additionally, it is also advocated that credit unions could use 
the Co-operative Central Bank as a facilitator for the transfer of know-how, could 
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ask for the assistance of the co-operative College in the UK or any other co-
operative institution that may assist them in specific areas. 
Finally, in terms of the 7th co-operative principle, “Concern for the community”, it 
was indicated by the interviewees that every possible effort should be taken by 
credit unions to assist the local population, e.g., by keeping branches in remote 
areas open, even if this is only for a few days per month.  Additionally, the focus 
group participants argued that credit unions could organize various events, e.g., 
lottery, fun days aiming at collecting money for charity or could undertake 
community work in order to assist the surrounding communities e.g., cleaning a 
park or a beach. 
Overall, a key theme that is present throughout the literature review and the 
findings is that of trust.  As seen in Section 1.1, credit unions are exceptional in 
maintaining longer-term relationships of trust with their members (Bijman et al., 
2012a; 2012b; Borzaga and Galera, 2012; Ferri, 2012; Sabatini, Modena and Tortia, 
2014).  Additionally, in Section 4.4.3, there was a claim that the presence of co-
operatives in a market forces other organisations to behave in a more trustful way 
(Feinberg and Rahman, 2006; Hesse and Čihák, 2007).  Moreover, trust was 
identified as a key ingredient for the creation of co-operatives in the first place 
(Karafolas, 2005).  Additionally, it was noted that the advantages of co-operatives 
over other forms of organisations are valid only when members trust their co-
operative (Spear, 2000).  Trust also seems to be the pre-requisite for the proper 
functioning of the Board of Directors (Section 2.2.3) as they act as fiduciaries, i.e. 
they hold the assets of the organisation (Mswaka and Aluko, 2015), as well as its 
undistributed reserves (Section 2.3 -intergenerational endowment- (Birchall, 1997)) 
in trust of the next generations.  Based on the results of the present study, trust is 
considered by individual interviewees as an important ingredient for the proper 
functioning of the financial system (Section 5.2), especially during the period after 
the financial crisis of March 2013.  Particularly, credit union employees considered 
that members would not be willing to financially contribute to their credit unions 
because they lost their trust in the whole financial system.  Moreover, trust in the 
Board of Directors was mentioned by focus groups participants as one of the 
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reasons for their lack of attendance of their credit union’s General Meetings 
(Section 6.5.2).  On the other hand, some focus group participants claimed that 
their trust in their credit union had fallen due to its inter-dependence on all other 
credit unions, while other participants noted that their credit union could regain 
their trust in the future, especially if those that caused the financial crisis were 
punished (Section 6.5.4).  Moreover, the adverse opinion towards the mergers 
amongst credit unions (Section 6.5.6) was considered as being due to the lack of 
trust among the members of various credit unions (Gall and Schroeder, 2006).  
Based on the above, it could be said that trust is gained through the contact of 
members with their credit union and its Board of Directors and that it is fostered by 
co-operative-related training.  In the past, members used to trust their credit 
union but due to the financial crisis of March 2013, the deposit haircut, the 
decrease in salaries, the loss of jobs and the related fear and uncertainty that was 
created, members have (partly) lost their trust in the whole financial system and 
consequently in their credit unions.  What is more, the transfer of 99% of the credit 
union ownership to the state may have been the “the straw that broke the camel's 
back”.   
The financial tragedy in Cyprus, in March 2013, could have acted as a multiplier of 
the negative feelings expressed by those interviewed and focus group participants, 
but these problems must have existed well before March 2013, something that has 
been confirmed by the Independent Commission on the Future of the Cyprus 
Banking Sector (Central Bank of Cyprus, 2013).  Additionally, the creation of a 
holding company (where all members were transferred granting them only 1%) and 
the handling of the 99% of the shares in credit unions to the state, following the 
injection of €1,5billion to the Co-operative Central Bank, may have also increased 
the negative feelings and pessimism among the participants of the present study.  
However, based on the data collected, the author of the present study considers 
that in the past, credit unions were much closer to their founding principles and 
this is evident by the high number of older people that are members of credit 
unions.  Additionally, in the past credit unions must have been more active in 
educating members and, non-members alike, regarding their distinctive features.  
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This may be proven by the number of credit unions that were founded in those 
early years, in contrast to the lack of founding any new credit unions in more 
recent years.  It seems that credit unions must have played a significant role in the 
communities in which they were operating, as according to a particular focus group 
participant, “30- 40 years ago people in the villages only had their church and their 
credit union”.  However, this has changed as credit unions have become larger, 
have lost their roots in local communities and have stopped educating their 
stakeholders.  The lack of education of their Board of Directors, management, 
employees, members, governmental agencies and society in general, about the 
distinctive aspects of co-operatives, could have rendered credit unions just another 
financial services provider.  Furthermore, social cohesion has been lost and it was 
replaced by the many and heterogeneous interests of individuals.  This loss of 
cohesion has allowed individual members to become distant in relation to their 
credit union, believing that others will control it, and focusing on their own needs 
and demands.  Similarly, the credit union Board of Directors, as a result of the low 
pressure from membership, could concentrate in meeting the demands of those 
that were still involved in a specific credit union, thus, creating an “elite” group 
(Itkonen, 1996; Birchall, 1997; Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, 2004a; 2004b; FSA, 
2007) and downgrading the need to maintain an effective governance structure.  
Furthermore, lower pressure by membership and less control from the Board of 
Directors, doubled by an outdated governance structure, could have allowed “too 
much latitude to management” (Kelly, 2014, p.10), who found the opportunity to 
pursue their own interests and agendas (Shaw, 2007; Alexopoulos and Goglio, 2009; 
2011).  An additional consequence of the lack of co-operative-related education is 
the ageing of members, as fewer younger people become members in credit 
unions, creating concerns about the long term viability of credit unions.  However, 
now that the financial crisis had its toll on society, people are looking for ways to 
strengthen their voice and demand lower interest rates and fresh capital in order 
to create new businesses for them and their unemployed children.  Once again, 
money-lenders and merchants rule the game, reducing even more, the disposable 
income of people.  It could be concluded that the conditions today are not very 
different from those that existed a hundred years ago, rendering strong credit 
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unions that focus on their members’ needs, an urgent necessity.  The high number 
of university graduates and the advances in technology, making information readily 
available, will multiply the effort that credit unions will invest in providing co-
operative-related education to young people.  Additionally, the tough conditions 
following the financial crisis of March 2013 may have reminded people about the 
benefits of solidarity and cohesion thus making them more acceptable to the ideas 
that credit unions promote: co-operation with others for the common benefit.  
Thus, what is needed is the acknowledgement of the difficult situation (lack of 
young members, concerns about the financial viability of credit unions and fears of 
credit unions’ transformation into investor-owned banks) by those in control of 
credit unions and the aiming at a two-fold objective.  
The first objective is external, by investing in educating the society about the 
benefits that credit unions can offer to people, encouraging them to become 
members and participate in the their credit union.  By doing so, the stakeholders of 
credit unions will remember/learn about the credit unions’ distinctive features, 
which differentiate them from all other providers of financial services.  The 
ideology behind co-operatives should not be forgotten as this will remind members 
that a co-operative is a collectively-owned organisation that provides protection to 
its members’ (financial) investments (Borgen, 2004).  Thus, this collective 
ownership will have a higher, overall value than those that for-profit and investor-
owned organisations offer.  Credit unions could encourage the participation of 
members, discover their needs and how to best meet them by using all possible 
channels (face to face meetings, official/unofficial gatherings, blogs, emails, 
forums, Facebook, tweeter).  By doing so, the credit union will be assisting its 
members in their value creation exercises thus improving their well-being (Vargo, 
Maglio and Akaka, 2008, Vargo and Lusch, 2011).  The longer members become 
distant, the fewer opportunities the credit union has to engage with them in order 
to offer members value propositions that will be of interest to them (Prahalad and 
Ramaswamy, 2004).  In other words, credit unions cannot survive or succeed in the 
future unless they get their members involved (Vargo and Lusch, 2004).   
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The second objective is the implementation of the basic ideas of S-D Logic.  The 
author of the present study considers that S-D Logic has many things in common 
with co-operatives (Section 2.4 and 7.3.4) which credit unions can implement in 
order to come closer to their members, to form partnerships/constellations with 
them, to find out about their members’ needs and to set up financial products that 
serve the exact needs of each and every member.  Following, the discussion of 
each FP shows in more detail how the present study contributes to practice as well 
as the existing literature. 
Taking the first of the ten principles of S-D Logic from Table 2.1, titled 
“Fundamental Premises of S-D Logic and their explanation” in Section 2.4: “FP1 
Service is the fundamental basis of exchange, i.e. the application of operant 
resources (knowledge and skills), "service," is the basis for all exchange. Service is 
exchanged for service” (Vargo, 2009).  FP1’s emphasis on knowledge and skills 
seems very similar to the provisions of the 5th co-operative principle, “Education, 
training and information”, credit unions could carry out focus groups and host 
competitions for children, thus creating memorable positive experiences, for these 
kids with credit unions.  Additionally, credit unions could provide one-to-one 
counselling and/or mentoring to new employees as well as periodic and ad-hoc 
training, e.g., at the Co-operative College, where their input will be required in 
order to put the co-operative principles and values in practice.  What is more, 
credit unions could engage in the training of existing and potential members by 
creating focus groups or workshops designed in increasing their awareness of the 
co-operative principles and values and co-operative difference.   
Going to FP2: “Indirect exchange masks the fundamental basis of exchange, i.e. 
goods, money, and institutions mask the service-for-service nature of exchange” 
(Vargo, 2009).  This is, maybe, the reason for credit unions’ loss of sight of their 
members.  Even though at the beginning credit unions were indeed membership 
focused and provided tailor-made service (singular) to each of their members, 
during the years they have started drifting towards mass produced services (plural) 
that aimed more in achieving economies of scale rather than satisfy the needs of 
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individual members.  That is why, credit unions must return back to their basics 
and their focus on membership.   
With regards to FP3: “Goods are distribution mechanisms for service provision, i.e. 
goods (both durable and non-durable) derive their value through use - the service 
they provide” (Vargo, 2009).  This however is very similar to credit unions’ core 
understanding, i.e. the value is gained from interacting/doing business with the 
credit unions and not through the appreciation of members’ investment in it.  
Thus, the more a member interacts with his credit union, the more he gains.  This 
could mean that it is also in the members’ benefit to be in close co-operation with 
their credit unions.  Additionally, credit unions should treat financial products, 
e.g., current accounts, loan facilities, credit and debit cards, for what they are; 
that is, products through which credit unions provide service to their members.  
Hence, credit unions should make an effort to increase the quality of their service 
to members, for example, through the design of better products that better meet 
the needs of each of their members.  What credit unions should not do is to provide 
products for the sake of having a range of products, forgetting that these are 
merely the vehicles through which credit unions service their membership.  So, 
custom-made products are desirable as long as these assist credit unions in 
providing better service to their members. 
Moving on to FP4: “Operant resources are the fundamental source of competitive 
advantage, i.e. the comparative ability to cause desired change drives 
competition” (Vargo, 2009).  The most important operant resource for credit 
unions is their employees as they depend on them in serving membership, in 
identifying members’ needs and providing ideas, as well as in suggesting solutions 
for meeting these needs.  The better trained and the more skills and knowledge 
credit union employees have, the better the quality of the service they will provide 
to membership.  This is why the specific fundamental principle goes hand in hand 
with FP1’s emphasis on knowledge and skills and the 5th co-operative principle 
“Education, training and information” as discussed above. 
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As far as the FP5 is concerned: “All economies are service economies, i.e. service 
(singular) is only now becoming more apparent with increased specialization and 
outsourcing” (Vargo, 2009).  Credit unions have traditionally focused in retail 
banking, by servicing the individual members and their businesses something that 
still applies to most credit unions today.  Credit unions were almost never 
interested in serving big companies or multinationals, but were founded in order to 
serve their membership.  This means that credit unions have always specialised in 
retail banking, something that has provided them with deep tacit knowledge and 
knowhow in dealing with individuals (their membership).  It seems that if credit 
unions use their specialization in serving the needs of their membership and they 
fortify this with even better training and even better product development, then 
credit unions can become much more useful to their members as they will better 
meet their needs. 
In the case of FP6: “The customer is always a co-creator of value, i.e. implies that 
value creation is interactional” (Vargo, 2009).  This is also fundamental for credit 
unions, as they are created by their members to serve their needs and to enhance 
their socio-economic standing.  When credit unions are created, members are 
directly involved in its day-to-day running and hence their needs are perfectly 
matched.  Things start to differentiate once salaried management is introduced 
and members depend on their elected Board of Directors.  But even in these cases, 
members can stir their credit union by putting pressure and holding management 
accountable during the AGM.  However, when credit unions become geographically 
dispersed and their membership becomes diverse then solidarity is lost and 
members start to drift away from their credit union as they believe that others will 
control it or they feel that even if they engage in it, they will not be able to 
influence it.  Credit unions seem to have fallen in this trap, treating their members 
as exogenous and hence not encouraging members to engage in it, with members 
ceasing to be co-creators of value.  This however, creates pressure on credit unions 
to guess what their members need as they lost their contact with them something 
that causes them to become even more distant as they find other service providers 
that better meet their needs; hence removing credit unions from their value-
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creation constellations.  Credit unions must re-establish members as co-creators of 
value and this can only be achieved by identifying and using all possible ways to 
increase members’ engagement in it by, e.g., designing products and service 
targeting the youth and by building on the once popular primary and high school 
co-operative savings plan.   
Moreover with regards to FP7: “The enterprise cannot deliver value, but only offer 
value propositions, i.e. the firm can offer its applied resources and collaboratively 
(interactively) creates value following acceptance, but cannot create/deliver 
value alone” (Vargo, 2009).  This means that credit unions cannot create value on 
their own, but instead, value is created by its members when they accept the 
credit union’s propositions and use them to satisfy their needs.  To this extend it is 
vital that credit unions re-establish their focus on membership as though this 
interaction, credit unions will learn about their members’ needs and ways to meet 
them, making attractive propositions that members use in their value creation 
exercises.  This way, credit unions re-enter the value-creation constellations of 
their members and the latter render the credit unions’ service of value.  Overall, 
membership is the only judge of credit unions’ value propositions.  As long as, and 
to the extent that members incorporate the credit union’s propositions in their 
value-creation activities, credit unions are of value to members.  To increase their 
value, credit unions must provide tailor-made service that is member-centered.  
Again, this means that credit unions must re-establish membership as their core 
objective and through this to re-establish regular contact with it, learning how to 
best structure its service propositions so that members value them and hence, use 
them in their value-creation activities.  This is the only way credit unions can 
become of value to their members. 
Moving to FP8: “A service-centered view is inherently customer- oriented and 
relational, i.e. service is customer-determined and co-created; thus, it is 
inherently customer-oriented and relational” (Vargo, 2009).  This strengthens even 
more the need for credit unions to refocus on their members’ needs and to re-
establish them as co-creators of value.  What can be done by credit unions, in this 
case, is to re-establish contact with members on a regular basis, engage in them 
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and re-establish them as co-creators of value.  Ways to achieve this include the use 
of local branches as hubs for re-activating local members, local staff engaging with 
local members and making insightful suggestions for the solution of local problems.  
Additionally, credit unions could establish blogs or dedicated pages in the social 
media (e.g., facebook and twitter) in order to activate members, as well as find 
out and then resolve or at least act upon members’ requests/comments.  
Moreover, local management should encourage formal or informal discussions with 
members, e.g., employing an open-door policy, giving fast solutions on the local 
basis.  Additionally, top management could distribute questionnaires to employees 
and members enquiring about best ways to re-establish contact with membership, 
and based on the results to carry out focus groups with members in order to 
identify the best suggestions to be implemented.  Re-establishment of contact with 
members will create opportunities for the attraction of non-members as well, so 
that the membership base is strengthened. 
With regards to FP9: “All economic and social actors are resource integrators, i.e. 
implies that the context of value creation is networks of networks (resource-
integrators)” (Vargo, 2009).  Members have needs that must be met, so they are 
constantly on the lookout to identify the best service provider in their existing 
constellation/network or otherwise they will use their family, friends, colleagues, 
co-workers and even the vast amounts of readily accessible information on the 
internet to identify potential new service providers whose value propositions may 
appeal more to members.  This creates both a thread and an opportunity for credit 
unions as dissatisfied members will remove their credit union from their 
constellation of service providers whereas, satisfied members will take on more 
and more credit unions’ value propositions, referring credit unions to other service 
integrators.  On the other hand, credit unions know that, if their service 
propositions are tailor-made to their members’ needs, members will continue or 
return to their credit union, re-establishing it in their value-creation constellations.  
Based on this, credit unions have a clear-cut mandate: employ all possible ways in 
order to make their value propositions attractive to existing and potential members 
and then communicate these propositions to members. 
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Finally, in examination of FP10, it can be said that: “Value is always unique and 
phenomenological, i.e. value is idiosyncratic, experiential, contextual, and 
meaning-laden determined by the beneficiary” (Vargo, 2009).  This means that to 
re-establish rapport with their members credit unions must encourage them to 
evaluate their value propositions or to take part in forums, events especially 
organised for this purpose, where members are encouraged to interact with the 
credit union in order to create memorable experiences.  These could include credit 
unions, employing the best students for a period of time, during school breaks, thus 
rewarding the youngsters and, at the same time, the latter could provide input in 
designing and promoting products.  Additionally, by combining FP10 with the 7th 
Co-operative principle, “Concern for the community” credit unions could try to 
keep branches in remote areas open, even if this will be for a few days, around the 
end and start of each month.  What is more, credit unions could have their local 
staff get involved in the community happenings and day-to-day life.  This will 
increase the sense of belonging and the sense of trust and at the same time 
increase the number of instances where members can interact with their credit 
union and can use its value-propositions in their value-creation activities.  
Moreover, credit unions could organise open days or fairs during which existing 
members and employees could present the philosophy, the differentiating factor 
and the principles and values, explaining them and relating them to their day-to-
day work.  In this way, existing members will associate with credit unions and will 
create memorable experiences that will lead to a positive attitude towards credit 
unions’ offerings; eventually members will start using these value propositions and 
will re-establish credit unions in their value-creation constellations.  Finally, by 
creating memorable experiences to potential members and youngsters, credit 
unions could educate the next generations about the merits of co-operation and 
get potential members/customers engaged far before they become members.   
Further to the analysis above, it should be noted that one should be aware of the 
limitations of S-D Logic, e.g., having a definition of services that is too broad to be 
implemented in operations (O'Shaughnessy and O'Shaughnessy, 2009) and whose 
present status is too general (Theoharakis and Sajtos, 2007).  Finally, today only a 
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minority of organisations practice S-D Logic and not all of the S-D Logic components 
have been tested simultaneously by an empirical study (Winklhofer, Palmer and 
Brodie, 2007).   
 
7.5 Contribution 
As discussed in Section 3.5, the present study aims to add to the existing volume of 
knowledge and to inform practitioners and supervisory bodies with regards to the 
practical adherence of credit unions to their founding principles.  This was made 
possible through the collection of data from employees and members of credit 
unions as well as statistics from the ex-supervisory body (CSSDA) in answering the 
following two research questions (Section 5.10): 
1. What are the perceptions regarding the practical application of the co-
operative principles?  
2. What are the perceptions regarding the active democratic participation 
of members? 
 
7.5.1 Contribution to academic knowledge 
The findings of the present study could contribute to academic knowledge in 
relation to co-operatives and co-operative governance.  As it seems that the 
strongest element of the governance structure of co-operatives is the involvement 
of members in its control and its management, the results of the present study add 
to previous academic findings, i.e. that the governance structure of credit unions is 
not as effective as proclaimed.  This is because it is not the majority of members 
that are in close contact with their credit union (Spear, 2004b; Bakaikoa, Errasti 
and Begiristain, 2004; Chaves, Soler and Sajardo, 2008; Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 
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2009).  A number of possible reasons were given for the lack of members’ 
involvement, including feelings of inability to achieve anything, even if they get 
involved, dissatisfaction with credit union’s decisions (Wind and Rangaswamy, 
2001; Bhuyan, 2007; Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009; Edwards, 2013; Hakelius and 
Hansson, 2016) or even free riding, (Hakelius, 1996, cited in Bhuyan, 2007; 
Edwards, 2013).  Additionally, the larger the size of a co-operative and its 
membership and the higher its heterogeneity and its geographical disparity, the 
less active members become (Bataille-Chedotel and Huntzinger, 2004; Spear, 
Cornforth and Aiken, 2007; Nilsson and Svendsen, 2011).  However no matter the 
reason behind this lack of member involvement, the reality is that members are 
distant and this lack of participation renders the governance structure of co-
operatives vulnerable.  This is because co-operative governance assumes that 
members are active, thus, creating the need for changes or even for the shift to a 
different governance model (Section 2.2.2) that does not require such an active 
membership.  The weakened governance may allow a small group of members 
(“elite”) to take control or to allow management to behave in non-appropriate 
ways (e.g., misappropriating assets, or using resources for reasons other than 
increasing the wealth of members) (Itkonen, 1996; Papageorgiou, 2004; Spear, 
2004a; 2004b; FSA, 2007).  Based on the findings of the present study, which builds 
on existing literature, it might be argued that lack of member participation could 
lead to changes in the existing governance structure or even to a different 
governance model.  Alternatively, academics could consider and suggest new ways 
in encouraging members to engage with their credit union and hence, strengthen 
co-operative governance.  These changes may include non-members experts and/or 
professionals to be allowed as a minority on the Board of Directors, hence 
enhancing control over management.  Additionally, remote voting, use of live 
streaming technologies, blogs, chat rooms etc. could replace traditional barriers 
for member engagement allowing access to even more people.   
Apart from the lack of member engagement discussed above, co-operative 
governance could also be undermined by the “temporal” demutualization of credit 
unions, as was the case in Cyprus, where, the state became 99% shareholder in 
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them.  By doing so, the governance structure was overturned, eliminating any 
member-based controls and restricting controls to those imposed by the 
governmental officials that were commissioned for this purpose.  Moreover, the 
99% ownership by the state, may have negatively affected the governance 
structure, as the removal of the member based Board of Directors to state 
appointed ones, may have increased the asymmetry of information, favouring 
members that place their personal interest on top of everything else, for example, 
by managing to obtain loans that they cannot repay.  A similar effect may have 
been caused by the mergers of credit unions, as the increase in the geographical 
area, the closure of many branches and the rotation of employees, may have 
increased the asymmetry of information regarding the true financial ability of 
members, restricting member assessment to computerised algorithms and not the 
face-to-face and tacit knowledge accumulated by key employees.   
Based on the findings of the present study, the co-operative governance may have 
also been negatively affected by the change in the supervisory authority as, up to 
the change in supervision, the Central Bank of Cyprus, was not (heavily) involved in 
credit unions.  Moreover, the speed with which the mergers among credit unions 
took place in the last few years (since March 2013) may have had its toll on co-
operative governance as the remaining credit unions grew substantially, sometimes 
literally overnight and staff was moved or was offered a package to resign.  This 
may have caused the “temporal” ineffectiveness of the governance structure, 
creating black holes in relation to procedures and risk areas.  Co-operative 
governance could improve by credit unions taking advantage of the provisions of 
the 6th principle (“co-operation among co-operatives”), with more advanced ones 
assisting the less advanced ones by exchanging know-how, procedures and 
experiences. 
More analytically, with regards to the 1st principle, the results of the present 
research support the findings of researchers (Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005; 
ICA, 2012a), with regards to the fact that credit unions are indeed open and 
voluntary organisations.  However, at the same time, the present research 
indicates that this may not be the case from now on, mainly because of the 99% 
Page 233 of 297 
 
ownership of the credit unions by the state.  If these fears realise then, there will 
be problems with the democratic running of credit unions and their autonomy and 
independence, as the state or the potential buyer of credit unions may restrict 
membership, findings that are already highlighted by Novkovic (2006) and 
Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013).   
With respect to the 2nd principle, the present research’s findings have concentrated 
on three areas.  Concerning the AGMs, the results have shown that it is not the 
majority that participates in them, something that contradicts existing literature, 
(Jones, 2001; Fonteyne, 2007) but at the same time it coincides with the findings 
of certain academics that found evidence that it is not the majority that attends 
the AGMs (Spear, 2004b; Bakaikoa, Errasti and Begiristain, 2004; Chaves, Soler and 
Sajardo. 2008; Nilsson, Kihlen and Norell, 2009).  Reasons that were mentioned 
include lack of encouragement to participate, free riding, lack of trust in the Board 
of Directors, lack of volunteerism and lack of co-operative feelings in the younger 
generations.  The results of the present study regarding the percentage of 
members voting at the Board of Directors’ elections indicate that only 30% to 40% 
actually vote, while the statistics from CSSDA indicate that the average 
participation in the last three elections for twelve credit unions was just 7%, five of 
which had a participation average lower than 3%.  Additionally, members claimed 
that they voted only when their acquaintances asked/encouraged them to do so.  
With regards to the results of the present study concerning the number of 
candidates in comparison to the available positions, it was found that around two 
candidates exist for every available position (1,5 candidates based on CSSDA’s 
statistics).  Other findings include the fact that existing Board members seem to 
have a clear advantage over the other candidates as they have already spent time 
preparing for the elections and they seem to know “all the tricks of the trade”.  As 
to the possible reasons for lack of members’ participation, the present study’s 
findings support existing academic research, i.e. members feel that they are not 
able to influence the decisions of the credit union and that they are dissatisfied 
with specific decisions (Wind and Rangaswamy, 2001; Bhuyan, 2007; Nilsson, Kihlen 
and Norell, 2009; Edwards, 2013; Hakelius and Hansson, 2016).  A second reason for 
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members’ lack of involvement is the loss of local identity, a finding that confirms 
those of Birchall (1997), Nilsson and Svendsen, (2011).  Additional possible reasons 
include free riding that has also been identified by Hakelius (1996, cited in Bhuyan, 
2007), Edwards (2013) and the horizon problem as identified by Borgen (2004), 
Osterberg and Nilsson, (2009).  Other reasons for members’ lack of participation 
identified by the present study include lack of proper communication of credit 
unions with their members and lack of encouragement to participate, issues that 
were also identified by researchers such as Hakelius (1996, cited in Bhuyan, 2007); 
Birchall (1997); Prahalad and Ramaswamy (2000); Payne et al. (2009); Barraud-
Didier, Henninger and El Akremi (2012).  Finally, a possible reason identified by 
both credit union members and employees is the involvement of political parties in 
the running of credit unions, e.g., in selecting the candidates to run for the Board 
of Directors’ elections, which supports the findings of academics such as Korres 
(1999) and Stefancic (2011).   
As far as the 3rd principle is concerned, the present research seems to contradict 
the findings of researchers (Papageorgiou, 2004; ICA, 2012a; Oczkowski, 
Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013), who assume that when the need arises, 
members will provide financial assistance to their credit union.  What the present 
research brings to the academic discussion is that in times of uncertainty and fear, 
members may not be interested in the common good but instead they may try to 
safeguard their personal wealth and interests (self-preservation).  Additionally, 
members may be unwilling to support their credit union in case their control over it 
is uncertain or lifted. 
With regards to the 4th principle, the results indicate an opposition to the current 
literature, (CSSDA, 2005; Novkovic, 2006; Atherton et al., 2011; ICA, 2012a; 
Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer, 2013) which supports that co-operatives 
remain independent and autonomous even from the state.  What the present study 
adds to the academic discussion is that during good times credit unions must 
strengthen their capital, through reserves or issuance of shares to new members, as 
in times of uncertainty, potential lenders, including the state, may try to restrict 
the autonomy and independence of credit unions.  This may be true as members in 
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an attempt to safeguard their well-being, may be unwilling to contribute to the 
financial strengthening of their credit union (results on 3rd principle above).  
Additionally, uncertainty and the time pressure to carry out mergers may create 
negative connotations to members who may become suspicious of the true 
intentions behind these imposed mergers.  In these cases, communication and 
transparency may reduce these negative feelings. 
The results of the 5th principle indicate that in reality credit unions may not be 
investing as much in educating/training as inferred in the existing literature (Bickle 
and Wilkins, 2000; Papageorgiou, 2004, Birchall and Ketilson, 2009) which indicate 
that co-operatives train their Board of Directors, management, employees, present 
and future members and the general public about the differentiating features and 
the benefits of co-operatives.  On the other hand, the present study’s findings 
seem to be in line with those of researchers like Novkovic (2006) and Oczkowski, 
Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013).  What the present research adds to the 
existing literature is that co-operative-related training may not be as common as 
expected, and this may lead to the reduction of members’ participation and the 
loss of members’ willingness to support their credit union.  The results may also 
indicate that co-operative-related training should be a matter of organised, 
structured and systematic effort, especially during times of crises.  This is because, 
credit unions and their distinctive way of operating may enable those who are 
unemployed to set up their own co-operative organisations and also empower those 
who are already running their own business to co-operate with others to enhance 
their bargaining power and to reduce the power of middle-men.  The negative 
views about the future revealed in the present study, may again be the effect of 
lack of co-operative-related training as people cannot see any feasible alternative 
to the current situation, an alternative that co-operatives can provide and have 
provided for the last one hundred years. 
With regards to the findings related to the 6th principle, these seem to be in line 
with the literature that supports that co-operatives co-operate amongst them 
(Birchall, 1997; Papageorgiou, 2004; CSSDA, 2005; Birchall and Ketilson, 2009), 
with the only exception being the findings of Novkovic (2006) who found evidence 
Page 236 of 297 
 
that the co-operation among co-operatives was only superficial.  Additionally, it 
has been found that members consider their personal interest as a priority higher 
than the common good.  This is because the results of the present study showed 
that members did not agree with the imposed merger mainly because they would 
lose their influence on management and they would not be in charge during the 
merger process, i.e. looking after their personal interests.  These results may be 
further strengthened by the responses from the personal interviews with employees 
of credit unions who considered that the mergers would enhance the financial 
viability of their credit unions and would increase their professionalization.  This 
indicates that the situation prior to the mergers may not have been ideal and that 
members may not have taken the best decisions for their credit union.   
Finally, with regards to the 7th principle, the results indicate that credit unions 
take care of their surrounding communities, something that is in line with what 
Novkovic (2006) and Oczkowski, Krivokapic-Skoko and Plummer (2013) say.  What is 
new based on the current study is that, in adverse times, credit unions may restrict 
or stop any amounts directed to the wider community because of lack of resources 
and/or imposed restrictions on the amount to be paid for this purpose.  
Interviewees argued that even under these conditions, credit unions can assist their 
surrounding communities by offering financial services in remote areas even for a 
few days per month, by organising fund raising activities and by offering social 
work.  What is also new is that, when asked about the criteria to decide on which 
branches to close down, employees mainly considered the financial indicators, 
whilst members gave priority to the social ones.  This difference in opinions may be 
due to the uncertainty and fear that employees felt regarding the future 
continuation of their employment and the viability of the credit unions as their 
employers. 
Overall, the findings of the present study are aligned with those of previous 
research, indicating that credit unions do not follow their founding principles.  
Additionally, they support previous research in that it is the minority of members 
that participate in controlling their credit union.  In particular, it is highlighted 
that credit unions must recognise the current situation and start looking for 
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solutions (Kelly, 2014) and that the adherence to co-operative principles is closely 
related to members’ involvement with their credit unions and as a result to the 
effectiveness of their governance structure.  Hence, credit unions may need to 
take a step back, return to basics and re-establish members’ well-being as their 
top priority.  One hundred years of strengthening the social fabric have rendered 
credit unions as very important, not in the sense of “too big to fail”, but rather as 
necessary for the individual member and society as a whole (Spear, 2000; Julia- 
Igual and Melia, 2006; Jones, 2012).   
To the author’s best knowledge, the present study is the first to collect data on co-
operative principles almost immediately (6 months for personal interviews –
September 2013- and 12 months for focus groups –March 2014-) after a major crisis.  
In this case, the co-operative principles were examined after the international 
financial crisis of 2008 and the local financial crisis of March 2013.  It was expected 
that in times of crises, the co-operative principles will be under scrutiny and 
pressure but the findings of the present study highlight that in times of crisis, the 
co-operative principles are put aside, and they do not represent a priority for 
credit unions or even for members.  This situation seems to be a logical result of 
the prior to the crisis situation, where credit unions were not practicing all of their 
principles.  For example, prior to the crisis, credit unions seemed to follow the 1st 
principle (voluntary and open membership), the 3rd principle “member economic 
participation”, the 4th principle “autonomy and independence”, 6th principle “co-
operation among co-operatives” and the 7th “concern for the community” whereas, 
they neglected the 2nd and 5th principles, “democratic member control” and 
“education, training and information”, respectively.   
7.5.2 Contribution to Practice and Policy 
In addition to the contribution to academic knowledge, the results of the present 
study could also be used by practitioners in Cyprus, (e.g., the Pancyprian Co-
operative Federation Ltd, the Co-operative Central Bank Ltd), the practitioners in 
the UK (e.g., through the Association of British Credit Unions Ltd 
http://www.abcul.org/home) and in Europe (e.g., through the European 
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Association of Co-operative Banks (http://www.eacb.coop/en/eacb.html).  
Additionally, the findings could assist in shaping future co-operative-related 
training courses, for example, by the Co-operative College in the UK 
(http://www.co-op.ac.uk/).  The results of the present study could also provide 
information for the current situation and hence become the starting point for any 
future change in the legislation or the guidance/rules of the supervisory body (the 
Central Bank of Cyprus).  Finally, the results could be of interest for the 
supervisory authority of non-financial co-operatives (CSSDA), as the adherence to 
the founding principles could represent an issue that also applies to non-financial 
co-operatives.   
Moreover, the results could be disseminated to the Cypriot co-operative parties 
above through a written summary in Greek, sent to their offices in the form of a 
report, followed by a presentation, allowing the opportunity for a round table 
discussion.  For example, as CSSDA is an autonomous department of the Cypriot 
government, it could use the findings in order to make changes to the current co-
operative law, in relation to the involvement of political parties, the compulsory 
increase of capital reserves and the offering of mandatory co-operative-related 
training to employees and management.  For the Association of British Credit 
Unions, the Co-operative College and the European Association of Co-operative 
Banks, it may be more appropriate to inform them about the results through a 
formal letter giving them the opportunity for a skype presentation or even for a 
face-to-face meeting. 
In general, the most crucial result that has been found is the importance of the co-
operative-related training of the Board of Directors, management, employees, 
existing and potential members, the governmental officials and the general public, 
which should be closely taken into consideration.  This is because without training 
people forget, the distinctive features of credit unions and act as if they are just 
part of any for-profit-business.  As discussed in Section 6.2.7, 6.5.5, the lack of co-
operative-related training allows management to depart from the primary 
objective which is to increase the wealth of members.  This creates and feeds free 
riding and apathy on the part of members, causing the reduction of the level of co-
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operative governance and allows even more space for management to pursue 
objectives other than the one they should.  Additionally, lack of training to existing 
members could restrict the volume of business they could do with their credit 
union, giving rise to problems such as “horizon problem”.  At the same time 
potential members are not made aware of the benefits of credit unions, hence 
depriving co-operatives from new and especially younger members, an issue that 
can eventually lead to fears about the long-term survival of credit unions.  In 
addition to this, the lack of co-operative related training may have an impact on 
the future of credit unions, especially with respect to decisions taken related to 
credit unions’ autonomy and independence (as already happened with the decision 
for a loan of €1,5billion in exchange for 99% of ownership in credit unions).  It is 
author’s opinion that if the governmental officials were aware of the co-operative 
principles and the distinctive features of credit unions, a different solution could 
have been found that would not have restricted the autonomy and the 
independence of credit unions. 
A second important finding for practitioners and supervisory bodies is the low 
participation of members of credit unions in AGMs, standing for election and in the 
elections for the Board of Directors (Sections 6.2.4, 6.4, 6.5.2).  The low 
participation of members could inevitably lead to further weakening of co-
operative governance allowing further opportunities to management to pursue 
objectives other than to increase the well-being of members.  The present study 
has identified that the loss of credit unions’ autonomy and independence leads to 
further decrease of members’ participation as they feel that no matter whether 
they participate or not, they cannot influence decision making.  In addition, the 
low member participation seems to go hand in hand with the findings regarding the 
seemingly inappropriate ways that credit unions communicate with their members 
(letter/leaflets/announcements) and the negative feelings of members about the 
way they get invited in AGMs (Section 6.5.2, 6.5.5).  This finding is also related to 
the lack of co-operative-related training and hence, practitioners and supervisory 
bodies should identify a number of alternative ways so as to increase the 
engagement of members, perhaps, through emails, blogs, twitter, chat rooms, etc.  
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Moreover, it was suggested that time should be devoted for casual/social meetings 
of members with the management and the employees of the credit union, for 
example, over a cup of coffee or during an open day.  However, it could be the 
case that despite its genuine effort, the Board of Directors may only achieve a 
limited increase in members’ involvement.  As seen in Section 7.3.4, this could be 
because of the changes in the contemporary society and the dominance of more 
self-centred and passive citizens. 
What is more, it has been highlighted that credit unions should gradually and 
persistently increase their capitalization.  As was shown during the financial crisis 
of 2008 and as of March 2013 (in the case of Cyprus) credit unions must build up 
reserves during “good” times in order to be on the safe side when the “not so 
good” times arrive, something which is in line with the “Spanish Dynamic 
Provisioning Scheme” (Brunnermeier et al., 2009; Saurina, 2009).  As, the existing 
literature has shown that credit unions are both slow and inexperienced in raising 
external finance (Section 4.4.3) and the present study has shown that during 
turbulent times, members are not willing to contribute to the financial 
strengthening of their credit unions (Sections 6.2.5 and 6.5.3) due to self-
preservation efforts, it is suggested that credit unions should gradually build up the 
necessary reserves through increase of their yearly surplus (income minus 
expenses).  
Furthermore, practitioners and supervisory bodies could be informed by the finding 
that the credit union employees felt that the professionalism and organisational 
structure of their credit union needed to be enhanced, expressing their opinion 
that this could be achieved through mergers (Section 6.2.8).  The interviewed 
credit union employees believed so even though the mergers could cause the 
creation of surplus personnel and possibly the dismissal of some of them and 
possibly their own lay off. 
Another finding that could assist practitioners and supervisory bodies is that 
political parties seem to be involved, at least, in the selection of candidates to 
stand for the Board of Directors’ elections.  As seen in Section 6.2.4 and 6.5.2, the 
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political parties agreed between them the candidates.  This however is worsened 
by the fact that after the announcement of these candidates, nobody else dared to 
stand as an independent candidate as they feared of being humiliated, if they did 
not get elected (Section 6.2.4).  What is more the focus groups participants 
highlighted the fact that when the political parties were involved in the elections 
for the Board of Directors, the number of people casting their votes was much 
higher than normally and that the political parties were even involved in the hiring 
of new employees (Section 6.5.4).  These findings are in agreement with those of 
the Central Bank of Cyprus (Section 4.2), indicating the possible magnitude of the 
problem.  Thus, supervisory bodies and policy makers should take action in order to 
reduce/eliminate the involvement of political parties in credit unions, facilitating 
their democratic running and their autonomy and independence.  Apart from the 
direct positive effects, these actions may also assist in the increase of members’ 
involvement with their credit union. 
What could also potentially inform practitioners and possibly supervisory bodies is 
that credit unions should provide for the surrounding communities, not only by 
continuing to do what they did so far (Section 7.2.6), e.g., offering scholarships, 
making donations, providing athletics, theatre plays and dancing class, but also by 
organising fund raising events and by offering social work.  Additionally, credit 
unions could continue providing services to remote areas by, for example, opening 
branches even for a few days around the end and beginning of each month and/or 
using branches on wheels (Section 6.2.9). 
Finally, the present study contributes to practice and to the existing literature in 
an  attempt not only to show the commonalities of co-operatives and Service-
Dominant Logic (S-D Logic) (see Section 2.4) but also to suggest ways that credit 
unions can benefit from the implementation of S-D Logic in their daily activities 
(see Section 7.4 above).   
Overall, the results of the present study could also be used by practitioners, 
supervisory bodies and policy makers as a warning bell about the future of the co-
operative movement.  If no action is taken, then credit unions will either lose their 
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membership or will be transformed into investor-owned banks following their 
demutualization (as happened in the UK following the Building Societies Act of 1986 
and, in Sweden, in 1990) or will be sold to an investor-owned bank that will 
amalgamate the credit unions’ operations with its own.  However, if their vision is 
to continue to use credit unions as a way to increase social cohesion, as a safety 
net and as an effective way to promote financial inclusion, then changes must take 
place.  These changes should ensure member democratic control, close supervision 
of management and an effective governance structure.  Using credit unions to 
increase social cohesion is far more complicated and time-consuming than 
permitting the transformation of credit unions into investor-owned banks, but the 
former will ensure the long-term prosperity of members and the society.  The 
option to be selected is a matter of strategic choice and vision. 
 
7.6 Limitations and further research 
Although close examination of various methodological issues have been considered, 
the present research has some limitations which could affect its findings.  Firstly, it 
should be noted that the present study took place on the island of Cyprus, which 
has both similarities and differences with other countries.  Therefore, the extent 
to which the findings are applicable in other settings is unclear.  To this effect, it 
would be interesting if similar research was undertaken in other geographical areas 
to assess the extent to which the results are similar in these areas as well. 
A further limitation is that the employees that took part in the interviews belonged 
to a small number of credit unions, whereas, the results of the focus groups were 
based on members from a specific credit union, rendering the results incapable of 
being generalizable.  As any other qualitative research, the intent was to 
understand the perceptions of employees and members regarding these credit 
unions, in more detail, rather than have results that are generalizable to other 
credit unions.  However, by studying the results of the current research, an 
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informed user could make “logical generalizations” and compare with comparable 
credit unions (Popay, Rogers and Williams, 1998, p.348). 
Another limitation is the fact that both the individual interviews (carried out in 
September 2013) and the focus groups interviews (carried out in March 2014) took 
place six months and one year, respectively, after the financial crisis in Cyprus 
(March 2013) and hence the results may have been influenced by the uncertainty, 
the lack of trust and frustration expressed by the participants of this study.  
Additionally, the results could have been affected by the fact that the Cypriot 
state obtained a 99% ownership in credit unions, something that may have caused 
additional pessimism among the members and employees that participated in the 
present research.  The results could have been different if the research was 
undertaken prior to these two events or a few years afterwards.  Therefore, it 
would be interesting if, in the future, a new research is carried out to assess 
whether employees’ and members’ perceptions change with regards to these two 
issues. 
A fourth limitation was the fact that the researcher of the present study used to be 
an “insider” and hence his experiences and knowledge of the reality regarding the 
above two research questions may have acted as “selective” perception.  To 
mitigate this risk the results of each of the three methods were kept separately 
and the comments of the researcher were clearly stated as such.  Also, the 
collection of data through three different methods with findings that support each-
others’ may ease these fears.  Finally, it should be noted that the affiliation of the 
researcher with the employees and members interviewed is not any different from 
any other qualitative research that uses a convenience sample (Burgess, 1984; 
Bryman, 2001). 
In an attempt to identify the areas where credit unions could potentially improve, 
and strengthen their member based objectives, the present study has briefly 
touched on the ideas of Service-Dominant Logic (S-D Logic).  It is the opinion of the 
present study’s author that credit unions could benefit from the ideas of S-D Logic 
(e.g., member/customer focused operations, importance of training, importance of 
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co-operation among credit unions) and hence it is suggested that future research 
concentrates more carefully on the similarities of the ideas behind credit unions 
and S-D Logic, possibly leading to the identification of ways the latter could assist 
credit unions remain focused on their members and on the increase of their well-
being.  In line with this, and building on recent conference papers, i.e. ICA 
conferences in Nicosia, Cyprus, in 2013 and, in Pula, Croatia, in 2014 and; EURICSE 
conference in Trento, Italy, in 2014, and the two publications to date (Review of 
International Co-operation, edited by Sonja Novkovic, International Co-operative 
Alliance, published in 2013, and a book chapter in “Credit Cooperative Institutions 
in European Countries”, edited by Simeon Karafolas, Springer, published in 2016), 
the author of the present study plans (apart from the results of the present study) 
to publish also a paper on the similarities of credit unions and S-D Logic.  
In conclusion, the results of the present study concur with the findings of those 
researchers who support that the governance structure is not as effective as 
predicted by the literature.  The suggestion thus, is for further research to be 
carried out, and perhaps to a greater extent (in terms of time and geographical 
location), in order to allow comparability of results and in an attempt to inform 
regulators, supervisory bodies, policy makers and practitioners, who could use 
these to formulate regulations and policies for the best operation of credit unions. 
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1: Interview questions: 
 
1st research question: “What are the perceptions regarding the practical application of 
the co-operative principles?”  
 
Question 1 from 36: 
Can you recall some of the seven co-operative principles?  If you do not remember then 
you can choose one from the co-operative Principles that are presented on this card. 
 
 
Question 2 from 36: 
Which co-operative principles presented on this card do you believe are the most 
important ones and why? 
 
 
Question 3 from 36: 
How do the products/services (e.g., current accounts, credit cards, letters of guarantee, 
etc.) that co-operatives offer assist the co-op members to improve their financial position? 
 
 
Question 4 from 36: 
How have products and services changed or could change to assist co-operative members 
to accommodate the new reality that the crisis has enforced? 
 
 
Question 5 from 36: 
Do you consider that the behaviour of the co-operators have changed as a result of the 
financial crisis?  If there was a change is it for the better? 
 
 
Question 6 from 36: 
How can the compliance of credit unions to the co-op Principles be evidenced in practice, 
e.g., by reference to internal/external documents? 
 
 
Question 7 from 36: 
Are you aware of any incident where someone was forced to become a member of a co-
operative? 
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Question 8 from 36: 
Are you aware of any incident where someone was forced to leave his credit union?  How is 
this decision justified? 
 
 
Question 9 from 36: 
If the need arises the co-operatives can ask their members to provide additional capital.  
How do you think that your members will react to the call to buy shares class B’ (new 
legislation 17 May 2013 as per Troika’s instructions)? 
 
 
Question 10 from 36: 
Why do you think that your members will react in this way to the call to buy shares class 
B’? 
 
 
Question 11 from 36: 
On 17 May 2013 the Cyprus Parliament voted the amendment to the law governing co-
operatives enabling co-ops to issue shares class B’ to strengthen their financial position.  
How would you react if you found out that the shares class B’ would be offered also to non-
members/investors? 
 
 
Question 12 from 36: 
How would you react if you found out that: (i) “Offering shares class B’ to non-members 
may create pressure from non-members on co-ops to become more like banks i.e. to 
pursue profits and neglect the social aspect of co-operatives? 
 
 
Question 13 from 36: 
How would you react to the following phrase: “Offering shares class B’ to non-members 
may even lead to the demutualization of credit unions as happened in UK (the U.K.’s 
Building Societies Act of 1986 prompted the largest demutualization process in Europe)? 
 
Question 14 from 36: 
According to the decision, the credit unions will be capitalized by an injection of €1.5 
billion from the Cyprus government in exchange for a 99% shareholding in co-operatives.  
Do you believe that the transfer of the 99% of co-op’s shares to the government with a 10% 
return per year is a better solution than the government granting a loan to co-ops with 10% 
interest rate? 
 
 
Question 15 from 36: 
What do you believe will be the future of the co-operative movement in Cyprus? 
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Question 16 from 36: 
In your opinion, what are the reasons for the high percentage of non-performing loans 
(with an average of 43%)? 
 
 
Question 17 from 36: 
In what ways do you think that the credit unions could gain, to an even greater extend, the 
peoples’ trust having in mind the deposits’ “haircut” and the improper governance of 
investor-owned banks? 
 
 
Question 18 from 36: 
From the perspective of an employee of a credit union, in what ways do you think that the 
co-operative principles shape your working relationships and/or the way you perform your 
duties (e.g., in relation to how you deal with your clients’/members’ needs/demands, 
humanistic Vs. commercial attitude, speed of service, effort to meet clients’/members’ 
needs etc.)? 
 
 
Question 19 from 36: 
What do credit unions offer to their clients that investor-owned banks do not do? 
 
 
Question 20 from 36: 
How often do you, as an employee of a co-operative, have, any kind of, training about the 
co-operative principles or co-operatives in general? 
 
 
Question 21 from 36: 
Do you think that such training (about the co-operative principles or co-operatives in 
general) was/would be useful? 
 
 
Question 22 from 36: 
How often does your credit union organize training programmes/seminars in relation to the 
co-operatives for its members or potential members? 
 
 
 
 
2nd research question: “What are the perceptions regarding the active democratic 
participation of members?” 
 
Question 23 from 36: 
What measures has your credit union taken in order to inform and/or attract the younger 
generations to become its members? 
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Question 24 from 36: 
During the negotiations with Troika, so far, which co-op bodies (e.g., co-op Central Bank or 
co-op Confederation) are responsible to inform and guide the Cyprus government regarding 
co-operatives? 
 
 
Question 25 from 36: 
What is your opinion regarding the proposed mergers demanded by Troika possibly reducing 
the number of credit unions from 100 to 18?  
 
 
Question 26 from 36: 
Given the present financial crisis and on the basis of the co-operative principles, in what 
practical ways could the co-operatives support their members (on top of the 
products/services that co-operatives offer already or could offer- question 3 from 36 
above)? 
 
 
Question 27 from 36: 
As a result of the mergers, it is estimated that the credit unions’ branches will be reduced 
from 410 to 250.  In your opinion, what should be the criteria (economic and social) on 
which the decision for the closure of branches should be taken?  
 
 
Question 28 from 36: 
What could be the conditions/reasons under which a member could not engage with his co-
operative, i.e. to lose his interest in his co-operative? 
 
 
Question 29 from 36: 
What forms of communication does your credit union use to reach its members, in order to 
increase transparency and the dialogue with them? 
 
 
Question 30 from 36: 
If you could change the existing communication methods that your co-operative uses which 
ones would you add/concentrate on so that your co-operative engages in active 
communication with its members? 
 
 
Question 31 from 36: 
What measures (e.g., monetary and non-monetary incentives) could a credit union take in 
order to encourage its members to engage even more with their credit union? 
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Question 32 from 36: 
What was the percentage of members voting at the previous three Board of Directors’ 
elections (i.e. for each of the previous three elections: number of members voting divided 
by total number of members)?  
 
 
Question 33 from 36: 
What was the proportion of the number of candidates to the number of available positions 
on the Board of Directors (e.g., 3 candidates for each position) for each of the last three 
elections?  
 
 
Question 34 from 36: 
What percentage of members attended each of the last three Annual General Meetings 
(i.e. members attending the AGM divided by total number of members)?  
 
 
Question 35 from 36: 
What kind of decisions are taken at the AGM as opposed to those taken by management? 
 
 
Question 36 from 36: 
What are the criteria for assessing which decisions will be discussed and taken at AGM? 
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Appendix 2: Summary of the initial findings for interviewees’ validation2: 
 
Following the financial break down of Cyprus, in March 2013, research was undertaken in 
September of the same year through structured individual interviews with thirty credit 
union employees as to their perceptions regarding the practical application of the co-
operative principles by credit unions in Cyprus and regarding the active participation of 
members in their credit unions. 
 
Based on the preliminary results of the research regarding the employees’ perceptions of 
the practical application of the co-operative principles by credit unions in Cyprus and 
bearing in mind that the interviews took place in September 2013, i.e. just five months 
after the deposit haircut, the restrictions on cash withdrawals and the high insecurity that 
people felt, we can say that: 
 
- 1st co-operative principle “Voluntary and open membership”: credit unions follow the 
principle as none of the respondents claimed that someone was forced to become member 
or to lose his membership (apart from very rare cases where a court convicts a member). 
 
- 2nd co-operative principle “Democratic member control”: the data has shown  that this 
co-operative principle is not followed in practice by credit unions in Cyprus since: (a) the 
majority of members do not participate in the elections for the Board of Directors; (b) 
there is not a lot of interest in being elected in the Board of Directors as the vast majority 
of respondents claimed that there were two or fewer candidates for each available 
position and; (c) almost all respondents considered that the percentage of members 
attending the General Meetings was between zero and less than 25%.  As to the type of 
decisions taken during the Annual General Meetings (AGM), the most popular decisions 
related to the approval of financial statements, the approval of mergers and the changes 
in the Articles.  Finally, when asked about the criteria for assessing which decisions will be 
discussed and taken at AGM, the respondents referred to the law/the Articles of 
Incorporation/the decisions taken by the Commissioner of CSSDA, to members’ suggestions 
(two of which doubted that members put any suggestions forward) and to the Board of 
Directors and the management. 
 
- 3rd co-operative principle “Member economic participation”: credit unions seem to have 
followed this principle, but now due to the financial crisis it is uncertain whether they will 
continue to follow it as members are not seen as willing to contribute to the financial 
strengthening of their co-ops. 
 
- 4th co-operative principle “Autonomy and independence”: credit unions seem to have 
followed this principle but again it is uncertain whether they will continue to follow it as 
respondents raised concerns regarding (a) the independence of credit unions following the 
transfer of 99% of their shares to the Cyprus state for €1,5 billion, for five years; (b) the 
possible loss of credit unions’ independence in case they issue and sell class B’ shares 
(which will not carry voting rights) to non-members enabling members to pressure credit 
unions to pursue profits and even to demutualize; (c) most respondents were not optimistic 
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about the future of credit unions fearing their shrinkage and their transformation into 
investor-owned banks or even their merging into a single credit union/co-op bank (with 
some respondents considering that what is happening today constitutes a fresh start for 
credit unions in Cyprus); (d) the possible loss of credit unions’ independence was raised.  
Members do not seem to submit their personal short-term benefits for the long-term 
benefit of all the members as it seems that they have obtained loans which they cannot 
repay.  On the other hand, the vast majority of respondents considered that the co-
operative principles do shape the employees’ way of operating, but some respondents 
considered that there are exceptions.  When asked about ways the credit union can regain 
people’s trust, the most popular answer was to build on the humanistic character of credit 
unions.   
 
- 5th co-operative principle “Education, training and information”: according to the data, it 
seems that credit unions do not follow this principle.  Respondents claimed that their 
credit union does not take any measures to attract younger generations and they doubted 
that the Cyprus government listened to what the co-operative bodies were trying to say.  
In addition, credit unions do not conform to this principle as they do not organize 
training/seminars for their employees or for their existing and potential members (on co-
operative principles and other co-operative-related areas).  Despite that respondents 
argued that their credit unions inform and attract new generations and that the co-
operative bodies guided the Cyprus government on co-operative-related issues, the old age 
of most of members, the situation during the financial crisis of March 2013 and the results, 
i.e. the transfer of the ownership in credit unions to the state, indicate that these are not 
effective. 
 
- 6th co-operative principle “co-operation among co-ops”: it seems that credit unions 
follow this principle as the vast majority of the respondents considered that the mergers 
(reducing the number of credit unions from 100 to 18) will be for the best and only the 
minority considered that it will be for the worse. 
 
- 7th co-operative principle “Concern for the community”: the data indicates that credit 
unions used to follow this principle, but due to the financial crisis it is uncertain whether 
they will continue to follow it as respondents considered that the financial criteria are 
more important than the social criteria, in deciding which branches to close.  This may 
indicate the willingness of credit union employees to assist their members, but, at the 
same time, realize that, due to the financial crisis and Troika, things will need to change.  
This is the case, even though credit unions are willing to adjust their demands to the 
financial abilities of their members.  
 
According to the preliminary findings, the most popular reasons that could cause the lack 
of participation of a member in his/her credit union are: lack of interest and personal 
benefit of members, members’ dissatisfaction with the decisions taken by a credit union, 
fear that members cannot influence a credit union’s decisions, the loss of local identity of 
credit unions (mainly because of the mergers) and the free riding of members. 
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With regards to the communication methods that credit unions currently use, the most 
popular methods were: letters/advertisements/announcements, personal contact, 
suggestion boxes and web sites, telephone calls, sms and General Meetings.  However, five 
respondents argued that their credit unions do not communicate with their members.  As 
to the better communication methods that credit unions should concentrate on the most 
popular methods were: personal contact and dialogue, further use of telephones and sms, 
social events, information events, enhancement of the web site and internet banking, 
advertisements, letters and Mass Media.   
 
Concerning the question of offering financial or non-financial incentives to activate 
members, sixteen members suggested financial incentives, while fourteen participants 
suggested non-financial incentives.” 
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Appendix 3: Focus Group questions: 
 
Question 1 from 24: 
In what way (if any) credit union employees perform their duties differently from the 
investor-owned banks’ employees?  Are credit union employees any different from 
investor-owned banks’ employees? 
 
 
Question 2 from 24: 
What are the similarities and differences between credit unions and investor-owned banks? 
 
 
Question 3 from 24: 
Do you believe that the social character of the credit unions has changed? If yes, in what 
ways and why? 
 
 
Question 4 from 24: 
What are the reasons for the changes that credit unions are going through today? (NOTE to 
researcher: what is described by the interview results is due to the culture that was 
created during all these years but now this culture is shaking the foundations of the co-
operative movement.)  
 
 
Question 5 from 24: 
Has the economic crisis affected the behaviour of members and/or the credit unions?  If 
yes, in what ways and why?  
(NOTE to researcher: The fear and the uncertainty that is evident in the interview results 
is due to the economic climate and the financial crisis of the last year.  Also, the results 
indicate that most participants were not optimistic about the future of co-operatives in 
Cyprus is not in line with the finding that the majority of participants were in favour of the 
mergers between the credit unions.  The researcher explained it as a sigh of employees’ 
uncertainty, hoping that the mergers will strengthen their credit unions and thus secure 
their jobs.)  
 
 
Question 6 from 24: 
Do you trust your credit union and how this has changed as a result of the financial crisis? 
(NOTE to researcher what can be done in order to regain the trust of their members?)  
 
Question 7 from 24: 
The government will give €1,5 billion to co-ops in exchange for 99% of their shares for five 
years. 
(a) In what way (if any) this has impacted on the ability of members to decide for and 
control their co-op? 
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Question 8 from 24: 
(b) In what way (if any) this has influenced the application of the co-operative Principles? 
  
 
 
Question 9 from 24: 
(c) Do you believe that this had any impact on the way credit union employees perform 
their duties? (NOTE to researcher the results of the interviews highlight the employees' 
fear that the selling of co-op shares to the state is restricting their independence.   
 
 
Question 10 from 24: 
Do you believe that your credit union should/should not take measures to inform and/or 
attract the younger generations to become its members and why? 
 
 
Question 11 from 24: 
How often does your credit union organize training/seminars on co-op related issues for its 
members?  In what way (if any) members can benefit from such seminars?  
 
 
Question 12 from 24: 
What is your opinion regarding the mergers that are being carried out since the last year? 
 
 
Question 13 from 24: 
Given the present financial crisis and on the basis of the co-operative principles, in what 
practical ways could the credit unions support their members? 
 
 
Question 14 from 24: 
What should be the criteria for deciding which branches should be closed? (NOTE to 
researcher: economic and social)  
 
 
Question 15 from 24: 
Do members attend the General Meetings? What are the reasons for this?  
 
 
Question 16 from 24: 
Kirton and Healy (2013) argue that Gordon et al.’s (1980) definition of union commitment: 
a willingness to continue being a member of the union, a willingness to participate in the 
union and a confidence in and acceptance of the union’s goals.  Are members active with 
regards to their credit union?  What are the reasons for this? 
 
 
Page 291 of 297 
 
 
Question 17 from 24: 
What kind of incentives credit unions should use in order to activate their members?  What 
are the reasons for this? (NOTE to researcher: financial Vs. non-financial) 
 
 
Question 18 from 24: 
What are the methods, credit unions currently use in order to communicate with their 
members? Are they effective and why/why not?  
 
 
Question 19 from 24: 
What communication methods should the credit unions employ in order to communicate 
effectively with their members and why?  
 
 
Question 20 from 24: 
What percentage of members participates in Board of Directors’ elections? What are the 
reasons for this?  
 
 
Question 21 from 24: 
What is the number of candidates in relation to the available positions for the Board of 
Directors; elections (e.g., two candidates for each position)? What are the reasons for this?
  
 
 
Question 22 from 24: 
What could be the reasons for the high percentages of non-performing loans? 
 
 
Question 23 from 24: 
What could the members do in order to ensure that credit unions remain focused in 
meeting the demands of their members? 
(NOTE to researcher: it appears that there are factors that they see within their control, 
and out with their control. May be this could be put into a question too?)  
 
 
Question 24 from 24: 
What do you believe will be the future of the co-operative movement in Cyprus? 
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Appendix 4: Summary of structured interviews and focus groups’ results: 
 
Co-operative principle Interviews’ results Focus Groups’ results CSSDA data 
    
1st: “Voluntary and open 
membership” 
Was followed.  Now uncertain if will 
be followed. 
Was followed.  Now 
uncertain if will be 
followed due to 99% 
ownership to state. 
N/A 
Forced to become member. None. N/A N/A 
Forced to be struck off the 
members’ registry. 
None. N/A N/A 
    
2nd: “Democratic member 
control” 
Not followed. Not followed. Not followed. 
Participation in the elections for 
the Board of Directors. 
Less than 30% of members vote during 
elections. 
30%- 40% of members vote 
during elections. 
7% of members 
vote. 
Members interest to be elected 
on the Board of Directors. 
Two or less candidates for each 
available position. 
1- 2 candidates run for each 
available position (political 
parties set the candidates 
with independent 
candidates fear 
humiliation. 
1,5 times more 
candidates 
than available 
positions. 
Members’ attendance to the 
General Meetings. 
Less than 25% of members with most 
employees claiming <1%. 
Do not attend (free riding). 8% of members 
participate. 
Kirton and Healy (2013) argue 
that Gordon et al.’s (1980) 
definition of union commitment.  
Are members active? 
 Active as clients and that 
they do not attend the 
General Meetings often. 
N/A 
Type of decisions taken during 
the Annual General Meetings as 
opposed to the decisions taken by 
management. 
Approval of financial statements and 
mergers, changes in Articles of 
Incorporation, examine members’ 
complaints, distribution of year’s 
profits, hear members’ suggestions. 
N/A N/A 
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Co-operative principle Interviews’ results Focus Groups’ results CSSDA data 
Criteria for assessing which 
decisions will be discussed and 
taken during the AGM. 
Decisions to bring the credit union in 
line with the law, the Articles of 
Association or the instructions given 
by the Commissioner of CSSDA. 
N/A N/A 
Members’ lack of participation. Members’ lack of interest and lack of 
personal benefit and free riding. 
N/A N/A 
Communication methods. Letters, advertisements and 
announcements, personal contact 
with members, suggestion boxes and 
web sites. 
Letters and circulars but 
ineffective. Personal 
contact with employees and 
Board of Directors. 
N/A 
Better communication methods. Personal contact and dialogue and 
visiting the working places of 
members. 
Personal contact and 
dialogue with evident effort 
on behalf of credit union.  
Also blogs, sms, emails. 
N/A 
Financial Vs. non-financial 
incentives to activate members. 
Financial incentives to members 
(small gifts for participation, 
enhanced services and/or lower costs 
to active members, small amount of 
cash to members for introducing 
potential members, linkage of 
dividends to profitability). 
Meeting with management 
“over a cup of coffee”, 
members’ voice to be 
heard, lower interest rates 
on loans.  Visits in working 
places not preferred by 
members. 
N/A 
    
Co-operative principle Interviews’ results Focus Groups’ results CSSDA data 
3rd: “Member economic 
participation” 
 
Was followed.  Now uncertain if will 
be followed 
Was followed.  Now 
uncertain if will be 
followed. (Members lost 
their trust and are afraid 
due to uncertainty in 
financial sector).  
N/A 
Members will buy shares to assist 
in the recapitalization of their 
credit union. 
Members will not assist. N/A N/A 
Reasons for members not assist in 
recapitalization. 
Loss of trust in credit unions and bad 
financial conditions in general. 
N/A N/A 
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Co-operative principle Interviews Focus Groups’ results CSSDA DATA 
4th: “Autonomy and 
independence” 
Was followed.  Now uncertain if will 
be followed due to 99% ownership 
to state. 
Was followed.  Now 
uncertain if will be 
followed due to 99% 
ownership to state. 
N/A 
Credit unions selling class B’ 
shares to non-members. 
Interviewees were positive. N/A N/A 
Way to regain peoples’ trust. Build on humanistic character of 
credit unions, whole system should 
regain people’s trust and; improve 
way credit unions are managed. 
N/A N/A 
Are credit union employees any 
different from investor-owned 
banks’ employees? 
 Yes.  Not-for-profit nature 
& anthropocentric 
character of credit unions 
N/A 
Difference between credit unions 
and banks. 
Anthropocentric character of credit 
unions. 
Credit unions are much 
more anthropocentric and 
friendly than investor-
owned banks. 
N/A 
Do you believe that the social 
character of the credit unions has 
changed?  
 Changing from 
anthropocentric to that of 
investor-owned banks. 
N/A 
What are the reasons for the 
changes that credit unions are 
going through today? 
 Lack of competent 
supervision and/or 
effective preventive 
measures, light heartiness 
of granting loans.   
N/A 
Selling of 99% of co-ops’ shares to 
the Cyprus government. 
Loan better as loss of independence 
due to sale of 99% of shares is feared. 
N/A N/A 
Selling of class B’ shares to non-
members enables pressure on 
credit unions to pursue profits. 
Fear for loss of credit unions’ 
independence. 
N/A N/A 
Selling of class B’ shares to non-
members enable non-members to 
pressure credit unions to 
demutualize. 
Fear for loss of credit unions’ 
independence. 
N/A N/A 
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Co-operative principle Interviews Focus Groups’ results CSSDA DATA 
Do you trust your credit union 
and how this has changed as a 
result of the financial crisis? 
N/A Members’ trust fell because 
of its interdependence on 
rest of credit unions. 
N/A 
The government will give 
€1,5billion to co-ops in exchange 
for 99% of their shares for five 
years. (a) impacted on ability of 
members to control their co-op?  
N/A The government will be the 
sole owner and will take all 
the decisions 
N/A 
(b) In what way (if any) this has 
influenced the application of the 
co-operative Principles? 
N/A Invalidates 2nd, 3rd and 4th 
and restricts resources for 
5th and 7th. 
N/A 
(c) Do you believe that this had 
any impact on the way credit 
union employees perform their 
duties? 
N/A Employees slower in their 
work. Something bothers 
them and distracts them.  
Due to the uncertainty re 
the future of credit union. 
N/A 
Future of credit unions. Fear shrinkage of credit unions 
and/or transformation into investor-
owned banks. 
“Pitchy black”.  Be 
transformed into or be 
bought by a bank. 
N/A 
High value of non-performing 
loans. 
Fear for loss of credit unions’ 
independence due to financial 
assistance required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lack of effective 
supervision, interpersonal 
relationships easing the 
granting of loans and lack 
of adherence to the rules 
 
N/A 
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Co-operative principle Interviews Focus Groups’ results CSSDA DATA 
    
5th: “Education, training and 
information”. 
Not followed. Not followed. N/A 
Informing the younger 
generations. 
Attract the younger generations by: 
offering products that are suitable for 
their age; through advertisements 
and leaflets, through the younger 
employees and; by visiting their 
working place. 
No effort to attract new 
members.  Should have 
done so. Not possible 
anymore: government 99% 
owner, budget cuts. 
N/A 
Informing and guiding of Cyprus 
government. 
Co-op bodies informed and guided the 
Cyprus government. 
N/A N/A 
Training employees on co-op 
issues. 
Credit unions do not or very seldom 
organize training/seminars for their 
employees. 
N/A N/A 
Usefulness of employee’ training 
on co-op issues. 
Training would be useful. N/A N/A 
Training members on co-op 
issues.  
Credit unions do not organize 
training/seminars for their members. 
 
Credit unions do not 
organize training/seminars 
for their members. 
N/A 
    
6th: “co-operation among co-
ops”. 
Followed. Followed. N/A 
Mergers. Credit unions continue with the 
imposed plan to merge among them 
and mergers perceived as being for 
the better. 
Members do not agree with 
the merger of their own 
credit union (became 
impersonal & lost the upper 
hand). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
N/A 
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Co-operative principle Interviews Focus Groups’ results CSSDA DATA 
7th: “Concern for the 
community” 
Was followed.  Now uncertain if will 
be followed 
Was followed.  Now 
uncertain if will be 
followed as government 
99% owner & budget cuts. 
N/A 
Ways credit unions could assist 
their members weather the 
financial crisis. 
Credit union should adjust demands 
to abilities of members (reduce 
interest rates, charges, extend 
repayment period, restructuring 
loans). 
N/A N/A 
Criteria to decide which branches 
to close down. 
32 responses re financial criteria and 
20 responses re social criteria. 
Social (servicing members), 
financial (cost) & political 
(strongest party in merger). 
N/A 
Employee awareness of co-
operative Principles. 
“Concern for the community”, 
“Democratic member control” and 
“Autonomy and independence” and 
co-operative Value of “Equality”. 
N/A N/A 
Credit unions assist their 
members. 
Provision of financial facilities to 
members’ needs and lower interest 
rates and charges. 
Writing off & restructure 
loans, reduce interest 
rates.  
N/A 
Credit unions could assist their 
members to weather the 
financial crisis. 
Reducing the loan instalments, 
interest rates, charges and extending 
the repayment period of loans. 
 N/A 
Behaviour of co-operators has 
changed as a result of the 
financial crisis 
Yes. Changed, due to economic 
climate, rendering fear and 
uncertainty more evident. 
N/A 
Credit unions comply with the co-
operative Principles. 
Yes. No. N/A 
What could the members do in 
order to ensure that credit unions 
remain focused in meeting the 
demands of their members? 
 Cannot do anything to 
influence their credit 
union. Could only continue 
to be clients and hope that 
things will return to their 
prior-to-the-crisis status. 
N/A 
 
